THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PEDRO BARBA, REYNALDO JASMINEZ, LEONARDO CORDERO, RODOLFO JASMINEZ, RUSTICO SALANDANAN, VICTORIO ALMANZA, ROGELIO HERNAND…

It is settled law that peaceful picketing is included in free
speech.^[1]
There is equally a recognition that it is more than just the expression of
views or of facts connected with a labor dispute, intended to arouse sympathy
for the cause of the working­men.  The
intent to persuade is there, of course, but it has a coercive aspect as well
and is thus not immune to that extent from restrictions and limitations.  As a matter of fact, certain activities
associated with it may at times make a mockery of peaceful pre­tension and thus
lie outside the bounds of the permissible in law.^[2]

The precise question in these two cases to be decided jointly is
whether conduct arising from what undoubtedly was excess of zeal in carrying on
picketing, resulting in complainants being un­able to leave the premises of
employment, may, under the circum­stances to be hereinafter more particularly
disclosed, constitute probable cause for the crime of illegal detention.  The lower court answered in the negative.  The matter was elevated to us on appeal.  We find no reason for reaching a different
con­clusion.

The order of the lower court complained of, presided by then
Judge A. Melencio Herrera of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, dated March 10, 1967, dis­missed the two informations filed against more than one hundred persons
engaged in picketing and thereafter accused of illegal detention, as there was
no probable cause shown.  The care and
circumspection with which the question was inquired into by the lower court is
shown by the fact that two previous orders regarding these cases had previously
been issued before such dismissal.

The first of such orders, dated Oct. 20, 1966, makes mention of
the antecedent facts leading to the accusation for illegal deten­tion.  A strike was called by the employees of the
Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. in Lucena sometime on December 14, 1965, a picket line
around or about the premises having been formed.  Sub­sequently, two complaints were filed with
the City Fiscal of Lucena against all the accused,
one by a certain Jose Pavon, Sr. and another by Pilar Echevarria charging them
with illegal detention, the allegation being that from 12:00 noon, December 18,
to 10:50 p. m., December 19, 1965, complainants were confined within and could
not leave the company compound because the picketing employees blocked the exit
from the premises as well as the other means of egress therefrom.  The City Fiscal of Lucena
conducted a preliminary investigation as a result of which the informations for illegal detention were filed.  No warrants of arrest were, how­ever, issued,
as the City Court of Lucena returned the cases to the
Fiscal’s Office for further investigation.  Instead of doing so, the City Fiscal chose to
have the matter passed upon by the lower court.

The aforesaid order of October
20, 1966 explained why it could not issue the warrants of arrest
sought.  Thus:  “As the Court, before issuing the
warrants of arrest, would like to assure itself of the existence of probable
cause in connection with the crimes actually charged in the two informations, and consonant with the doctrine enunciated in
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil.
739, let these cases be set for hearing on November 8, 1966 at 2:00 o’clock p.
m. on which date and hour the Prosecution shall have the two complain­ing
witnesses available for examination by the Court.  The hearing will not form part of the trial
and will be held notwithstanding absence of the accused.”^[3]

Then came the order of December
1, 1966 resetting for further hearing on December 13, 1966 the two cases so that
additional evidence could be presented by the prosecution.  It would appear, therefore, that after the
second hearing the lower court was still not persuaded that the warrants of
arrest should issue, this not­withstanding the specific finding of fact set
forth in such order of December 1,
1966.  Thus:  “On December 18th, which was a Satur­day,
some non-striking employees of the Company, the complainants among them,
entered the compound at about 7:30
in the morning, together with several out-of-town workers who were engaged in
erection work within the compound.  At
about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of
that Saturday, the strikers formed a picket line.  Most of them concentrated at the front gates
while others went around the compound perimeter.”^[4]

