RAMON LANZAR, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND CITY OF ILOILO, RESPONDENTS.

Lanzar versus Director of Lands

The Case

This is Ramon Lanzar against the Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo. Lanzar asked the courts to register in his name a parcel of land in the District of Molo, Iloilo City, which he claims to own in fee simple. The Director of Lands and the City opposed the application, insisting that the land is foreshore land forming part of the public domain and is needed by the City as a road right of way for the Molo-Arevalo Boulevard. The case matters because it settles, with remarkable consistency across decades, that land added to the shores by the action of the sea belongs to the public domain and cannot be acquired by private persons through long possession, however open and uninterrupted that possession may have been.

Procedural History

In May 1960, Lanzar filed his application for registration of title in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed their opposition in August 1961. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision in March 1963 in favor of Lanzar, holding that he and his predecessors-in-interest had possessed the property publicly, continuously, and adversely for more than thirty years, and that no proof had been adduced that the land was necessary for public utility or for the establishment of special industries. The Director of Lands and the City appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on March 24, 1970 reversed the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the land, being an accretion formed by the action of the sea, is property of the public domain and not susceptible of private appropriation. Lanzar then filed a petition for certiorari to review that decision before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The material facts are not disputed. The land applied for is an accretion to Lot Number 1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, formed by the gradual action of the sea before 1922. During the cadastral survey of 1911 to 1912, the lot did not yet exist, so the accretion must have developed from 1912 to 1922 and thereafter. It is now separated from the sea by the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard.

Ignacio Arroyo, the registered owner of Lot 1899, leased the property in 1922 to Maximo Tonogbanua, who possessed the whole of Lot 1899 and its accretion. In 1927, Arroyo donated Lot 1899, together with its accretion, to the Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo, which in turn leased the property to Lanzar. The lessee planted coconuts and bananas, and a portion was devoted to palay. A verification by the Bureau of Lands disclosed that the land applied for lies outside Lot 1899, being an accretion formed by the action of the sea.

On August 13, 1959, the Beaterio and Lanzar entered into an agreement under which the Beaterio assigned to Lanzar all its rights to the accretion. The Beaterio had possessed Lot 1899 and its accretion through its lessee openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, and adversely to all claimants and under claim of ownership. It had declared Lot 1899 for taxation, and Lanzar caused the tax declaration to be transferred to his name in May 1960.

Issues

• Whether or not land formed by the action of the sea as an accretion to the shores is property of the public domain.
• Whether or not only the executive or the legislature, and not the courts, may declare such land no longer intended for public use so that it may belong to the adjacent owner.
• Whether or not the applicant acquired the land through acquisitive prescription by reason of adverse possession for more than thirty years.

Applicable Provisions

Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides:

Article 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.

This is the central provision: it places accretions to the shores in the public domain and makes any transfer to the adjacent owner dependent on a government declaration.

Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Article 339. The following are property of public domain: 1. Those things intended for public use, as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads and others of a like nature.

The Court uses it to show that the Civil Code confirms rather than contradicts the Law of Waters.

Article 341 of the same Code provides:

Article 341. Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the requirements of the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State property.

This confirms that land leaves the public domain only by a subsequent act of the State, not by private possession.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err. Lands formed by the action of the sea belong to the public domain. The Court relied on its consistent jurisprudence, beginning with Ker and Company versus Cauden, which taught that the first part of Article 4 is an express declaration that such land is public property, and that the later provisions merely provide that when the State no longer needs the land, the State shall grant it to the adjoining owners. No such grant was shown here. The Court also cited Insular Government versus Aldecoa and Company, which held that shores and lands reclaimed from the sea, while devoted to public uses and without any grant to private persons, remain part of the public domain and are not susceptible of prescription, being outside the commerce of men.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the courts may themselves determine that the land is no longer intended for public use. Under Article 4, it is the Government that shall declare the land to be the property of the adjacent owners. The Court likewise rejected the charge that Aldecoa amounted to judicial legislation, holding that Articles 339 and 340 of the Spanish Civil Code are not repugnant to Article 4 of the Law of Waters, and that the Civil Code confirms it.

On the third issue, the Court held that Lanzar could not acquire the land by prescription. Possession by a private person without previous permission or authorization from the Government, even with intent to own, is illegal possession and amounts to a mere detainer of land that belongs to the public domain. The Court also found that the land is needed by the City of Iloilo for the expansion of the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard.

Doctrine

Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. They are not susceptible of private appropriation or of acquisition by prescription, because they are outside the commerce of men. Only when such lands are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for public utility, for special industries, or for the coastguard service may they pass to the owners of the adjacent estates, and even then only when the Government declares them to be the property of those owners. Neither the courts nor long adverse possession can supply that declaration.

Disposition

The petition for review was dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: accretion to the shores by the action of the sea is public domain, not prescriptible, and passes to the adjacent owner only by government declaration. Examiners use this case to test the limits of acquisitive prescription and the power to classify public domain land.