PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JEREMIAS DY Y RACE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
SADANG, J.:
Antecedents of the Appeal
On May 30, 2000, accused-appellant Jeremias Dy y Race (hereafter, appellant) was charged, together with Rudy Vargas, with murder. The Information[2] reads:
That on or about January 16, 2000 at 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon thereof, at Sitio Samoyao, Brgy. Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring together and mutually helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot [sic] one Eliminio Rase y Barbalino with a homemade gun locally known as “Riot”, hitting the latter on the chest which caused his immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was initially archived in February 2001 for failure of the authorities to arrest appellant and Vargas but was revived after over five years with the arrest of appellant. On October 4, 2005, appellant entered a not guilty plea upon his arraignment with the assistance of a counsel de parte.[3] Vargas remains at large.[4]
After the pre-trial[5] on January 24, 2006, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, viz: Cornelia Rase (Cornelia), widow of the victim Eliminio, Gabriel Rase (Gabriel) and Jonathan Rase (Jonathan), sons of Cornelia and Elimino, then 11 and 9 years old, respectively; Ruben Rase (Ruben), Eliminio’s brother; and Dr. Marilou Hernandez, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The defense presented two witnesses: appellant and PO1 Gil Llenares.
Version of the Prosecution
Just as the sun was setting at around 6 PM of January 16, 2000, Eliminio Race was grating coconut on the porch of his house in Sitio Samoyao, Barangay Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. Gathered around him were his five children, Gabriel, Jonathan, Mary Ann, Agustin, and Junior. His wife Cornelia was in the kitchen, some ten meters away, washing and preparing gabi to be cooked with coconut for the family supper. Suddenly, appellant, Eliminio’s nephew[6] who has been known to Jonathan and Gabriel as “Manoy Bong” from their early childhood, appeared, armed with a homemade gun locally known as riot. Gabriel and Jonathan easily recognized appellant by the light of the setting sun and the gas lamp in the porch. From a distance of less than two meters, appellant shot Eliminio, hitting him on the right chest. Gabriel was only one and a half meters away from Eliminio while Jonathan was right in front of him. After shooting Eliminio, appellant casually walked away and headed towards Ruben’s house. Eliminio fell and laid prostrate on the ground, he died instantaneously. Cornelia, who heard the gunshot, ran towards the porch and she saw the lifeless body of Eliminio. Gabriel and Jonathan embraced Eliminio and cried, telling Cornelia that “Manoy Bong” shot their father. The two boys pleaded that they flee the place because appellant had told them that he will get more bullets and return for them.[7]
Ruben, who was in his house near the fishpond some two hundred meters away, also heard the gunshot. About five minutes later, he sighted appellant walking towards his house. Appellant pounded his gun on the wall of the house and summoned Ruben to come out. At that moment, Gabriel heard shouts coming from Ruben’s house. Ruben, fearing for his life and the lives of his wife and daughter who were with him, stayed inside the house and kept quiet so as not to cause any commotion. In a short while, appellant left and headed to the fishpond dike. About ten minutes later, certain that appellant was no longer in the vicinity, Ruben and his family fled their home and sought refuge in the house of his nephew in Sitio Buri, Barangay Puro, in fear that appellant would return to kill them.[8]
Meanwhile, Cornelia and her children hastened to the house of Eliminio’s mother, Ida Rase, which was not far away. Cornelia told Ida that Eliminio had been shot by appellant. She left her children with Ida and went to the Aroroy, Masbate Police Station. She reported the shooting of Eliminio and told the police that her children identified appellant as the assailant. Upon Cornelia’s request, the policemen went to the house and they saw Eliminio’s body still sprawled on the ground. The policemen laid Eliminio’s body on a wooden table and conducted an investigation. Cornelia, Gabriel and Jonathan narrated the circumstances of Eliminio’s death and identified appellant as the perpetrator.[9] Eliminio’s remains were then brought to the house of his brother Patricio Rase in Barangay Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. The next day, January 17, 2000, Ruben went to Patricio’s house. Eliminio’s children told Ruben that appellant shot their father.[10]