What subsequently happened is narrated in the succeeding para­graph
of such order:  “At 12:00 o’clock, noon,
of the same day, complainants, together with other Company employees, made a
first attempt to leave the Company compound through the main gates.  They could not do so because several strikers
(picketers) formed a line breast to back, four deep, before the main gates such
that it would have been necessary, for the employees to go through, physi­cally
to push the picketers aside.  A second
attempt to leave was made at 5:00 o’clock
p. m. on the same day, which was also un­successful, as was the third attempt
at 8:00 o’clock that night.  A fourth attempt was made at 7:00 o’clock the following morning, Sunday; a
fifth attempt was made at 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, all with the same negative result and for the same reason.
Shortly before 10:50 p. m. of that
Sunday night, the picket was lifted and complainants were able to leave the
Company compound.  During that Saturday
and Sunday, complainants, when not at their places of work, spent the time at
the Superintendent’s house.”^[5]

The lower court remained unconvinced that a crime of illegal
detention was committed, there being in its opinion, quoting from Viada, no “acto de detencion o encerramiento, privativo de libertad“, it
being its opinion that the objective of the controversial act “was not to
deprive complainants of their personal liberty but to impair the operations of
the Company.”^[6]  The lower court added: “Moreover, it
strikes the Court that it would have been quite easy for complainants to have
broken parts of the chicken wire fence, as it had then been broken, and for
them to have left the Company compound through the break.  As it was, complainant Pavon
had stated ‘I came in through the gate, so I am going out through the gate
also’ * * *.”^[7]

Then came the order of March
10, 1967, subject of this appeal. 
After setting forth that the prosecution was allowed to introduce
further evidence so that it could finally determine whether warrants of arrest
should issue or the cases should be dismissed, the order stated:  “At the hearings held on February 16 and
March 2, 1967, Capt. Salvador Red, Sergeants Mamerto
de Vera, Eligio Tabios and
Antonio Escartin, of the Philippine Constabulary,
gave their version of what had happened at the, picketing of the Red V Coconut
Products, Inc. Their testimony cannot be deemed as having established pro­bable
cause for a charge of Illegal Detention against the picketers.”^[8]

The closing paragraph again referred to the alleged crime of
illegal detention not having been committed: 
“The basic fact relevant to these cases which had been confirmed by
the testimony of the aforementioned four witnesses is that a picket line had
been established across the main gate of the company, the closeness and
movement whereof prevented ingress and egress from the company compound.  The establishment of that picket line in the
opinion of the Court is not probable cause for charging the picketers with
Illegal Detention.”^[9]

In this appeal, a brief on behalf of plaintiff-appellant, People
of the Philippines,
was filed by private prosecutors, Romeo A. Real and Victorino
B. Javier.  While such brief did assail
with vigor and with some plausibility the validity of the order of dismissal of
the lower court, it is not sufficiently persuasive.   As noted at the outset, the appeal must
fail.

It is undeniable from the facts as found by the court below which
must be accepted, only a legal question being before us, that the strike in
question was characterized by more than its share of the bitterness usually
associated with labor disputes.  The
animosity that existed between the employees on the one hand and management on
the other was most marked.  Picketing was
resorted to with a minimum emphasis on its persuasive aspect.  It was intended primarily as an instrument of
coercion to assure that sufficient pressure be exerted so that labor’s demands
be met.

The picketers, the accused in this case, were adamant and
inflexible; such unyielding attitude was quite evident in the manner the
picketing was carried on. Those outside the employer’s premises were not
allowed to get in.  Those within they
would keep inside.  They formed a solid
phalanx precluding without the use of force anyone from passing through the
ranks.  Apparently, with respect to the
two complainants, they did succeed in their design.  They were kept inside from the noon of December 18 to about 11:00 in the evening of the next day.

The precise question before us, one of first impression, is
whether on the above decisive facts warrants of arrest ought to have issued,
there being a probable cause that the offense of slight illegal detention was
thus committed. Kidnapping, deten­tion or any other manner of deprivation of
liberty is penalized as slight illegal detention if committed without the
attendance of the circumstances that would constitute the grave offense,
penalized as kidnapping and serious illegal detention.^[10]
Our answer to the above question is in the negative.  The lower court must be sustained.

