G.R. No. L-44063. November 29, 1983
VICTORIANO F. CORALES, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF LANDS), RESPONDENTS.
MAKASIAR J.:
Before Us for another resolution is the
manifestation and motion filed by
respondent Government Service Insurance System on April 14, 1982 in
the cases of Corales, Villones, Cañeja and Barga. In the
latter compensation cases of Duran, Calvero, Delegente and Ceniza, motions to
amend decision, for reconsideration, and for reconsideration/clarification
have, in the meantime, been filed either by petitioner or respondent which,
off-hand, involve the same matters presented to Us in
the first four cases (p. 314, L-44063 rec.).
Thus, in Duran, respondent Employees’
Compensation Commission filed an urgent motion to amend decision on April 29, 1982 and respondent GSIS filed on May 7,
1982 its motion for
reconsideration. In Calvero,
respondent ECC filed a motion for reconsideration on November
11, 1982. In Delegente,
respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration/clarification on December
14, 1982. In Ceniza,
respondent GSIS filed its joint reply on May 23, 1983.
Since it appears that the
problem now presented before Us for consideration does not deviate from the
issue We have extensively discussed in Our resolution of March 15, 1982, We
have to restate certain portions of the said resolution which can very
well serve as a backgrounder or refresher for a final clarification and
resolution of the problem of implementing the decreed compensation awards.
The pertinent portions
are quoted thus:
“The main issue common to all these cases revolves on the
entity liable to pay the compensation claims of petitioners for ailments
initially suffered before the effectivity of the New
Labor Code — whether the Government Service Insurance System or the government
offices and agencies which are the
employers of petitioners — which were filed with the Government Service
Insurance System under the provisions of the New Labor Code, adversely decided by the System and affirmed by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, but on appeal to this Court, were favorably considered;
because We applied the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the old
workmen’s compensation law (Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended), instead of the provisions of the
New Labor Code on employees’
compensation which have been criticized as retrogressive. The social justice impact of the new compensation
law as compared to the prior compensation law has been deeply noted and
lamented in a resolution of this Court, through the Second Division, in the
case of Ibañez vs. ECC, et al., L-47008, March 8,
1978, before Corales, thus: ‘Upon consideration of the allegations of the
petitioner and the comments thereon of respondent Employees’
Compensation Commission, and the Government Service Insurance System, the Court
resolved to DENY the petition, noting that since the current Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 626,
has indeed reduced the broad instances of compensability under the former
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Court is powerless to apply the doctrines laid
down under said Act to petitioner’s case, even as it feels that perhaps a
legislative remedy may be worthy
of study by those concerned to the end that what was conceded to be humane attitude
inspired by the social justice precepts of the Constitution may be reconciled
with the new or additional benefits, if any, that the Labor Code provides in
compensation cases and thereby avoid the impression that in regard to the
security aspect of public or private employment, so worthy of compassionate
approach, there has been an intentional backward step in the policies of the
New Society.
“The mother case is Corales vs. ECC,
et al., wherein petitioner, who started his career in the government in 1932
and retired on March 26, 1975 under Republic Act No. 660, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4968, filed on August 4, 1975 a compensation claim with the
Government Service Insurance System for his tuberculosis which was traceable
to 1965 when he was downed by a high fever.
“In Our February 27, 1979 extended resolution, We stressed
that the substantive provisions applicable to his claim are those of the old
workmen’s compensation law and not those of the New Labor Code on employees’
compensation, because of the following considerations: (1) the cause of action accrued as early as
September, 1965, hence during the effectivity of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; (2) the time limitation in Article 292
of the Labor Code — which requires that workmen’s compensation claims accruing
prior to the New Labor Code shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices
of the Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise, they shall
forever be barred — does not apply to
petitioner who filed his claim on August 4, 1975 with the Government
Service Insurance System; because of the controlling jurisprudence under the
old law that the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, is ten [10] years, it being a right
founded on statute and, as such, is considered
a vested right; (3) the provisions of
the New Labor Code on Employees’ Compensation, Book IV, Title II, apply only to
injury, sickness, disability or death accruing on or after January 1, 1975
(Art. 208); and more precise is Section 1(c) of Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, which declares that only injury or
sickness that accrued on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability
or death shall be compensable under the rules; and (4) the filing by
petitioner of the claim with the GSIS, instead of with the appropriate regional
office of the Department of Labor does not militate against the claim; because
the filing of a claim in an office that has no authority to act on it can be
treated as having been filed with the appropriate agency as long as it is filed
within the period allowed by law /Pobre vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 315-320, May 31, 1977/; and Art. 294, Title II (Transitory
and Final Provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and
claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this
Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of
their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II
(Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmen’s compensation claims accruing
prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the
period from November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and
adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of
action arose.
