G.R. No. L-44613. February 28, 1977
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF REMEGIO ROMERO Y ROSANA, REMEGIO ROMERO Y ROSANA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATI…
FERNANDO, J.:
In this application for habeas corpus filed on September 20,
1976, it was categorically affirmed that on December 2, 1975, petitioner, who
was suspected of having committed the crime of robbery, was taken from his
residence by persons who identified themselves as belonging to the Metropolitan
Police Force and has since then been restrained and deprived of his liberty in
the Quezon City Jail.[1]
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and other National
Defense officials[2]
were named respondents in view of the matter having been referred to the
Philippine Constabulary[3]
and that despite the lapse of nine months, he has not as yet been released.[4]
Hence the petition. Thereafter, on September 22, 1976, the Court issued
the following resolution: “The
motion of counsel for petitioner to litigate as pauper for the reasons stated
therein is [granted]. The Court [issued]
the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on Wednesday, September 29,
1976 at 3:00 p.m. and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ
not later than the aforesaid date and time.”[5]
The return was filed on September 29,
1976.
There was qualified admission of the facts as alleged. More specifically, there were special and
affirmative defenses set forth thus:
“1. On November 27, 1975, at
about 8:00 o’clock p.m., two Chinese persons were held up in Del Monte Avenue, Quezon City by four men, one of whom has been identified as
the petitioner herein. On the occasion
of the said robbery, one of the Chinese victims was shot by the petitioner and
thereby suffered serious physical injuries.
* * * On December 2, 1975, members of the Metropolitan Police Force
received confidential information regarding the identity of certain gangs
victimizing taxi passengers, and acting on this, elements of the Metropolitan
Police Force apprehended the petitioner Remegio
Romero, along with three other suspects, who admitted upon interrogation that
they robbed the two taxi passengers earlier mentioned on November 27, 1975 and
that petitioner shot one of the passengers.
* * * These facts are also reflected in the resolution or preliminary
investigation report of Major Ernesto A. Punsalang,
Judge Advocate General Services, Preliminary Investigation Officer,
Headquarters, P.C. Metropolitan Command Officer, * * *. 2.
Under General Order No. 2-A, par. 4, the Secretary of National Defense
is specifically ordered to ‘forthwith arrest or cause the arrest and take into
custody’ * * * persons as may have committed the crimes of kidnapping, robbery,
carnapping, smuggling, gun running, trafficking, and
prohibited drugs and hijacking.’ The petitioner has been arrested and detained
pursuant hereto, and properly investigated by the Judge Advocate General
Services. A prima facie
case for robbery in band, with serious physical injuries, and illegal
possession of firearms have been found.
Such crimes are specifically triable by the
military tribunals as provided by General Order No. 12 (8) for ‘violations of
the law on Firearms and Explosives found in the Revised Administrative Code and
other existing law’ and General Order No. 54, * * *. Consequently, petitioner’s arrest and
detention are lawful. Petitioner’s
contention that no formal information or complaint had been filed before any
competent court or body is without any factual basis. A charge sheet against the accused, the
petitioner herein, has already been filed by the PC Judge Advocate General
Service Office and this is presently undergoing evaluation pursuant to Rule No.
4 of the Rules in Presidential Decree No. 39.
Petitioner’s detention by Jail Warden of Quezon
City is pursuant to the Defense Department Order No. 720 authorizing
provincial, city and municipal wardens to accept the custody and detention of
persons which are arrested within their jurisdiction and in conformity with
Presidential Decree No. 421 (21 March 1974) integrating the metropolitan police
and jails under the PC Metrocom.”[6]
The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition “for lack of merit.”[7]
The matter was forthwith heard on September 29, 1976.
Counsel for petitioner, Attorney Aventino B. Claveria, was unable to dispute the facts alleged and to
minimize the force of the applicable law invoked by respondents. He was however, in a resolution of this Court
of said date, given a period of fifteen days within which to submit a reply to
the return and, if he could do so, to submit additional arguments on behalf of
petitioner. Up to now no such reply has
been forthcoming. It is quite apparent
then that the jurisdictional question posed could not be refuted by
petitioner. Hence the plea for dismissal
must be granted.