Dr. Marilou Hernandez conducted a post-mortem examination which showed that Eliminio sustained a single gunshot wound on his right clavicular area, one (1) inch in width, two (2) inches in length, and eight (8) inches in depth, with gunpowder burns. Dr. Hernandez concluded that the gunpowder burns indicate the probability of short range firing. She assessed the gunshot wound to be fatal as it most likely hit the heart. She stated that no slugs were recovered because there was no exit wound, however, the gunshot wound alone could bring about a person’s death.[11]
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied complicity in the crime and proffered an alibi. He alleged[12] that at 6 PM of January 16, 2000, he was in his parents-in-law’s house in Barangay Cabangkalan, Aroroy, Masbate, where he was farming the rice field of his father-in-law Jeneroso Dalinog. Claiming that he has been residing in Barangay Cabangkalan since 1999, appellant stated[13] that the last time he saw his uncle Eliminio was in 1997 when he went to his mother’s plantation in Sitio Samoyao, where Eliminio lived. He averred[14] that from Barangay Cabangkalan to Barangay Panique it would take about an hour’s drive by truck and from Barangay Panique to Sitio Samoyao, thirty minutes on foot. He claimed to have a good relationship with Eliminio and stated that the person against whom Eliminio harbored a personal grudge was one Iling Onelan, the present husband of Cornelia.[15] He also claimed having a good relationship with Gabriel and his other uncle Ruben and asserted that he does not know of any reason for his indictment.[16]
PO1 Gil Llenares, an investigator of the Aroroy Police Station who was not yet in the police force on January 16, 2000, testified that the incident relating to the death of Eliminio was entered in the police blotter as Entry No. 11942 on the basis of a report of one Marissa Rase, sister-in-law of Eliminio, that the latter was shot to death by appellant and Rudy Vargas.[17]
On July 12, 2010, the RTC promulgated[18] the June 2, 2010 Decision[19] convicting appellant of murder. The fallo reads:[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding JEREMIAS DY y RASE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He shall serve his sentence at the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. In his service thereof he shall be credited with such period that he had undergone preventive imprisonment while this case is pending pursuant to Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.
On his civil liability, Jeremias Dy is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Eliminio Rase the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Rejecting appellant’s defense of denial and alibi for lack of proof of the physical impossibility of his presence in the crime scene, the RTC accorded[21] full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gabriel and Jonathan. The RTC ruled that said testimonies are eyewitness accounts, categorical, consistent, and untainted by any ill-motive to falsely accused-appellant, and they were corroborated by the physical evidence. The RTC ruled out the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because the prosecution’s evidence is silent as to the time that appellant determined to commit the crime thus making it impossible to ascertain whether he had the opportunity, thru sufficient lapse of time, to reflect on the consequences of his act.[22] However, the RTC appreciated treachery.
Seeking reversal of his conviction, appellant interposed this appeal raising this assignment of errors:[23]
- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and
- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OF HIS DEFENCE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI.
Appellant ascribes[24] error to the RTC’s giving of full credence to the testimonies of Cornelia, Gabriel and Ruben on the contention that said testimonies are contradictory and inconsistent. He adverts to Cornelia’s declarations in her affidavit[25] and during the preliminary investigation[26] that it was only Rudy Vargas whom she saw aiming the gun at Eliminio and argues that said declarations contradicted her testimony in court that she did not witness the actual shooting. He asserts that such incoherence rendered doubtful Cornelia’s credibility.