“Because We declared the aforesaid
resolution as final and executory, respondents
resorted to this present motion for clarification. Thus respondent
Employees’ Compensation Commission submitted on March 28, 1979
the following points for clarification:
“A. Payment
by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of compensation/medical benefits
for claims filed under the New Labor Code with said office which it
finds to be noncompensable under said code but may be
considered compensable under the repealed Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended;
“B. Legal implications of the application by this
Honorable Court of the ten-year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the
present case on claims filed under similar circumstances in relation to the
provision in the New Labor Code on prescription of actions whereby all
workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required
to be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise, they shall be forever
barred;
“C. Legal basis for the Employees’ Compensation
Commission to assume jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed
Workmen’s Compensation Act to compensation cases involving causes of action
accruing prior to January 1, 1975.
“Likewise, respondent GSIS filed on April 17, 1979 its own motion for clarification
with respect to the following points:
“I. Whether or not the GSIS has a right of
reimbursement from the employer of petitioner, considering that the employer
was originally liable to pay the claim and payment by the GSIS for the employee
rewards the employer for his failure to pay the claim.
“II. To whom should the GSIS pay the administrative
costs and whether or not the GSIS should, at the very least, have a right to recover the administrative costs from the
employer of petitioner.
“Petitioner was required to comment on the aforesaid motions
and he filed one on August 28, 1979.
“Meanwhile, several
cases were decided by this Court applying the doctrine in the aforesaid Corales case. Thus, the cases of Villones (G.R. No.
L-46200, July 30, 1979); Cañeja (G.R. No. L-46992, March 31, 1980), and Barga (G.R. No. L-49227,
April 25, 1980), were all favorably decided in favor of petitioner workers as
their ailments were all traced to dates prior to the effectivity
of the new compensation scheme under the New labor Code.
“In Villones, a government
teacher died on September 2, 1975
or more than three (3) years from his initial service on July 3, 1972.
His death was traced town ailment he contracted way back on December 4, 1972. His dependent filed a claim on December 23, 1975.
“In Barga, petitioner
began working for the government on August
10, 1959 and in 1969, he began to feel the symptoms of duodenal
ulcer; was hospitalized by reason thereof on February 22, 1975, discharged on March 4, 1975 and was re-admitted to be subjected
to exploratory laparotomy and drainage of pelvic
abscess. He was discharged on March 30, 1975 and resumed working on
May 5, 1975. He thereafter filed his claim for
compensation.
“And in Cañeja, petitioner,
who entered the government service on July 5, 1950, filed his claim on July
30, 1976 for schizophrenia, for which he was confined at the National Mental
Hospital during the periods from December 6, 1961 to February 15, 1962, from
July 9, 1966 to January 10, 1967, and from January 2, 1973 to May 15, 1975 and
had been under treatment for the same illness as an out-patient for the periods
from July 30 to November 11, 1968, and on May 2, 1974, August 26, 1974,
December 22, 1975, April 26, and June 8, 1976.
“Invariably, herein respondents filed
motions for reconsideration and/or motions for clarification along the same
points raised in the Corales case” (pp. 285-288,
L-44063 rec.).
In Our consolidated disposition of the aforesaid motions for
clarification and/or reconsideration, We resolved
thus:
“WHEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO PAY THE CLAIMANTS THE DECREED AWARDS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CASES,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM TO
REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE RESPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OF THE CLAIMANTS OR OF THE DECEASED
EMPLOYEE AFTER DUE HEARING,”
From the aforecited subject resolution of March
15, 1982, respondent
Government Service Insurance System filed in the same consolidated cases of Corales, Villones, Barga and Cañeja its manifestation
and motion on April 14, 1982, further clarifying therein its
position. Said respondent submitted the
following:
1. The legal theory of the GSIS’s
right to reimbursement is anchored on the quasi-contract nature of compensation
claims and aimed at the preservation of the State Insurance Fund for the
benefit of beneficiaries under the current law;
2. Primarily, compensation claims that should
have been filed before the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission should be
pursued, by the principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium,
before the regular courts by private employees against their employers and
before the Commission on Audit as money claims in case of government
employees.