1. A recent decision, Go
v. General Olivas,[8]
likewise a habeas corpus application, is controlling. The crime imputed to the person detained, Jovito M. Go, is that of kidnapping, likewise included
among the offenses triable by military
tribunals. After noting that in Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2[9]
it was held that there is no constitutional objection to civilians falling
within the competence of such bodies for certain crimes set forth in the
presidential decrees invoked by respondent national defense officials, it was
pointed out that a release on habeas corpus could still be ordered by this Court
if it could be shown that a military tribunal either lacked jurisdiction or had
subsequently lost it. Reference was made
to the leading case of Payomo v. Floyd,[10]
a 1922 decision. The opinion likewise
cited Chief Justice Moran who, in Cabiling v. Prison
Officer,[11]
the first decision from this Tribunal after Liberation in 1945, expressly
affirmed the doctrine that the only question before the judiciary is whether or
not the court martial was vested with jurisdiction to try the petitioner for
the offense in question. In view of the
above, there being no showing of loss of jurisdiction by the military
authorities, this petition, to repeat, cannot succeed.
2. It bears repeating,
though, that a detained person before a military tribunal is specifically entitled
to all the rights of an accused. So
Justice Antonio, speaking for the Court in Aquino v.
Military Commission, expressly stated:
“It is important to note here that an accused being tried before a
military tribunal enjoys the specific constitutional safeguards pertaining to
criminal trials. Thus, he is entitled to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf, and to be exempt from being a witness against himself. As in trial before civil courts, the
presumption of innocence can only be overcome by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. These
tribunals, in general, are ‘bound to observe the fundamental rules of law and
principles of justice observed and expounded by the civil judicature.’ * * *
There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner’s contention that such
military tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused
and that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of
petitioner’s constitutional rights.”[12]
More specifically, the military authorities should see to it that he be granted
as required by the fundamental law a speedy and public trial.[13]
That way, there would be less occasion for petitions of this character. What is more, it would make manifest that
there is proper observance of what is ordained by the Constitution.
3. The failure of
Attorney Claveria to submit the reply cannot go
unnoticed. The resolution required him
to do so. As a member of the bar, his
duty is clear. That was to obey. Were it not for the fact that he did lend his
service to the cause of liberty and thus in a way help to assure that
constitutional mandates are not ignored, a much more severe penalty for this
blatant disregard of a task imposed on a practitioner is indicated. Under the circumstances, however, with the
additional consideration that at the hearing of this petition his relative
inexperience was quite manifest, it suffices that he be admonished.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. A copy of this decision should likewise be
spread on the record of Attorney Aventino B. Claveria.
Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
[1]
Petition, par. 2.
[2]
The other officials named respondents are Maj. Gen. Fidel Ramos, Chief,
Philippine Constabulary; Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas,
Commanding Officer, Metropolitan Command, Philippine Constabulary; and Maj.
Ernesto Punzalang, Investigator of PCM PI-No. 68.
[3]
Petition, pars. 3-5.
[4] Ibid,
par. 6.
[5]
Resolution dated September 22, 1976.
[6]
Special and Affirmative Defenses, Return to the Writ and Answer to Petition, 3-7.
[7] Ibid,
7.
[8]
L-44989, November 29, 1976.
[9]
L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63
SCRA 546.
[10]
42 Phil. 788.
[11]
75 Phil. 1.
[12]
63 SCRA 546, 593-594.
[13]
Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution, insofar as pertinent, reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.”
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CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur in the result, it being clear there is legal cause for
petitioner’s apprehension and detention, he being properly charged with robbery
in band, with serious physical injuries, and illegal possession of firearms.
However, I consider it unnecessary in this case to enter into any
disquisition of the supposed rights of a civilian accused before a Military
Commission established under martial law, much less to make any categorical
holding that “a detained person before a military tribunal is specifically
entitled to all the rights of an accused.” Actually, there are other more
important cases pending in this Court in which such a delicate proposition of
law may be properly and fully discussed and resolved. With all due respect to the able and
distinguished writer of the main opinion, the reference made by him therein to
the rights aforementioned is necessarily obiter dictum. In fact, even the portions of Aquino vs.
Military Commission quoted may not be taken as necessarily based on any
constitutional guarantee, since the rights enumerated by Mr. Justice Antonio in
his opinion, are no more than those recognized by Presidential Decree No. 39,
which are not necessarily comprehensive of nor identical with all the rights of
an accused ordained by Sections 16 to 22 of the Bill of Rights nor those
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court. I cannot venture to guess what Mr. Justice
Antonio would have held, if nothing were mentioned about them in said decree. Besides, I am not aware that what would
otherwise be the usual constitutional rights of Senator Aquino, other than
those enumerated in the decree, have all been recognized and fully enforced,
precisely, it may be assumed, on account of the constraints of martial
law. How far such constraints can
supersede constitutional rights of civilians charged with civilian offenses not
indispensably related to the martial law objectives of the Government is the
grave question the Court has yet to answer definitely in the other unresolved
cases before it. I feel I have to
caution all concerned that it would not be altogether judicious to consider the
decision in this case as already doctrinally authoritative beyond where it is strictly
borne by its factual milieu.