PHILIPPINE WOMEN’S UNIVERSITY, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for insufficiency of evidence.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the petitioner and her counsel for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

The facts are borne out by the records.

On January 29, 2009, petitioner-appellant Philippine Women’s University, Inc. (hereinafter “PWU”) filed a Petition^[2] for the reconstitution of the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 112932 with the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging that the copy on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila is substantially destroyed as what is left of it is only the extreme upper and lower portion of the title; that on file with the Register of Deeds is a cancelled TCT No. 89228, in the name of the Philippine Women’s Educational Association, from which TCT No. 112932 was derived; that PWU has in its possession the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 112932; that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Philippine Women’s Educational Association; that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate copy has been issued on the subject title; that the subject property was never sold, encumbered or delivered to any entity to guarantee any obligation; that the only improvement is the building of the Philippine Women’s University, which is the principal office of the petitioner; and that no deeds or other instruments or encumbrances affecting the property have been presented for registration.

A Notice of Hearing was issued on April 23, 2009, setting the initial hearing on August 5, 2009.  Then, on August 26, 2009, PWU established the jurisdictional facts of the petition.  Since there was no opposition, PWU presented its evidence ex-parte on September 16, 2009.  The testimony of Agnes Debulos, PWU’s Accounting Officer and Property Custodian is summarized as follows:

She narrated that the petitioner is the Philippine Women’s University; that she is the custodian of all titles pertaining to the assets of the university; that PWU is located along Taft Avenue corner Nakpil St. and Malvar St., Malate, Manila; that PWU is the owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932; that their paralegal officer tried to get a certified true copy from the Register of Deeds of Manila but they failed because only the upper and lower portion of the title was left on file; that they were issued a Certification by records officer Perlino Califlores; that the upper portion of the title indicates Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89228; that the said property is declared for taxation purposes under the name ‘Philippine Women’s Educational Association’; that Philippine Women’s University and Philippine Women’s Educational Association are one and the same; that the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89228 was by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Philippine Women’s Educational Association to Philippine Women’s University on September 1969; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932 has an approved survey plan and technical description.^[3]

On May 19, 2011, the court a quo rendered its now assailed Decision, dismissing PWU’s petition for reconstitution of title on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.  It ruled that:

A cursory examination of the evidence presented on record, the petitioner herein presented as its lone witness its Record’s Custodian Agnes Debulos.  The petitioner’s representative a certain Dr. Amelou B. Reyes did not testify in court.  What is baffling to the court is why would the petitioner delegate the entire prosecution of this case to a record’s custodian whose authority to represent the petitioner was not proven.

While its lone witness testified that they were able to get a certification from the Register of Deeds of Manila that said title to property was torn and damaged [it] would not be sufficient to convince the court for the relief prayed for.  She has no personal knowledge how it came to be so.  The petitioner relied solely on the bare allegation of their witness Debulos.  The petitioner could have presented as witness Perlino V. Califlores of the Register of Deeds who issued the said Certification.

This Court in resolving the issue at hand is bound by the rules on evidence and the established facts, we could not simply rely on bare allegations without convincing proof to establish the same.

Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply in land registration proceedings.  If there is a specific law to be observed, the mode of the proceedings is mandatory and must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be void.^[4]

Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the Resolution^[5] dated August 13, 2012, PWU filed the present appeal, alleging that:

THIS (SIC) HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PETITION.^[6]

More specifically, PWU claims that the court a quo erred in dismissing its petition considering that there was no opposition thereto and that during the ex-parte proceedings, it was able to submit various exhibits (many of which are public documents) to prove that the copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila is, in fact, damaged.

Respondent-appellee Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposes the appeal, averring that the lower court correctly denied the petition because PWU failed to discharge its burden of proof prescribed by law and jurisprudence for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title.

Thus, the issue in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo committed reversible error in dismissing PWU’s petition for reconstitution of title.

After a careful evaluation of PWU’s arguments and its evidence, the Court rules to grant the appeal.

Republic Act No. 26, otherwise known as “An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed” provides for both judicial and extra-judicial reconstitution.  The same law gives both modes of reconstitution the same binding effect.  Initially, Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree”, abrogated administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title.  But later, under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6732, approved on July 17, 1989, administrative reconstitution was revived under specific conditions, thus:

Sec. 110.  Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original of Torrens Title.—Original copies of certificates of titles lost or destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree.  The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds:  Provided, further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).

Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having been filed by any such officials.^[7]

In the case at bar, PWU chose to avail of judicial reconstitution because the conditions for administrative reconstitution are not present.

