G.R. No. L-30027. July 31, 1969
ESTATE OF JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, REPRESENTED BY THE EXECUTOR, ANTONIO DE LA FUENTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE…
CASTRO, J.:
During her lifetime Justina Santos made
various contracts in, favor of Wong Heng, a Chinaman
now deceased, whereby she leased to the latter a large parcel of land on Rizal Avenue, in Manila
for a period of 99 years and gave him a 50-year option to purchase the property
in the event the lessee obtained Philippine citizenship. In Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She[1]
this Court annulled these contracts as constituting an “insidious
pattern” to subvert the Constitutional ban against alien landholding.
Following our decision in that case, the estate of Justina Santos, the petitioner in this case, applied to the
lower court for a writ of execution.[2]
At the same time it sent the respondent Lui She the
following letter:
“February 23, 1968
“MRS. LUI SHE
Hen Wah Restaurant
661
Rizal Avenue
Manila
“Madam:
“As counsel for the Philippine Banking Corporation
representing the estate of Justina Santos y Canon
Faustino, we quote hereunder the dispositive portion
of the decision, of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-17587, ‘Philippine Banking
Corporation vs. Lui She,’ as follows:
“‘ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff
Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land
subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking
Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the
defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the
Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35 with legal interest from
the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in
court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of
rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his
heirs. Costs against the
defendant-appellant.’
“The records will show that the amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 41956 was filed on June 9,
1960, and, in accordance with the decision, legal interest due on
the amount of P56,564.35 is P3,393.86 every year from June 9, 1960, or approximately P26,302.42 as of March 9, 1968. Please consider this, therefore, as a demand
for the payment of said principal and interest.
“We likewise make demand upon you to turn over the premises to
the estate and to vacate the same not later than March 9, 1968.
“Finally please be advised that, as of the time the decision
became final and executory, the estate considers as
the reasonable monthly rental the amount of P15,000.00, and we will consider
you responsible for the payment of this amount for the period during which you
continue to illegally occupy the premises and withhold its possession for the
estate.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) EZEQUIEL S. CONSULTA
EZEQUIEL S.
CONSULTA”
The respondent did not reply.
Instead she sent payment of P3,120 on July 3, 1968, which the petitioner accepted and applied as
partial payment of the rental of P15,000 for the month of July.
On July 11 the respondent, through counsel, wrote the following
letter:
“July 11, 1968
“Philippine Banking Corporation
Administrator of the Estate of
Justina
Santos y Canon
Faustino, Deceased
Port Area, Manila
Security Bank & Trust Company
Escolta, Manila
“Dear Sirs:
Re: Lui She
“We are writing on behalf of Lui She
relative to her occupancy of the premises located at 661
Rizal Avenue, Manila. In this connection we invite you to the
following:
“1. As you may know, by
reason of the action of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
41956 sustaining the lease for fifty (50) years[3]
in favor of Wong Heng, his widow, Lui
She, during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme
Court in good faith entered into a sublease contract with third parties. One of these subleases is for a period of ten
(10) years to expire in January, 1977.
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, Lui
She is now confronted with the serious problem of terminating this
sublease. This is, however, not an easy
matter as the sublessee acquired its sublease rights
in good faith. The only practical
solution would be for Lui She to secure the
prolongation of her stay in the premises as long as legally possible and, as a
necessary consequence, that of the sublease so as not to expose Lui She to a claim for damages.
“2. By this time you must
be already aware of the condition of the leased premises where the improvements
are not exactly in first class tenantable condition and whenever it rains the groundfloor area is usually flooded. The rental Lui She
has been paying (and during Wong Heng’s lifetime that
being paid by him) as you know, is for the use of the land. It is my client’s view that the present
rental of P 3,120.00 monthly is reasonable, but on account of your demand for a
readjustment she proposes to have the same increased effective July 1, 1968 to P5,000.00
monthly. We earnestly plead for your
kind and favorable consideration of this proposal considering Lui She’s financial predicament and the threatened lawsuit
for damages she may face at the hands of the principal sublessees.
“3. We also wish to point
out that actually Lui She is not occupying the entire
land area involved in Civil Case No. 41956.
We, therefore, feel that her proposal to pay P5,000.00 monthly for the
portion still in her possession is reasonable considering all circumstances.