The rationale for the aforestated
submission is: When administrative agencies
are endowed with quasi-judicial powers, such as the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Insurance
Commission, they eat into the general jurisdiction of regular courts so that, al
contrario, if those administrative agencies
are abolished, their jurisdiction should revert back to the regular courts or
to other appropriate agencies vested by law with general jurisdiction such as
the Commission on Audit with respect to government claims.
3. The government employer concerned, not the
GSIS, should be directed to pay for
claims accruing under the old
law, invoking the cases of Avendaño and LaO. To hold
government employers directly liable in these cases would do away with the
circuitous proceedings for reimbursement, saving on time, effort and expense on
the part of the government (pp. 318-319, L-44063 rec.).
Respondent System prays,
among others, that:
1. Its
manifestation be noted, and that the pronouncements of this Court as to
the alleged “offer” of the Government Corporate Counsel be deleted
or qualified as being merely an equitable solution to the legal predicament of
the GSIS being made to satisfy a liability that belongs to the government
employer concerned;
2. Subject to the succeeding paragraph, the
grant to the GSIS of the right of reimbursement be applied only in the Corales, Villones, Cañeja and Barga cases, and in
other similar cases involving workmen’s compensation claims where the decisions
of the Supreme Court have already become final and executory;
and
3. With respect to all the other cases still
pending or not yet final and executory, in the
exercise of this Court’s sound discretion, either (a) the legal submission of
the GSIS that workmen’s compensation claims be filed with the Commission on Audit for government employees and in the
regular courts for private employees or (b) the legal submission that the
government employers themselves be held directly liable to pay in line with
precedents, be followed, in fairness and justice to the claimants, although the
first alternative is preferred as being more inconsonance with the law (p. 319,
L-44063 rec.).
In Barga vs. ECC, petitioner Barga, in his comment on the GSIS’s
manifestation filed on October 1, 1982, pleads that the reliefs
prayed for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subject manifestation be granted
provided his award is not prejudiced; that respondent System’s submission
under paragraph (c) be declared improper and irrelevant at this stage of the
proceedings and that the same may be properly ventilated in future cases; and
that respondent System be ordered to facilitate and expedite the processing
and payment of awards in the four cases (p. 186, L-49227 rec.).
In the Villones case, petitioner also
submitted his comment on the same manifestation on May 31, 1982 stating therein
that the resolution of issues raised by the GSIS should not be made a condition
precedent to the execution of this Court’s decision; that the matter of
reimbursement by the government employer should not be utilized to delay
execution thereof since the government guarantees the solvency of the State
Insurance Fund; that the resolution of this Court directing the GSIS to pay
petitioner’s award should be immediately executory
and no longer reconsidered; and, that the GSIS’s
submission that workmen’s compensation claims be filed with the Commission on
Audit for government employees and with the regular courts for private
employees derogates upon the principle
of speedy labor justice, as such
claims would surely be subjected to
bureaucratic auditing red tape,
fund availability requirements and technical rules of evidence and procedure in
courts (p. 325, L-44063 rec.).
In the meantime, this Court has allowed compensation benefits in
several cases conformably with the doctrine laid down in the Corales case.
Accordingly, the following cases were decided in favor of petitioners/claimants whose ailments were
contracted on dates prior to the effectivity of the
new compensation scheme under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
In Duran vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-52363),
petitioner filed the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended,
on behalf of her husband, the late Municipal Judge Restituto
Duran. Decedent entered the government service on October
15, 1941 in the
Department of Finance. He joined the
judiciary on May 31, 1952 as justice of the peace. He was initially hospitalized in March, 1972
and for the next five years, he was on and off confined for castralgia,
angina pectoris, gouty arthritis, myofascitis,
coronary insufficiency, hypocalcenia with cramps and monocytic leukemia.
He died of acute monocytic leukemia on April
28, 1977. Petitioner filed her claim with the
GSIS on March 14, 1978.
This Court, in its decision dated March 30, 1982 found decedent’s death from acute monocytic leukemia compensable and adjudged the claim allowable
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (p. 115, L-52363 rec.).