Appellant also alludes to the incompatibility of the testimonies of Gabriel and Ruben. He claims that Gabriel testified that after shooting Eliminio appellant headed to Ruben’s house and Gabriel heard screams therefrom; however, Ruben declared that when appellant reached his house he summoned him to come out but he stayed inside the house and kept quiet.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters[27] that although Cornelia’s testimony is not an eyewitness account, nonetheless, the commission of the crime and the identity of its perpetrator were proved by the eyewitness accounts of Gabriel and Jonathan. The OSG stresses that Gabriel and Jonathan’s testimonies were borne out of personal knowledge given their presence and proximity to Eliminio and appellant at the time of the shooting. The OSG argues that the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential and irrelevant and do not detract from appellant’s culpability. The OSG insists that the testimonies of Gabriel and Jonathan positively identifying appellant as the shooter are corroborated by the physical evidence and untainted by any material inconsistency, hence, they are entitled to great weight and must be sustained.
Finally, the OSG prays for the modification of the civil indemnity and for the award of moral and exemplary damages in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
RULING
Appellant essentially challenges the credibility of prosecution witnesses Cornelia, Gabriel and Jonathan. It has been held time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of the witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its singular and unequaled opportunity of direct observation of the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Hence, where the issue raised involves the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to decide the question and its findings thereon are not to be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the case. The reviewing court is enjoined to observe restraint in interfering with the trial court’s assessment of credibility absent any indication or showing of underminding facts of relevance or of grave abuse of discretion.[28] Jurisprudence further instructs that where there is no evidence that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motive to fabricate charges or falsely testify against the accused, the presumption is that that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[29] Here, appellant never imputed improper motives against the prosecution witnesses.
Although there is an apparent variance between Cornelia’s affidavit and her testimony in open court, such does not necessarily affect her credibility. It is a well-entrenched rule that the variance between the witnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect their credibility for it is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated, incomplete, and inaccurate resulting in their seeming contradiction with the declarants’ testimony in court. Hence, disrepancies between the affiant’s statements in his affidavit and those he made on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him; for as between the affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because ex-parte affidavits are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in court.[30] At any rate, Cornelia clarified in open court that she never mentioned the name Rudy Vargas when she executed her affidavit and she never saw Rudy Vargas on the night in question.[31] She admitted that she did not see the actual shooting and stated that it was her children who did.
A reading of the assailed decision shows that the conviction of appellant was based on the eye-witness accounts of the victim’s sons. Gabriel and Jonathan narrated in a simple, direct and forthright manner what they saw on that fateful evening. They witnessed how their father was gunned down in cold blood in their presence. They knew appellant because he is their cousin and they positively identified him as their father’s killer. It has been held that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erases any doubt that the witness could have erred, and that a witness related to the victim has a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the
attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, have the highest interest in seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.[32] Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the record to show that Gabriel and Jonathan could have been ill-motivated in accusing appellant of the serious offense of murder. The RTC did not err in giving full faith and credence to their testimonies.
Considering that Gabriel and Jonathan had positively identified appellant as the assailant, his defenses of denial and alibi must fall. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of a witness. To surmount the positive and affirmative testimony of the prosecution witness, denial must be proved by strong evidence of non-culpability, otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without weight in law. Alibi, on the other hand, is an inherently weak defense and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses on affirmative matters. An alibi, being easily fabricated, is to be viewed with suspicion and received with caution. For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus crimis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.[33]
Appellant’s assertion that he was in the house of his parents-in-law in Barangay Cabangkalan is bare and uncorroborated. It must be underscored that physical impossibility takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accused maintains where he was, more important is the accessibility between these two points.[34] Moreover, the evidence upon which the alibi rests must be so airtight that it admits no exception.
Where there is the least possibility of accused’ presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.[35] In this case, appellant did not even attempt to prove his alibi by strong and competent evidence.
Appellant’s flight and eluding arrest for five years should not be ignored. His flight is at odds with his assertion of innocence. It evinces consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. An innocent person will not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him.[36]
The alleged inconsistency between Gabriel’s and Ruben’s accounts of the events that transpired after the shooting is more apparent than real. Gabriel’s testimony that he heard screams from the house of Ruben does not necessarily contradict Ruben’s testimony that he kept quiet. Ruben also testified that appellant was calling out to him, daring him to come out of the house. It is therefore possible that the screaming or commotion heard by Gabriel originated from appellant himself, not Ruben. In any case, even if there is such inconsistency, it concerns a minor detail that transpired after the crime. It is inconsequential because it neither proves nor disproves an element of the crime.