Clearly, there was no kidnapping; the detention or deprivation of
liberty under the circumstances, while certainly not to be justi­fied, was not
done with criminal intent.  It was the
outcome of picketing carried to excess, one might say, by people who, perhaps
in a less tense atmosphere and in the absence of the bitterness that did
characterize this particular labor dispute, should have known better but
apparently did not.  Their objective, as
clearly observed by the lower court, was not to inflict loss of freedom to the
com­plainants but to weaken management resistance so that it would give in to
their demands.  While no doubt to be
deplored, such conduct cannot be made a basis for a finding of probable cause
that the crime penalized by the codal provision in
question was committed.

Instances may occur where a criminal action may lie. We do not
intimate any opinion as to what offense may be then committed or under what
circumstances a finding of probable cause is justified.  We do not have to do so as that is not the
question before us.  What we do affirm is
that the judiciary should be on the alert lest in scrutinizing conduct that may
lie outside the traditional concept of peaceful picketing, those so engaged may
subject themselves to a serious criminal liability. More precisely, while the
acts here complained of are im­moderate, they certainly do not add up to the
commission of the offense of slight illegal detention.  To such a judicial approach, the lower court
manifested fidelity.  We cannot reverse
it then.

It is not to be forgotten either that the offense of slight
illegal detention is penalized by reclusion temporal.  To say that the accused, numbering more than
one hundred who took part in such picketing, laid themselves open to such a
serious charge, there being a probable cause, and thus, if convicted, be made
to suffer a severe penalty, would be to pose an ever-present threat to labor.
Obviously, the result is far from desirable. 
The Revised Penal Code in effect becomes a veritable sword of
Damocles.  Militancy and zeal in the
defense of labor’s rights could be stigmatized as the perpetration of a
criminal act.  As a result, the
probability that punishment, not excluding the afflictive kind, may be incurred
is no longer remote.  To that extent, the
constitutional policy of social justice and protection to labor would be
nullified and set at naught.

It is worthy of note that Solicitor General Felix B. Makasiar, on behalf of plaintiff-appellant, People of the
Philippines, did file on June 25, 1969, a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging
that after “a close analysis and careful study of the facts of the case,
the applicable law and the errors imputed to the lower court by the private
prosecutors, ” he arrived at the “inescapable conclusion that the
lower court did not err in dismissing these cases.^[11]
He would pray, therefore, that the appeal be dismissed in these two cases.  Since the case was submitted as far back as
May 8, 1969, we did not feel called upon to act favorably on this motion of the
Solicitor General although it cannot be denied that as by him asserted, his
office has control over prosecution of offenses before appellate tribunals.

His appraisal of the situation though from the facts as found by
the lower court thus leading him to seek the dismissal of these cases fortifies
the conclusion reached by us.  Thus:  “It is readily apparent that the facts
do not constitute the crime of illegal deten­tion charged in the information.^[12]

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the order of the
lower court dismissing these two cases, there being no probable cause shown for
the crime of slight illegal detention having been committed, arising solely
from the inability of the two com­plainants to leave the employer’s premises in
view of the manner the picketing was carried on, does not suffer from any
infirmity.

WHEREFORE, the order of March 10, 1967 by the lower court dismissing these two
cases is hereby affirmed.  Without
pronounce­ment as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., in the result.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Reyes, JBL, J., on official
trip.

^[1] Mortera v. Court of Industrial Relations, 79 Phil.
345 (1947).

^[2] Cf.
Security Bank Employees Union-NATU v. Security Bank & Trust Company,
23 SCRA 503 (1968).

^[3]
Order, Annex A, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 34-35.

^[4]
Order, Annex B, Ibid, pp. 37-38.

^[5] Ibid,
p. 38.

^[6] Ibid,
p. 40.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8]
Order, Annex C, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 45.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10]
Art. 268 reads:  “Slight illegal
detention.  – The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the
crimes described in the next preceding article without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated therein. 
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place
for the perpetration of the crime.  If
the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained
within three days from the commence­ment of the detention, without having
attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding seven
hundred pesos.  (As amended by Republic
Act No. 18.)” The circumstances referred to are: “1. If the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days; 2.  If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority; 3.  If any serious
physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; 4. If the person kid­napped
or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public officer.” (Art. 267,
Revised Penal Code.)

^[11]
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Record on Appeal, p. 71.

^[12] Ibid,
p. 73.