On April 29, 1982, respondent ECC filed an urgent motion to amend
decision praying that the dispositive portion of aforecited decision be Amended to the effect that
petitioner should be awarded P6,000.00 as death
benefits, refunded medical and hospital expenses duly supported by receipts,
and given burial expenses of P200.00 in accordance with the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, instead of the original award of P12,000.00 as death benefits
and P1,000.00 as funeral expenses (p. 126, L-52363 rec.).
On May 7, 1982, respondent GSIS filed its motion for
reconsideration praying therein for reconsideration and setting aside of
subject decision and for the payment of the award pursuant to the old
Workmen’s Compensation Act or in the alternative, for this Court to allow
reimbursement to the GSIS for whatever final amount the latter will be directed
to pay petitioner (p. 133, L-52363 rec.).
Commenting on this Court’s finding of compensability of
decedent’s various ailments, respondent GSIS rationalizes in its motion:
“Coronary insufficiency is a qualified occupational disease
but gouty arthritis is not. Gouty
arthritis is due to an increase in uric acid which is, in turn, due to the intake of rich foods, beans, etc.. Coronary insufficiency is
treated basically with vaso-dilators, not antibiotics
or anti-rheumatic drugs” (p. 135, L-52363 rec.).
Petitioner filed her
comment on the motions of respondents ECC and GSIS on July 8,
1982 praying that
the decision of March 30, 1982 be maintained and that the same be implemented as soon as legally possible by whatever
government agency may be directed ay (p. 142, L-52363 rec.).
In Calvero vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-52059), petitioner entered the government
service as classroom teacher on July 28, 1941. She
suffered from multiple sclerosis, which was initially discovered on June 12,
1971. By reason of such illness, petitioner retired
on November 1, 1977 at the age of 55. She filed her
claim for disability benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, in the latter part of
January, 1978 (pp. 156 & 157, L-52059 rec.).
In Its decision of September
30, 1982, this Court
allowed compensation disability benefits of P6,000.00,
reimbursement of properly receipted medical and hospitalization expenses and
rehabilitation services plus attorney’s fees equivalent to 5% of the award. Petitioner’s
ailment of multiple sclerosis was adjudged as compensable (p.
169, L-52059 rec.).
On November
11, 1982, respondent
ECC filed a motion for reconsideration of aforecited
decision wherein it pleads for reconsideration of the same and for dismissal
of the petition based primarily on the ground that conformably with Art. 292 of
the New Labor Code, the claim of petitioner is barred
since it was filed beyond March 31, 1975 (p. 174, L-52059 rec.).
Respondent GSIS, on
January 6, 1983,
filed its motion for reconsideration/clarification praying, among others,
that the decision in this case be reconsidered by dismissing the claim for
disability benefits for having been barred by the specific statute of
limitations provided for in Art. 292 of the New Labor Code and for having been
filed with an entity not vested by law with jurisdiction to resolve the same or that said decision be
amended/clarified by expressly qualifying the benefits granted as not lifelong;
by deleting the grant of 5% attorney’s fees; and by requiring petitioner’s
employer, the Ministry of Education and Culture, to effect direct payment of
the claim.
In Delegente vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-47460), petitioner filed the claim for
medical and income benefits on behalf of decedent who worked as letter carrier
in the Bureau of Posts regional office at San Pablo City for more than 34 years from January
1, 1942 up to his
death on May 28, 1976 (p. 129, L-47460 rec.).
Decedent initially detected his ailment which was later confirmed
as thyroid carcinoma secondary to
pulmonary tuberculosis on or about April, 1974 or 1½ years before he submitted to surgical constilation. He was finally confined on October
20, 1975 and during
such confinement, he was operated on for total thyroidectomy
and excision biopsy of the supra-clavicular
masses. Decedent died on May 28,
1976. Petitioner filed the claim as early as March
10, 1976 (pp. 130
and 135, L-47460 rec.).
On November
2, 1982, this Court
rendered a decision finding decedent’s ailment compensable and granting him P6,000.00 death benefits, the refund of medical and hospital
expenses duly receipted, P200.00 burial expenses and P600.00 attorney’s fees
(p. 149, L-47460 rec.).
Respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration/clarification
on December 14, 1982
praying for direct payment of the award by employer Bureau of Posts even before
the questioned decision becomes final, for the total removal of attorney’s fees
and the deletion of the award of administrative costs (p. 167, L-47460 rec.).