“4. As to the money
judgment we suggest that the matter be left to the competent courts for final
disposition.[4]
“5. May we point out that
actually Lui She is the victim of misfortune not of
her own making. We ask that you treat
her problem with sympathy. It is
unfortunate enough that she lost her husband; this misfortune was aggravated by
the unprecedented forfeiture of lease-hold rights which the Court of First
Instance of Manila considered valid at least for fifty (50) years.
“In the light of the foregoing, we request that Lui She be permitted to pay rental at the rate of P5,000.00
monthly starting July 1, 1968.
“We look forward to hearing from you soon.
Very truly your
DOMINGO E. DE LARA & ASSOCIATES
By:
(Sgd.)
DOMINGO E. DE LARA”
In reply the
petitioner, through its special administrator, wrote:
“July 17, 1968
“Atty. Domingo E. de Lara
305 Madrigal Building
Escolta,
Manila
Re: Your Letter dated July 11, 1968
“Dear Sir:
“With regard to the proposal of your client to pay a rent of P
5,000.00, please note that our original demand was for a rent of P15,000.00,
which we subsequently reduced to P9,000.00.
“As to the money judgment, which we are requiring your client
to pay as a condition to withholding enforcement of the ejectment
order you will please note that it is a final and executory
judgment of the Supreme Court so that the question of liability for the amount
had been finally settled and resort to procedural technicalities may only
serve to indicate dilatoriness.
“We understand the predicament of your client, but you are
perhaps aware that our duty as special administrator — to preserve and
maintain the estate in the most beneficial manner – constrains us to take the
steps we have taken. It would have been
more prudence [sic] and certainly more in keeping with good faith if
your client had not entered into sublease contracts, considering that her
occupancy was then being litigated.
“Unless approved by the probate court, the foregoing proposals
are tentative and are not to be taken as novating the
judgment against your client.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)
Carlos J. Paras
CARLOS J. PARAS
Trust Officer”
In turn the respondent wrote the following letter:
“August 5, 1968
“Security Bank and Trust Company
Manila
“Gentlemen:
“Referring to the proposal of our client, Lui
She, contained in our letter of July
11, 1968 to the Philippine Banking Corporation, we are tendering
herewith Continental Bank check RAB-A 128724 dated August 2, 1968 for P5,000.00 payable to you representing
the monthly rental for August, 1968 which we reiterate you accept as the
adjusted rent monthly.
“In Philip pine Banking Corporation’s letter of July 17, 1968, a photostat
copy of which we enclose, we note that approval by the probate court of any proposal
is contemplated. In this connection, we
call attention to the recitals in our letter of July 11, 1968 on the basis of
which we believe that a monthly rental of P5,000.00 is reasonable under the
circumstances. We feel confident that,
if called upon, we can convince the probate court of the reasonableness of this
rental.
“We also take this opportunity to remind you that the frontage
of the leased property on Rizal
Avenue actually belongs to the City of Manila
and that the property of Doña Justina
does not in fact abut on Rizal
Avenue. For
this reason, to enable our client to have an outlet on Rizal
Avenue, since about 1959 her husband has been paying rentals to the City of
Manila for the account of Doña Justina. If you will therefore consider this fact, we
think that our client’s proposal for a P5,000.00 monthly rental is well
justified. For your information, our
client is paying over P1,000.00 annually to the City of Manila in order to keep
this frontage on Rizal Avenue.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) DOMINGO E. DE LARA
Counsel for Lui She”
In accordance with this letter she paid P5,000 for the month of
August and for each of the succeeding months thereafter. For its part the petitioner accepted the
payments and issued receipts therefor, showing that
the monthly payments were applied to the satisfaction of the sum of P15,000
which the petitioner was demanding as monthly rental, until December 1968 when
it refused to accept further payments from the respondent.
On November 12, 1968 the petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution.
It appears that the writ of execution issued on March 19, 1968 was returned unsatisfied on August 27, 1968 for failure of the
sheriff to serve it on the respondent within the 60-day limit provided in the
Rules of Court.[5]
On November 16, 1968 an alias
writ of execution was issued, commanding the sheriff “to cause the
defendant Lui She and all persons claiming
possession under her to vacate the land belonging to the estate of the deceased
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino, represented by Mr.