Discrepancies on minor and collateral details not central to the fact of the crime do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses’ declarations as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[37] Immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on a very material and significant point bearing on the very act of the accused.[38] Thus, appellant cannot plausibly bank on these trivial inconsistencies for even if they do exist, said inconsistencies tend to strengthen rather that weaken credibility as they indicate the absence of contrivance, fabrication, or rehearsal. Again, trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witnesses rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.[39]
The absence of motive does not extricate appellant from culpability. Motive is a state of mind which cannot be easily discerned. It is not an element of the crime of murder and as such, need not be proved. Lack of proof of motive does not preclude conviction. Long-settled is the precept that the prosecution has no burden of proving the motive of the accused when he has been identified as the author of the crime. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, and that neither friendship nor even relationship is a deterrent to the commission of a crime. Accordingly, even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict where there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who was the perpetrator of the crime.[40] Where there is direct and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to establish the motive of the accused is of no moment.[41]
We sustain the finding of the RTC that the killing was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution which tend to directly and specially insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[42]
The evidence shows that Eliminio, while preoccupied with the grating of coconut, was shot by appellant without any warning and for no reason. Eliminio was totally unaware of the impending attack on his person. He was unarmed and in no position to defend himself or flee from his assailant. The mode of attack shows that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted it in order to make sure that Eliminio has no chance to defend himself or to flee. As correctly ruled by the RTC:[43]
In this case, the victim was undoubtedly taken by surprise when the accused approached and, without words, shot him. He was unaware of any harm that would come to him while he was grating coconut. The suddenness of the attack left him defenseless and completely deprived of any opportunity to retaliate. That this manner of attack was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused was clearly shown by him unexpectedly arriving at the house of the victim already armed with a gun and, without warning, shot the victim on a vital part of his body. Indeed, by this manner, he made sure that the victim could not fight back.
The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant is correct, hence, is upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.[44]
Finally, we agree with the OSG that moral and exemplary damages must be awarded. When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[45]
Thus, pursuant to recent jurisprudence, the heirs of Eliminio are entitled to an award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime.[46] The award of P50,000.00 granted by the RTC as civil indemnity must therefore be increased to P75,000.00. Moreover, moral damages of P50,000.00 must be awarded notwithstanding the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the Eliminio’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 is also awarded in adherence to prevailing jurisprudence which allows said award when the crime was attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying, such as treachery, or ordinary. In addition, while actual damages cannot be awarded since there was no evidence of actual expenses incurred for the death of Eliminio, the sum of P25,000.00 is awarded by way of temperate damages as it cannot be denied that his heirs suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. Temperate damages is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification. Interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid should also be awarded to the heirs of Eliminio.[47]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 44, dated June 2, 2010, in Criminal Case No. 9627, finding accused-appellant Jeremias Dy y Race guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, viz: 1) the award of civil indemnity ex-delicto of P50,000.00 is increased to P75,000.00; 2) accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Eliminio Race moral damages of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, and temperate damages of P25,000.00; and, 3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay interest on the awards of damages at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Dimaampao, J., Chairperson, and Diamante, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, pp. 118-121. Per Judge Pazlinda A. Villamor-Sanchez.
[2] Id. at 1.
[3] Id. at 26, 30.
[4] Id. at 118.
[5] Id. at 34-38.
[6] Accused is the son of Eliminio’s and Ruben’s older sister, Belinda Rase. See TSN, October 16, 2006, pp. 2,6; TSN, February 6, 2007, pp.4-5; TSN, July 23, 2007, pp. 2-3; TSN, September 20, 2007, pp. 3-4; TSN, July 13, 2009, p. 3.