On March 3, 1983,
petitioner filed her comment on aforesaid motion of respondent System with
prayer that the same be denied for lack of merit (p.
178, L-47460 rec.).
Respondent ECC filed its
comment on the motion on April 13, 1983, stating therein that it has no objection to
the GSIS’s proposition (p. 139, L-47460 rec.).
In Ceniza vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-55645), the late Perpetua
Ceniza entered the government service on September
12, 1947 as public
school teacher. She contracted chronic pyelonephritis and uremia while in the service and for
which ailments, she was confined in December, 1977. She died on January 30, 1979 at the age of 49. On November 14, 1979, her husband-petitioner filed the claim for
compensation benefits under the New Labor Code (pp. 75 & 76, L-55645 rec.).
This Court rendered
decision on November 2, 1982 allowing compensability and granting
benefits under the former compensation scheme (p. 75, L-55645 rec.).
On December 15, 1982,
respondent GSIS filed its motion for reconsideration/clarification praying
that, since the decision has not yet become final and executory,
the Ministry of Education and Culture be made to pay directly to
petitioner-claimant the awarded benefits, and also, since under the old
workmen’s compensation law, the employer is ultimately liable (p. 95, L-.55645
rec.).
On February
4, 1983, petitioner
filed a manifestation with prayer that respondent GSIS be directed to pay the
benefits awarded and thereafter, it be allowed to
seek reimbursement from the Ministry of Education and Culture. (p. 100, L-55645 rec.).
In compliance with this
Court’s resolution of January 31, 1983, petitioner submitted his comment on
February 22, 1983 stating therein that he has no objection to respondent GSIS’s paying the award and afterwards seeking
reimbursement from the Ministry after due hearing and reiterating its prayer
for the GSIS to be allowed to seek minibursement
after payment is effected (p. 106, L-55645 rec.).
Respondent ECC filed its
comment on May 4, 1983 manifesting that it does not conform to the submission
of the GSIS that the Ministry should pay directly to petitioner and instead,
respondent System should be made solely responsible for the payment of benefits
since under the New Labor Code, it is the custodian and administrator of the
State Insurance Fund (p. 115, L-55645 rec.).
On May 23, 1983, respondent GSIS filed a joint reply to aforecited comment and manifestation restating its prayer
in its previous motion for reconsideration/clarification (p. 120, L-55645.
rec.).
By way of summation and simplification, respondent GSIS has
initially opted for application of the right of reimbursement, if granted, in Corales, Villones, Cañeja and Barga
cases only and in other similar cases involving workmen’s compensation claims
where the decisions of this Court have already become final and executory. In Duran,
respondent System seeks the payment of the award as per provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and for reimbursement of whatever amount it will be
directed to pay. In the subsequent cases of Delegente and Ceniza,
said respondent specifically and finally prays for direct payment of the
approved claims by the respective employers of petitioners/claimants even
before finality of the decision.
Respondent ECC stubbornly
clings to its previous position that the petitions or claims should be
dismissed since the same are already barred conformably with Article 292 of the
New Labor Code; and maintains that it does not agree to the GSIS’s
submission of direct payment by the employer since under the new compensation
scheme, the System as the administrator of the State Insurance Fund should be
solely and directly liable for payment of claims.
Of these subject approved claims, only five petitioners-claimants
have specifically expressed what they plead for. Thus, in Barga
and Villones, both claimants do not oppose the
matter of reimbursement to the GSIS as long as the processing and payment of
their benefits are facilitated and implemented pursuant to Our
resolution of March 15, 1982. They feel, however, that the proposed filing
of claims with the Commission on Audit or courts would still be premature at
this stage but might be seriously considered in future cases, and, that such procedure would defeat the guaranteed
speedy labor justice. In Duran
and Delegente, all that the
petitioners-claimants pray for is the implementation of this Court’s decision
in their respective claims without
touching the awarded benefits.
At this juncture, the common issues of compensability of these
claims and of whether or not said claims are already barred,
have been foreclosed by Our resolutions of February 27, 1979 and March 15, 1982, wherein We exhaustively confronted and resolved the same.
Our sole and urgent concern at this moment is the payment of
these claims and which agency should be primarily liable.