Antonio de la Fuente.” However, on motion of the
respondent, who claimed that the writ was not in accord with the decision of
this Court and that at any rate the respondent’s occupancy of the land did not
derive from the contracts annulled by this Court but from a new lease contract,
the lower, court quashed the writ of execution.
In its order dated December 9, 1968, the court said:
“The decision of our Supreme Court
nullifying the 50-year lease was promulgated on September 27, 1967. Lui She and her sublessees had plenty of time to take steps for the
protection of their interests. The
Special Administrator, on the other hand, having won the case, demanded a
monthly rental of P15,000.00. Lui She countered with an offer of P5,000.00 and made these
payments but the Special Administrator issued receipts applying these payments
of P5,000 as partial payments to the monthly rental of P15,000.00
demanded. It should be noted that the
monthly rental on the voided lease contract was P3,020.[6]
It is claimed that there was no approval by the Probate Court of this new
charge of rental. Being month to month,
there was no need of approval by the Probate Court as being within the regular
powers of the Special Administrator. The
demand for increase in rental is an obvious offer for a lease contract on month
to month basis – for if there was a desire to regain the premises, the Special
Administrator should have demanded the return of the premises and charged the
rental theretofore agreed upon. The
increase in rental impliedly gives rise to a desire to continue lessor-lessee relations should the lessee agree to the payment. The acceptance by Lui
She of the receipts making application of payment was an implied acceptance of
this offer to lease on month to month basis.
This being so, in order to properly evict Lui
She and her sublessees, there will be need of new
illegal detainer cases for the possession of Lui She has been legalized (Cruz v Atencio
GR No. L-11276, February 28, 1959).”
The petitioner asked for reconsideration and, failing, filed this
petition for mandamus. It contends that
the respondent judge acted “arbitrarily, capriciously and
whimsically” in holding that the parties had in effect entered into a new
lease contract when the fact was that the minds of the parties never met on the
amount of rent to be paid for the premises.
On the other hand, the respondent defends the correctness of the
disputed order of the lower court and, as a preliminary question, challenges
the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the instant petition for
mandamus. The respondent’s point is that
under section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as recently amended by Republic Act
5440,[7]
this Court’s jurisdiction extends only to “petitions for issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals.”
It is obvious that the respondent has overlooked the second
paragraph of the same provision which gives the Supreme Court “original
and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance … [over] petitions
for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus
. . . .” This was found in the said section 17 even before its amendment
by Republic Act 5440. It is from this
provision that this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain petitions for mandamus,
as well as other special civil actions, against lower courts is derived. Nor is there merit in the contention that at
all events the petitioner’s remedy should be by appeal. It is by now part of conventional wisdom that
an order denying execution, as an order granting one, is not appealable, otherwise a case would never end.[8]
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is claimed that the
decision of this Court, in so far as it directed the return of the land, was in
effect novated because the parties had agreed on a
new lease contract covering the same property.
Thus the respondent argues that there was a tacit renewal of the lease
contract[9]
when, instead of pressing for the enforcement of the writ of execution, the
petitioner allowed it to lapse, forcing the sheriff to return it to the court
unsatisfied.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the failure to
serve the writ on the respondent was due to the intervention of the
petitioner. This is what the sheriff
said in his return:
“I hereby certify that after several attempts to serve a copy
of the writ of execution issued in the above-entitled case on March 19, 1968
upon the defendant LUI SHE, etc. the same was served upon her personally on
August 11, 1968; that by virtue of said writ, I caused her to surrender
possession of the premises object of the writ to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking
Corporation.
“That the sixty (60) day period having expired already and
that no more proceeding shall be undertaking [sic] thereon, I now return
the writ of execution to the court of origin, duly served.”
