THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ILDEFONSO DE CASTRO, JR., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On or about December 26, 1945, appellant was caught in
possession of a Japanese pistol, which he “used to threaten the person of Sophie
Genova.” On January 7, 1946, the chief of police of Magallanes, Sorsogon, filed
a complaint against him in the justice of the peace court of said municipality
for illegal possession of a firearm. At the preliminary investigation the
accused appeared, accompanied by his father who was an ex-justice of the peace,
and pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had presented two witnesses and
Exhibit A and had rested its case, the accused renounced his right to present
proofs. Finding the existence of a probable cause, the justice of the peace
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for trial on the merits.

The assistant provincial fiscal filed an information in the
Court of First Instance on March 12, 1946, charging the accused with illegal
possession of a revolver with three rounds of ammunition. After various
postponements granted by the court at the instance of the accused, the case was
called for trial on December 22, 1947. On that date the accused and his
attorneys presented a written plea which reads as follows:

“PLEA TO THE INFORMATION

“Come now the accused and his undersigned attorneys and
respectfully enter the following plea in the above-entitled case:

“That the accused admits the allegations in the information but
invokes the provisions of Proclamation No. 1 of the President of the
Philippines, dated July 20, 1946, as exempting him from criminal liability.

“Sorsogon, Sorsogon, December 22, 1947.

“(Sgd.) ILDEFONSO DE CASTRO, JR.
“Accused

“(Sgd.) HUGO D. DADO

“(Sgd.) FELICIANO S. GONZALES
“Attorneys for the
Accused

When the case was called the attorneys for the accused
submitted the foregoing plea to the court. Notwithstanding that plea the court
ordered that the information be read to the accused. The attorneys for the
accused renounced the reading of the information, saying that the accused
considered himself duly informed thereof. Notwithstanding that waiver the court
insisted and ordered that the information be read to the accused in open court,
after which the court asked the accused whether he had understood the
information which had just been read to him, and the accused answered in the
affirmative. The court then asked him whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty.
Thereupon Attorney Gonzales addressed the court as follows:

“MR. GONZALES: At this stage, we are entering the written plea
of the accused.

“JUZGADO: Hagase constar que el acusado ha manifestado al
Juzgado que acaba de someter su contestacion a la querella y reitera y confirma
las alegaciones contenidas en dicha contestacion.

“JUZGADO: Quieren ustedes decir que el plea que acaban
ustedes de someter es la contestacion del acusado a la querella?

“SR. GONZALES: Si, señor. Pedimos un plazo de 10 dias desde
esta fecha para someter un memorandum por escrito.

“JUZGADO: Se concede a la defensa y al Fiscal Provincial un
plazo de 10 dias a contar desde este dia para someter sus informes
respectivos.”

Thus the only issue submitted to the trial court was whether or
not Proclamation No. 1 of the President of the Philippines, dated July 20, 1946,
and issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 4, exempted or relieved the accused from
any criminal liability upon the facts alleged in the information and admitted by
the accused in open court.

Upon the memoranda filed by both parties, his Honor Judge Jose
R. de Venecia found that Proclamation No. 1 invoked by the accused was not
applicable to the instant case. It appears that Republic Act No. 4, which was
approved and took effect on July 19, 1946, amended section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56, by increasing the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms. Section 2 of said Act provides that
the provisions of the foregoing section to the contrary notwithstanding, any
person in possession of any of the prohibited articles therein mentioned, may,
without incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same to such officer and
within such period of time as the President shall by proclamation designate and
fix immediately upon the approval of this Act: Provided, however, That
this section shall not be interpreted to mean as in any way exempting from such
liability any person, without the requisite license, found, within the
aforementioned period of time, making use of any of said articles, except in
self-defense, or carrying them on his person except for the purpose of
surrendering them as herein required: Provided, further, That this
section shall not in any way affect any case pending in court, on the date of
the passage of this Act, for violation of section twenty-six hundred and
ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code.” Proclamation No. 1 fixed the
period within which any person in possession of firearms might, without
incurring any criminal liability, “surrender the same to the Secretary of the
Interior or to the governor of the province or the mayor of the place wherein he
resides or to any officer of the Military Police Command of the Philippine
Army,” namely, not later than August 31, 1946, in the provinces of Luzon. Since
the present case was already pending in court when Republic Act No. 4 was
approved and Proclamation No. 1 was issued, the trial court held that under the
last proviso hereinabove quoted the accused was not exempted from criminal
liability. Consequently the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56, and sentenced him to suffer one
month of imprisonment, to pay a fine of P200 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The decision of the trial court was dated January 12, 1948.
Various postponements of the reading of that sentence were granted by the court
upon petition of the accused. It was finally read to him on May 26, 1948.
Immediately after the reading of the sentence the accused presented a notice of
appeal.