Nevertheless, for the
consumption of future claimants and respondent agencies, We emphatically
reiterate:
“With respect to the second and third points of clarification
of the respondent ECC on the legal implications of the application by this
Honorable Court of the ten-year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the
present case (Corales) on claims filed under similar
circumstances in relation to the provision in the New Labor Code on
prescription of actions whereby all workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required to
be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise they shall be forever barred;
and the legal basis for the Employees’ Compensation Commission to assume
jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed Workmen’s Compensation
Act to compensation cases involving causes of
action accruing prior to January 1, 1975, the subject points of clarification
sought for are clear from Our pronouncement that the vested rights of
claimants, whose causes of action accrued before the regime of the new compensation
scheme, over the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the previous
compensation statute, including the right to file their claims during the
ten-year prescriptive period,
should be recognized and respected. Consequently,
respondents GSIS and ECC have
jurisdiction over claims the causes of action of which arose during the effectivity of the old workmen’s compensation law, which
must be resolved by them on the
basis of the provisions of the old workmen’s compensation law which is more
sympathetic to the plight of the working man as it is more expressive of the
social justice guarantee of the supreme law of the land.
“As delineated above, petitioners whose causes of action
accrued during the effectivity of the old
compensation law and continued even after its repeal unto the regime of the new
employees’ compensation law, filed their respective claims for compensation
only after the deadline set forth under the new law; but which deadline was
ruled by this Court as not barring the claims of the petitioners as filed with
the GSIS which under the new law is mandated to take cognizance of
compensation claims, the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission and its
regional branches being then in the process of folding up.
“Relevant to state at this point is the fact that herein
petitioners (except petitioner Barga, who resumed
working after his temporary disability), like claimant in the Romero case [77
SCRA 482, 489 (1977)], despite their medical disability, persisted in working
by their sheer determination and ingenuity until their compulsory retirement (Corales), death (Villones), and mental incapacity (Cañeja).
“It must also be noted that the new compensation law in fixing
the March 31, 1975 deadline of filing claims accruing during the effectivity of the old compensation law with the regional
offices (WCC) of the Department of Labor, overlooked the vested rights of
claimants to file their claims within the ten-year prescriptive period
recognized under the previous compensation law and jurisprudence.
“Hence, respondent GSIS and ECC as the only existing agencies
presently entrusted by law with the processing of claims for compensation
benefits have jurisdiction over the claims herein involved and over all
claims of claimants similarly situated.
(While P.D. 954, issued on July
6, 1976, empowered the Secretary [now Minister] of Labor to assume and exercise
effective jurisdiction over workmen’s compensation cases, this was however
expressly limited to the power and authority to determine, dispose of and to
take final action on workmen’s compensation cases pending as of March 31,
1976 before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the Workmen’s Compensation
Units in the regional offices of the Department [now Ministry] of Labor, and
those cases remanded or to be remanded by the Supreme Court for further
proceedings).
xx xx xx xx
“Indeed, to sustain the stand of respondent ECC on this matter
would result into a situation wherein herein claimants and others similarly
circumstanced would have a bare right
without any forum to enforce the same. A
vested right rooted from a social legislation enacted pursuant to the social
justice provision of the Constitution may not be rendered worthless by a
literal construction of the pertinent provisions of the New Labor Code, which
would thus inflict upon the petitioners and those equally situated the
harshness of the arbitrary and constricted time limitation set forth in its
Article 292.
“The President-Prime Minister, in promulgating the New Labor
Code, did not deliberately intend to inflict such injustice on claimant
employees and thereby deny them the social justice guaranteed by the
Constitution he swore to uphold and defend.
“As long as this Supreme Tribunal exists and functions as the
vital instrument of social justice, the aforesaid situation will never be
countenanced.”
The proposition of the GSIS that compensation claims of,
government employees and those of private employees should be filed with and
pursued before the Commission on Audit and the regular courts, respectively,
not only has been advanced too late in the day to merit consideration, but also
appears inaccurate and cannot be upheld in the face of certain specific
provisions of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 626, Title II, as amended) and its
implementing rules.
The exclusive responsibility of administering and disposing of
claims for compensation benefits is clearly defined in the following provisions
of the said Code, thus:
“Art. 171. Exclusiveness
of liability. — Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred Sixty-one as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Eighty-six,
as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Six Hundred Ten, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight Hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System, during the period of such
payment for the same disability or death, and conversely.
“Art. 178. Settlement
of Claims. — The System shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute from this Title with
respect to coverage, entitlement to benefits,
collection and payment of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other
matter related thereto, subject to appeal to the Commission, which shall
decide appealed cases within twenty (20) working days from the submission of
the evidence” [Emphasis supplied].