According to Section 3 of R.A. 26, lost or damaged TCTs shall be reconstituted from such of the following sources as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;  and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Meanwhile, according to Section 4 of the same law, liens and other encumbrances affecting a destroyed or lost certificate of title shall be reconstituted from the following sources as may be available, in the following order:

(a) Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owner’s, co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate;

(b) Registered documents on file in the registry of deeds, or authenticated copies thereof showing that the originals thereof had been registered;  and

(c) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the liens or encumbrances affecting the property covered by the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

R.A. 26 provides different procedures for the reconstitution, depending on whether it is administrative or judicial, and depending on the source used for the reconstitution of the lost or damaged certificate of title.  In the case at bar, the reconstitution is judicial, and the source used is the owner’s duplicate of the lost or damaged transfer certificate of title (Sec. 3[a], R.A. 27).  Thus, the procedure is that under Section 10, in relation to Section 5, of R.A. 26 which provides:

SECTION 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:  Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.

x x x                x x x                x x x
SECTION 5.  x x x The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary sources for reconstitution and with an affidavit of the registered owner stating, among other things:

(1)	That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
(2)	That the owner’s duplicate certificate or co-owner’s duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures;
(3)	That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
(4)	That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed;
(5)	That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the Assessor’s Office; and
(6)	That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution.

Generally, in proceedings for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles, the standing policy is for the courts to tread with caution even in the absence of opposition.  As explained in Republic vs. Holazo:^[8]

A judicial reconstitution proceedings is one in rem.  It denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form or condition.  The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.

The petition for reconstitution is mandated to prove not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted but also that at the time the said title was lost or destroyed, he was the registered owner thereof.  The fact that no opposition is filed by a private party or by the Republic of the Philippines will not relieve the petitioner of his burden.  The Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.

Courts should proceed with caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles of land under Rep. Act No. 26.  x x x

The court a quo anchored its decision to dismiss the petition on two grounds: (a) PWU’s sole witness, Agnes Debulos, was incompetent to prove the allegations of the petition, and (b) the court was not convinced that the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila is, in fact, torn and damaged.  In other words, the lower court was of the opinion that PWU’s evidence was a hearsay evidence.

We do not agree with the court a quo.

Indeed, under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge.  But there are well-recognized exceptions.  One of which is an entry in official records.  According to Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

To prove that the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila has been torn and damaged, PWU submitted a Certification^[9] dated September 22, 2008 issued by Perlino V. Califlores, Records Officer III of the Register of Deeds of Manila.  The Certification states:

CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the attached torn and damaged Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112932 is on file with this Registry.

This is to certify further that this torn and damaged portion is what remained of TCT No. 112932.  Other portions of which cannot be located inside our Registry vault.

This Certification is issued this 22^nd day of September, 2008 at Manila Registry of Deeds, Philippines upon the request of MR. ALFREDO DIZON of #4 Pardo de Tavera Street, Sto. Niño, Quezon City for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

(SGD) PERLINO V. CALIFLORES
Records Officer III            

NOTED BY:

(SGD) ATTY. MARISSA E. TIMONES
                  Register of Deeds

The above Certification is an exception to the hearsay rule.  There is no need for either Perlino V. Califlores or Atty. Marissa E. Timones to personally appear before the court only to identify the said Certification.  Besides, even if the Certification was not identified by the person who executed it, the sufficiency of the Certification is not an indispensable requirement in reconstitution cases, as ruled in Republic vs. Dela Raga.^[10]  In fact, the Supreme Court said that the report may even be disregarded.  Dela Raga reiterates the earlier ruling in Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.^[11] where it was held that:

Even LR[A] Circular No. 35, which is also mentioned in Circular 7-96, does not require any clearance.  Rather, it requires the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division to make a report, and likewise the Register of Deeds to write a report of his or her findings after verifying the status of the title, which is the subject of the reconstitution.  Both reports are to be submitted to the reconstitution court on or before the date of the initial hearing.  It is not mandatory, however, for the reconstitution court to wait for such reports indefinitely.  If none is forthcoming on or before the date of the initial hearing, it may validly issue an order or judgment granting reconstitution.  This is implied from the provisions of Section 16 of the same Circular, which states:

’16. Should an order or judgment granting reconstitution be issued by the Court without awaiting the report and the recommendations of this Commission as well as the verification of the Register of Deeds concerned, or while the examination, verification and preparation of the report and recommendation are still pending in the said Offices due to the failure of the Clerk of Court or the petitioner to comply with all the necessary requirements as called for herein, and it appears that there is a valid ground to oppose the reconstitution, a motion to set aside the order/judgment granting reconstitution or to stay the period of finality of said order/judgment shall be filed by the Land Registration Commissioner and/or the Register of Deeds thru the Solicitor General or the provincial or city fiscal concerned.’

In the present case, therefore, neither was the Petition for reconstitution affected nor was the RTC divested of its jurisdiction by the fact that the trial court rendered the judgment ordering the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title without awaiting the report and recommendations of the land registration commissioner and the register of deeds of Quezon City.  (Emphasis supplied)

Secondly, the court a quo erred in its pronouncement that the President of PWU should have personally testified.  Indeed, Dr. Amelou Benitez Reyes, being the President of the University, was the person who verified the petition.^[12]  She did this pursuant to the Resolution^[13] dated December 16, 2008 of PWU’s Board of Trustees.  There is, however, no requirement in R.A. 26 or in the Rules on Evidence that the person who verified the complaint or petition should be presented as witness during the trial.  Any other person can be presented as witness.  What is important is that, in civil cases like this one, the plaintiff or petitioner is able to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.^[14]  By “preponderance of evidence” is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.^[15]  In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial.^[16]  The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.^[17]

