G.R. No. L-34637. February 24, 1984
THE POLICE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, CRISPINO M. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE GUARDSON R. LOOD AND SIMPLICIO C. IBEA, RESPONDENTS.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch
VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No.
48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered
then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to
reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the
same municipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up
to the date of his actual reinstatement. Upon the filing of the
petition, the Court, at petitioner’s instance, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining respondent court from executing the
questioned decision.
Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then
Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo (later on substituted during the pendency of
this case in the court below by incumbent Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada)
pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of
serious irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose
Lee, Jr.
Respondent thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court seeking
his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent court which rendered
its decision declaring the decision of the Police Commission as null and
void and ordered the town mayor to “reinstate the plaintiff to his
former position as patrolman in the Police Department of San Juan, Rizal
with back salaries and remunerations pertaining to said position from
the date of his suspension to the time of his reinstatement to the
service.” Respondent court ruled that the decision of petitioner
commission was based on incomplete records as there was no transcript of
the testimonies of witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the
Board of Investigators and that the commission’s conclusion was without
factual basis and was in violation of administrative due process.
Respondent court also ruled that the question of the temporary status of
the appointment of Ibea for lack of civil service eligibility (which
was raised in the court below by the answer of Mayor Joseph Ejercito
Estrada) had become moot and academic upon respondent Ibea’s subsequent
acquisition of a civil service eligibility.
Hence, this petition which this Court finds meritorious, as per the
assignment of errors made by the Solicitor General on behalf of
petitioner commission, as follows:
“I. The lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio
C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission
decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes
taken of the proceedings of the case.“II. The lower court erred in disturbing the findings of facts
of the Police Commission, an administrative agency duly vested by
Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and authority to render decision in
administrative cases against policemen and whose decision is final.“III. The lower court erred in holding that the allegations on
the temporary status of the appointment of respondent Simplicio C. Ibea
for lack of civil service eligibility has been rendered moot and
academic upon the latter’s subsequent acquisition of a civil service
eligibility.”
The Court finds the errors assigned to be well taken.
1. Respondent court’s ruling against petitioner’s decision as
falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it
decided the subject administrative case without stenographic notes
(which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings
of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the
Board of Investigators shall be a “board of record,” and as such it does
not provide for office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who
may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The
proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in
character, in line with the principle that “administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.”[1]
The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties
are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.
The decision and resolution of petitioner commission amply show that
both complainant and respondent were given the opportunity to be heard
by the board and to adduce their respective evidence, which were duly
considered and taken into account in its decision. The absence of the
transcript of stenographic notes (which were not taken by the board) in
the records of the case submitted by the Board of Investigators of San
Juan, Rizal in the administrative proceeding cannot be claimed to have
deprived respondent of due process of law. The report of investigation
(which contained a summary report of what transpired during the hearing
of the case), the affidavit-complaint, and respondent’s answer thereto,
as well as the memoranda of the parties were sufficient basis for the
decision and resolution of the commission, and substantially and
essentially constituted the “records of the investigation” required in
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 4864.
2. The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision was supported
by substantial evidence consisting of the affidavit-complaint (which was
duly affirmed when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and testified
before the board) and the documentary evidence duly marked by the board
as exhibits for the complainant (and which were not questioned by
respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that
administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence on the record,[2] or stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.[3] As expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,[4]
substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative
finding of fact, and substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
The commission’s reasons for having chosen to believe the complaint
filed by Mr. Jose Lee, Jr. as against respondent’s defense were
extensively discussed in its decision (Annex “N”) and reiterated in its
resolution, thus:”A close perusal of the record shows that said affidavit was
presented by the complainant during the proceedings and its presentation
was not objected to by the respondent-petitioner. Hence, it became a
part of the records and therefore must be considered in the deliberation
of this case. Moreover, there are documents presented and incorporated
in the records of the case that are corroborative of the affidavit of
the complainant. Some of these documentary evidence are memorandum of
the complainant, copy of the police blotter, letter of the complainant
to Lt. Bautista, reply of the Clerk of Court to Jose Lee, Jr., a copy of
the decision of Cesar Cruz, Acting Municipal Judge of San Juan, Rizal
and the investigation report of Pat. Simplicio C. Ibea which was
eventually submitted though late. All these documents, one way or
another, corroborate the affidavit of the complainant. Hence, the
allegation that the affidavit is uncorroborated does not hold water.”[5]
The above-mentioned documentary evidence which convinced petitioner as
to the veracity of the charges against respondent were certainly more
than persuasive and substantial.
Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to believe the theory of
the defense put up by respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground
that there was no evidence to support the findings of the Police
Commission. In effect, respondent Court substituted its own judgment
for that of the Police Commission which is final, contrary to the
prevailing principle that “in reviewing administrative decisions, the
reviewing court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if
originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence that was
not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.”[6]
3. Since the appointment of Simplicio C. Ibea to the police force
was only temporary in nature for lack of civil service eligibility at
the time, the same was duly terminated upon his dismissal pursuant to
the commission’s decision. Respondent had no longer any legal right to
be reinstated to the service where the mayor does not want him
reinstated by extending him a new appointment as in the instant case.
Respondent court erred in holding that the allegations on the temporary
status of the appointment of private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea for
lack of civil service eligibility had been rendered moot and academic
upon the latter’s subsequent acquisition of a civil service
eligibility. Under the civil service law then in force, the fact that
private respondent subsequently became a civil service eligible did not ipso facto
render permanent the nature of his temporary appointment as to make the
question moot and academic. In fact, under Section 24 (d) of Republic
Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), the law in force at the time
of Ibea’s appointment, a temporary appointment could not exceed six
months (now one year under R.A. 6040). That he was allowed by the mayor
to continue in the service even after the six-months period was merely
an extension of grace. Thus, as the Court held in similar cases:
“Temporary appointments, under Section 682 of the Revised
Administrative Code, are limited to three months. Upon the expiration
of that period, a temporary appointee could be removed at will. Any
continuance thereafter as a temporary employee was an extension of
grace. The fact that petitioner became a civil service eligible did not
entitle him to a permanent appointment to the position. The power to
appoint is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
Petitioner’s temporary appointment did not ripen, by virtue of his
acquisition of eligibility into one of permanence.”[7]
– – –
“Since his appointment is temporary, it did not confer upon
appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent character the position
to which he was appointed. His civil service eligibility will avail
him none.”[8]
In fine, since respondent Ibea was merely a temporary appointee, he was
subject to removal at any time without the necessity of following the
procedure set up by Republic Act No. 4864, for removal of police
officers, and regardless of the complaint filed against him. After his
services were terminated by former Mayor Sto. Domingo, his reinstatement
was no longer legally feasible in the face of incumbent Mayor Estrada’s
refusal to do so, considering that he held merely a temporary
appointment.
For “well-settled in this jurisdiction is the principle that when an
appointment is temporary, the same is terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing power, and no cause is required to be shown for such
termination.”[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned decision of respondent defunct Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 12069 is hereby
set aside and the preliminary injunction issued against its enforcement
is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Maribojoc vs. Hon. Pastor de Guzman, 109 Phil. 833 (1960).
[2] Santos vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 637 (1967).
[3] Castillo vs. Rodriguez, 14 SCRA 344 (1965) and Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil 422.
[4] 69 Phil. 635, 642.
[5] Resolution, p. 4, Annex O.
[6] Timbancaya vs. Vicente, et al., 119 Phil. 169 (1963); Insurefco Paper Pulp & Project Workers’ Union vs. Insurefco, 95 Phil. 761 (1954); Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635.
[7] Jimenez vs. Francisco, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-9699, prom. Feb. 28, 1957.
[8] Jimenea vs. Guanzon, 22 SCRA 224 (1968); see also Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343 (1968).
[9] Azuelo vs. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 (1960); see also Ferrer vs. De Leon, 109 Phil. 202 (1960); Quitquit vs. Villacorta, 107 Phil. 1060 (1960); Mendez vs. Banzon, G.R. No. L-10483, April 12, 1957, 101 Phil. 48; Agapuyan vs. Ledesma, 101 Phil. 1199 (1957); Montero, et al. vs. Castellanes, 108 Phil. 744 (1960).