HON. JOAQUIN F. ENRIQUEZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ABDULWAHID BIDIN, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA CITY;…

Enriquez versus Bidin

The Case

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition brought before the Supreme Court by the City Mayor of Zamboanga City against a judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. The mayor asks the Court to set aside the trial court's order granting a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction that restrained him from demolishing the night market stores of certain beer and carinderia operators and, more importantly, required him to issue or renew their business permits. The case matters because it draws the line between a mayor's discretionary licensing power and the writ of mandamus, and because it reminds us that the public welfare prevails over private interests built on mere provisional permits.

Procedural History

The operators of the night market stores at the East Reclaimed Area filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City on July 6, 1968, to compel the mayor to issue or renew their business permits. After a summary hearing on their motion for preliminary writs, the trial court issued its order of July 22, 1968 granting a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The mayor filed a manifestation questioning the court's authority to order him to issue the permits, but the trial court treated this as an admission of the propriety of the injunction. The trial court denied reconsideration on October 3, 1968.

The mayor then filed this original action for certiorari and prohibition on October 8, 1968. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction on November 28, 1968, restraining enforcement of the trial court's order. After hearing on the merits, the Court resolved the case.

Facts

The private respondents had been licensed to operate beer and carinderia establishments, known as night market stores, at the East Reclaimed Area, a government property administered by the Bureau of Lands, for the past ten years under previous city administrations. When the petitioner assumed office as the new city mayor, he issued their permits for the first quarter of 1968 and circulated a letter allowing them to continue operating until December 31, 1968, subject to conditions, among which was the removal of sleeping quarters and other unauthorized additions to the buildings.

The operators failed to comply with these conditions, and their stores had been the scene of brawls, fights, and serious crimes. On April 17, 1968, the mayor wrote them revoking their permits and rejected their requests for renewal. The operators then sued for mandamus to compel the renewal of their permits.

During the proceedings, the mayor presented evidence that the licenses were provisional and revocable, that the operators had bound themselves to vacate the land when the government needed it, and that they had violated the Sanitary Code and Building Ordinance. The operators, for their part, showed that they had been licensed for over ten years and had introduced considerable improvements in reliance on the permits. The trial court granted the injunction, finding their business had acquired a certain degree of stability and character of permanence. The mayor brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the mayor to issue or renew the business permits of the respondents.
• Whether or not the mayor's refusal to issue or renew the business permits was a valid exercise of his authority under the city charter, and thus not correctible by mandamus.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, paragraph k, of the Zamboanga City charter, Commonwealth Act Numbered 39, as amended, provides:

To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke same, in conformity with the provisions of law or ordinance, for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such license or in the premises which the business for which the same have been granted is carried, or for any other good reason of general interest.

This provision is the source of the mayor's discretionary power to grant, refuse, and revoke permits, and it is the basis for holding that his action is not a mere ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court's order of July 22, 1968 was null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court against that order was made permanent. The Court found that the mayor's action of closing the stores and refusing to renew the permits was based on compelling considerations of the public welfare which must prevail over the private interests of the respondents, and that such action was in the valid exercise of his authority under the city charter.

On the second issue, the Court held that the mayor's authority and discretion to issue or refuse the business permits, while not absolute, is not subject to a writ of mandamus in the absence of a showing of gross abuse or misuse of power. The Court quoted the rule governing mandamus:

The granting of writs of prohibition and mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to be exercised on equitable principles and said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear.

It further restated the requirement:

It is essential, therefore, for a writ of mandamus to issue, that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and specific.

The respondents failed this test. They could assert no right to the permits that was well defined, clear, and certain, nor claim a clear and specific duty on the mayor's part to issue them as a ministerial act. The Court also noted that the national government had rejected all revocable permit applications for the area and had set it aside for specific public purposes: a port area, a customs zone, and a post office building.

Doctrine

A city mayor's power to grant, refuse, and revoke municipal licenses and permits under the city charter is discretionary, not ministerial. It is not subject to a writ of mandamus in the absence of a showing of gross abuse or misuse of power. For mandamus to issue, the petitioner must have a legal right to the thing demanded that is well defined, clear, and certain, and the respondent must have a clear and specific duty to perform the act required. Where the mayor's action rests on compelling considerations of public welfare, those considerations prevail over the private interests of permit holders, especially where the permits are provisional and revocable and the land has been set aside by the national government for public purposes.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was granted, the trial court's order of July 22, 1968 was set aside and declared null and void, and the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was made permanent. The Court also admonished Atty. Rolando E. de Leon for his rash statements, with a warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: a mayor's discretionary licensing power is not compellable by mandamus absent a showing of gross abuse or misuse of power, and the public welfare prevails over private interests. Examiners like to use this case to test the requisites of mandamus and the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties in local government licensing.