[7] TSN, October 16, 2006, pp. 3-7; TSN, February 26, 2007, pp. 2-5, 9-11; TSN, May 8, 2007, pp.3-6; TSN, July 23, 2007, pp. 3-4;TSN, September 20, 2007, pp.3-12.
[8] TSN, February 26, 2007, pp.5-7; TSN, July 23, 2007, pp. 4-6, 11-13.
[9] TSN, October 16, 2006, pp. 6-9.
[10] TSN, July 23, 2007, pp. 6-7;15-16.
[11] TSN, March 20, 2006, pp. 2-4, 6,8.
[12] TSN, July 13, 2009, pp. 3-5, 8-9.
[13] Id. at 4-5.
[14] Id. at 4,8.
[15] Id. at 5,9.
[16] Id. at 9.
[17] TSN, September 22, 2008, pp. 2-3, 5.
[18] Records, pp. 114-117.
[19] Supra, note 1.
[20] Records, p. 121.
[21] Id. at 119-120.
[22] Id. at 120.
[23] Rollo, p. 35.
[24] Id. at 36-42.
[25] Records, p.6.
[26] Id. at 11-13.
[27] Rollo, pp. 61-74.
[28] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014; People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010, citing People v. Bantiling, G.R. No. 136017, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 47 and People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 20; People of the Philippines v. Chris Corpuz y Basbas, G.R. No. 191068, July 17, 2013.
[29] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, supra; People of the Philippines v. Joemarie Jalbonian alias “Budo”, G.R. No. 180281, July 1, 2013.
[30] Leticia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013, citing People v. Perreras, 414 Phil. 480, 488 (2001), People v. Quiming, G.R. No. 92847, May 21, 1993, 222 SCRA 371, 376, and People v. Dumpe, G.R. Nos. 80110-11, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 547, 552. See also People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, supra.
[31] TSN, October 16, 2006, pp. 8, 11, 14.
[32] People of the Philippines v. Gilberto Villarico, Sr. @“Berting”, Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, and Ricky Villarico, G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, citing Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163271, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 301.
[33] People of the Philippines v. Chris Corpuz y Basbas, supra., citing People of the Philippines v. Carlito Mateo y Patawid, G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 375, 390; People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, supra; Rodolfo C. Velasco v. People of the Philippines, supra.
[34] People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, supra., citing People v. Mamarion, G.R. No. 137554, October 1, 2003; 412 SCRA 47.
[35] Rodolfo C. Velasco v. People of the Philippines, supra., citing People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 318, 339.
[36] People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, supra., citing People v. Deduyo, G.R. No. 138456, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 146, 162; People of the Philippines v. Chris Corpuz y Basbas, supra., citing People v. Deunida, G.R. No. 105199-200, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 520, 534; People of the Philippines v. Joemarie Jalbonian alias “Budo”, G.R. No. 180281, July 1, 2013, citing People v. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 461, 476.
[37] People of the Philippines v. Chris Corpuz y Basbas, supra.
[38] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, supra.
[39] People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y Ursal, supra., citing People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507, 517.
[40] Leticia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, supra., citing, People v. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994, 229 SCRA 581, 587 and People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923, 929 (1996); Rodolfo C. Velasco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, citing People v. Rollon, G.R. No. 131915, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 295, 314, People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 88 (2003), and People v. Bermas, 396 Phil. 191, 231 (1999).
[41] Leticia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, supra.
[42] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, supra., citing People v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 548 548, 555 and People v. Hatsero, G.R. No. 192179, July 3, 2013; Rodolfo C. Velasco v. People of the Philippines, supra.
[43] Id.
[44] Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. – x x x.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x x x x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
[45] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, supra., citing People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646, 657.
[46] People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Maglosi, supra.
[47] Id., citing People v. Roman, G.R. No. 198110, July 31, 2013, People v. Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013; People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013; and Avelino v. People, G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013; People of the Philippines v. Joemarie Jalbonian alias “Budo”, supra.; People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.