In this appeal a new counsel for the appellant abandons the
defense of exemption from criminal liability under Proclamation No. 1 and
contends that the trial court should have ordered a plea of not guilty to be
entered for the appellant and should have ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence.

It seems to us that to countenance such tactics would be to
allow the accused to trifle with the court. By his written plea, which he orally
reiterated in open court, the accused admitted (factually and not
hypothetically) the allegations of the information, thus relieving the
prosecution from the necessity of proving them. The only issue he submitted to
the court for decision and for which he asked for ten days within which to
present a memorandum, was whether or not Proclamation No. 1, issued pursuant to
Republic Act No. 4, exempted him from criminal liability. That issue was decided
adversely to him, and after more than four months of delay in the promulgation
of the decision caused by his repeated requests for postponement, the appellant
did not even move for a new trial on the ground that he had made a mistake in
admitting the allegations of the information and that he had a valid defense to
offer.

The appellant further contends that his written plea should
have been treated by the trial court as a motion to quash under section 2
(f) of Rule 113, which says that the.defendant may move to quash the
complaint or information on the ground that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished. This contention is patently an afterthought which merits no
serious consideration. If the accused had any defense other than his mistaken
reliance on Proclamation No. 1, he should really have presented to the trial
court a motion to quash so that in case it should be denied he could avail
himself of such other defense. But he did not do that. Instead, he admitted the
allegations of the information outright and submitted the case for decision on
the merits upon the question of law raised by his plea of confession and
avoidance, which in effect was a plea of not guilty. If by that plea the accused
had intended to present a motion to quash (which he did not), he would and
should have protested to the trial court against the sentence of conviction and
should have moved that court to set it aside and hear the evidence. Instead of
doing that, he caused the promulgation of the sentence to be postponed for more
than four months and, after hearing it, immediately appealed therefrom. He never
asked the trial court to hear any witness in his behalf, nor did he offer any
proof whatsoever. He has had his day in court. He cannot complain.

Appellant prays this court to reverse the decision appealed
from and to acquit him, “or else to grant him a new trial.” Neither of these
alternative prayers has any legal or factual basis.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and
Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurs in the result.

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DISSENTING

PARAS, J.:

I am of the opinion that the “Plea to the Information”, quoted
in full in the majority opinion, should have been considered by the trial court
either as a motion to quash (demurrer before) or as a conditional plea of
guilty. If considered as a motion to quash, it was the duty of the trial court
to accordingly pass upon it. If denied, the accused should have been required to
plead. If considered as a plea, the trial court should have ordered its
substitution by a plea of not guilty, since said plea contains a statement which
if true would preclude a finding of guilt of the offense charged (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d Ed., Vol. II, pp. 684-685, citing U. S. vs.
Edpalina, 27 Phil., 43), in which case the lower court was bound, after
substituting a plea of not guilty, to proceed with the trial. It is clear that,
under the plea here in question, the accused had not contemplated to admit his
guilt of the offense charged in the information, and this is obvious from the
fact that said accused claimed to be exempt from criminal liability in
view of the provisions of proclamation No. 1 of the President of the
Philippines, dated July 20, 1946. It is immaterial whether the accused raised a
question of law. The important thing is that, in virtue of that defense, he
cannot be convicted of the very offense for which exemption is claimed.

The fact that various postponements of the reading of the
sentence were asked by the accused is also of no moment, since said
postponements cannot amount to a waiver of his right to a trial, as prescribed
by law.

My vote, therefore, is to remand the case to the lower court
for a new trial, the accused being considered as having entered a plea of not
guilty.