Going now to the evidence of PWU, we note that it presented, among others, the following relevant documents:

1. Exhibit “H”, a faithful reproduction of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 112932;

2. Exhibit “I”, the Certification dated September 22, 2008 issued by Perlino Califlores, Records Officer III of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, attesting to the fact that the copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the said office is torn and damaged;

3. Exhibit “I-2”, machine copy of what remains (upper and lower portions) of the copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila;

4. Exhibit “A”, the verified petition itself where PWU alleges that:

x x x                x x x                x x x

5. Petitioner has in its possession and custody the original of owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 112932, a photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex “D”.

6. The subject property covered by the title is declared in the name of Philippine Women’s Educational Association under Tax Declaration No. 00059, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “E”.

7. After a survey, the land was issued a lot plan and technical description duly approved by the Land Management Bureau, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “F” and “F-1”, respectively.

8. The adjacent adjoining owners of the parcel of land are the following:

Name	Address
a. Clemence Agro Marine Corp.	227 Gen. Luna, Malate, Metro Manila
b. Marc Properties Corp.	1971 Taft Avenue, Malate, Metro Manila

9. That no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s Duplicate Copy has been issued on the subject title by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila.

10. That the subject title was never sold nor encumbered nor delivered to any entity to guarantee any obligation.

11. That the only improvement is the building of the Philippine Women’s University, which is the principal office address of the Petitioner.

12. That no deed or other instruments or encumbrances affecting the title have been presented for registration.

To the mind of this Court, the above documentary evidence are more than sufficient to justify the reconstitution of the damaged copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila.  First, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 112932 is intact and has not been cancelled.  Second, the copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila has not been cancelled and is still in force.  Third, PWU has shown that it is the registered owner of the property described in TCT No. 112932.  Fourth and last, the description, area and boundaries in both owner’s duplicate copy and the copy of the Register of Deeds of Manila have not been changed.  Clearly, these documents are the required proof under RA 26 for the reconstitution of a lost or damaged certificate of title.

The Court also adds that these documents were admitted by the court a quo, were never rejected, and have not been rebutted by the respondent-appellee Republic of the Philippines.  As discussed above, the court a quo’s grounds for dismissing the petition are erroneous.  To emphasize, first, the Certification dated September 22, 2008 issued by Perlino Califlores, Records Officer III of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, attesting to the fact that the copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the said office is torn and damaged, is valid and sufficient evidence under the Rules of Court, and, second, there is no rule that requires the President of PWU to personally testify.  The matters on which she would have testified were sufficiently covered by Agnes Debulos, PWU’s Accounting Officer and Property Custodian who, by the way, was duly qualified and the offer of whom was not objected to at the time she was called to the witness stand.  According to Section 35, in relation to Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, objection to testimonial evidence must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.

Thus, it was reversible error on the part of the court a quo to dismiss PWU’s petition for reconstitution of title.  Considering that PWU has satisfied the requirements of R.A. 26, the reconstitution of the damaged copy of TCT No. 112932 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila should be ordered.  Of course, the reconstitution is subject to the limitations provided under Sections 18 and 19 of R.A. 26 which respectively provide:

SECTION 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if both titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its reconstitution, except the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of title.  Thereupon, the register of deeds shall cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and spread upon the owner’s duplicate, as well as on the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate, if any has been issued, such annotations of subsisting liens or encumbrances as may appear on the recovered certificate of title, cancelling at the same time the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven hereof: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the recovered certificate of title shall be likewise cancelled, but all subsisting liens or encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be transferred to the new certificate of title and to its owner’s duplicate, as well as to any co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate that may have been issued, the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, if any, being thereby ipso facto cancelled.

SECTION 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 19, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, in P-09-181 (LRC REC No. 7929) is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered GRANTING the Petition dated December 22, 2008, and ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Manila to RECONSTITUTE the damaged original copy of Transfer Certificate Title No. 112932, with the necessary annotation that it is a reconstituted title and subject to the limitations provided under Republic Act No. 26, as amended.  Furnish copies of this Decision to the Register of Deeds of Manila and the Land Registration Authority in Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

Zalameda, and Diy, JJ., concur.

^[2] Record, p. 1.

^[3] Decision, p. 2;  Rollo, p. 35.

^[4] Decision, pp. 2-3;  Rollo, pp. 35-36.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 27-28.

^[6] Appellant’s Brief, p. 5;  Rollo, p. 15.

^[7] Emphasis supplied.

^[8] G.R. No. 146846, August 31, 2004.

^[9] Exhibit “I”;  Record, p. 22.

^[10] G.R. No. 161042, August 24, 2009.

^[11] 406 Phil. 263, 278 (2001).

^[12] Petition, p. 5;  Record, p. 5.

^[13] Annex A to the Petition;  Record, p. 8.

^[14] Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

^[15] Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91869, October 19, 1992.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Ibid.