Under Article 165(e) of
the Code, “System” means the SSS or the GSIS, as the case may be.
Furthermore, to give more
teeth to the aforequoted provisions, Article 175(c)
of the Code empowers the Commission
(ECC) to approve rules
and regulations governing the processing of claims and other settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System (GSIS). This simply means that the GSIS initiates the
promulgation and adoption of rules and regulations subject only to approval by
the ECC.
And pursuant to the
authority vested in the ECC under the aforecited
Article 175(c) to promulgate
rules and regulations, the said Commission incorporated certain explicit and
mandatory provisions into the amended rules.
The pertinent sections under Rule XVII (Settlement of Claims) read as
follows:
“Section 1. Services. -?
a) The claim for medical benefits shall be filed
on a prescribed form by an accredited physician or accredited hospital directly with the System.
xx xx xx
“Sec. 2. Income Benefits. — The claim for income benefits shall be
filed in a prescribed form by the employee, his dependents or his employer on
his behalf, directly with the System. xx xx
“Sec. 3. Adjudication. -? Upon receipt of the claim, the System shall process the claim and determine whether or not the injury, sickness,
disability or death is compensable” (underlining supplied).
Unless and until the
Labor Code and its implementing rules on compensation are amended, the
foregoing provisions stand as they are.
In the meantime, the filing, processing and adjudication of claims for
compensation should remain with the GSIS and the ECC.
In the light of the
foregoing, in the cases of Corales, Villones, Cañeja and Barga and other similar cases where the decisions had
already become final and executory, the GSIS shall
remain liable to pay the respective petitioners-claimants the decreed awards in
the said cases, without prejudice to the right of the Government Service
Insurance System to reimbursement from the respective employers of the
claimants or petitioners; because said cases were adjudged compensable pursuant
to the Workmen’s Compensation Act as they cover ailments initially contracted
prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, even
if said cases were filed after the effectivity of
said Code.
In all other cases where
the decisions decreed awards under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for ailments
initially contracted prior to the effectivity of the
New Labor Code, although the claims were filed thereafter, but said decisions
have not yet become final, the awards shall be paid by the respective employers
of the claimants.
WHEREFORE, IN CORALES, VILLONES, CAÑEJA AND BARGA CASES,
THE MANIFESTATION AND MOTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS
DENIED AND SAID SYSTEM IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY THE PETITIONERS OR CLAIMANTS THE DECREED AWARDS IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CASES, THE DECISIONS THEREIN
HAVING ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE RESPECTIVE
EMPLOYERS OF THE CLAIMANTS OR PETITIONERS.
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTIONS
OF THE DECISIONS IN THE FOLLOWING CASES
ARE HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
IN G.R. NO. 52363 (DURAN VS. ECC):
“WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AND THE SUPREME COURT (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR)
IS HEREBY DIRECTED
“1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
“2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER’S MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL EXPENSES SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;
“3. TO PAY PETITIONER TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS
AS FUNERAL EXPENSES;
“4. TO PAY PETITIONER SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS
AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND
“5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
“SO ORDERED.”
IN G.R. NO. 52059 (CALVERO
VS. ECC):
“WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY
ORDERED
“1. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS;
“2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HER MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;
“3. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX HUNDRED
(P600.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND
“4. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
“SO ORDERED.”
IN G.R. NO. 47460 (DELEGENTE
VS. ECC):
“WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (BUREAU OF POSTS) IS HEREBY ORDERED
“1. TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
“2. TO REFUND PETITIONER’S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;
“3. TO PAY PETITIONER BURIAL EXPENSES IN THE
AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS;
“4. TO PAY PETITIONER SIX HUNDRED (P600.00)
PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND
“5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
“SO ORDERED.”
IN G.R. NO. 55645 (CENIZA
VS. ECC):
“WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE
IS HEREBY ORDERED
“1. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
“2. TO REIMBURSE THE DECEDENT’S MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS;
“3. TO PAY PETITIONER BURIAL EXPENSES IN THE
AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS;
“4. TO PAY PETITIONER SIX HUNDRED (P600.00)
PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND
“5. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.
“SO ORDERED.”
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, Plana, and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino and
Relova, JJ., no part.
Melencio-Herrera and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
in the result.