The sheriff’s return, it is true, does not explain why he was
unable to serve the writ on the respondent earlier, but if the petitioner
really stopped the sheriff to allow the negotiations on a new lease to continue
unhampered, we are at a loss why the sheriff did persist in serving it on the
respondent until he succeeded in doing so on August 11, 1968 – and only the
fact that by then the life of the writ had expired made him desist from
enforcing it. On the other hand the
respondent’s claim that it was the petitioner which allowed the writ to lapse
is belied by her other claim, contained in paragraph 3 of her answer to the present
petition for mandamus, that –
“respondent Lui
She, through her representatives, called the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to
Lui She’s negotiation and/or agreement with the
Philippine Banking Corporation, as special administrator of the Testate Estate
of Justina Santos y Canon Faustino, and the Security
Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the Estate of Lorenza
Santos y Canon Faustino. Respondent Lui She took it that her explanation was accepted by the
Deputy Sheriff and on that account the latter returned the writ without further
proceedings.”[10]
It would appear therefore that if execution of the judgment has
not been carried out it was because the respondent persuaded the sheriff that
there was no longer need for enforcing the writ, the parties having reached a new
agreement for the lease of the premises, and not because the petitioner did not
press for its enforcement.
What is more, to speak of an implied new lease (tacita reconduccion)
is, first of all, to assume a fact: the expiration of a former contract. But the lease contract in this case did not
expire; it was declared void for being repugnant to the Constitution, having
been found to be part of an elaborate scheme to circumvent the prohibition
against the acquisition by aliens of lands in the Philippines. Secondly, such a lease would be a revival of
the former one, albeit not of its period.
Can there be a revival of a void contract? Thirdly, if the terms (except the period) of
the old contract are revived, Why were there long negotiations over the amount
of the rent?
On the other hand, the trial court, in its disputed order of
December 9, 1968, said there was a new lease contract and that as a matter of
fact the respondent had been paying and the petitioner had been issuing
receipts for the payments. Hence, to
evict the respondent the petitioner would have to institute a wholly new action
for unlawful detainer.
To begin with, the letter of February 23, 1968 shows that the
petitioner demanded the return of the land with the threat that for any delay it
would demand from the respondent the payment of P15,000 a month in rent. But the respondent apparently took the threat
as an offer on the part of the petitioner to lease the premises, and indeed the
subsequent correspondence of the parties, set out in full at the beginning of
this opinion, tends to show that what began as a threat to exact payment of an
amount as compensation for the illegal occupancy of the premises became an
offer and the subject of bargaining. The
position of the petitioner became so equivocal that after its letter of July
17, 1968 it was not entirely improbable that the petitioner was willing to
lease the premises if the respondent would pay the reduced amount of P9,000 as
monthly rental, and that the petitioner was dangling the threat of execution of
the judgment as a means of inducing the respondent to agree to the new
rental. But even if this were so, still
we cannot hold, as the lower court did, that a new lease contract was thereby
celebrated. To be sure, the parties
could not agree on the rental, and while the monthly payments of P 5,000 made
by the respondent were accepted by the petitioner it did so with a reservation,
and in fact all the payments were applied to the satisfaction of the sum of
P15,000 which the petitioner was demanding as monthly rental.
In sum, there could not in law be any implied renewal of the void
lease contract, and the correspondence between the parties clearly shows that
there was no new lease contract entered into over the premises in question.
In thus refusing to execute the judgment in L-17587 the lower
court disregarded the duty which clearly and inescapably devolved upon it.
A s to the petitioner’s claim for P 40,000 in damages, consequent
to the illegal occupancy on the premises by the respondent, this Court is of
the view that this matter may be litigated in a separate action.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is granted, and the
respondent judge is commanded to issue a writ of execution in L-17587,
conformably with the above pronouncements.
Costs against the private respondent.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on official leave.
[1]
L-17587, Sept. 12, 1967, 21
SCRA 52.
[2]
The dispositive portion of the decision of this Court
in L-17587 reads:
“ACCORDINGLY, the contracts
in question (Plff Exhs.
3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is
ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as
represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng
(as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She)
is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and
the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be
applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises
shall have been vacated by his heirs.
Costs against the defendant-appellant.”
In its order
dated March 19, 1968 the
Court of First Instance of Manila granted execution for the recovery of the
land but denied recovery of the money judgment on the ground that the claim was
barred, no contingent claim having been filed againSt
the Estate of Wong Heng within the time limited in
the notice of the probate court. See
Rule 86, sec. 5
[3]
The lease contract was originally for 50 years but a subsequent contract
extended the period to 99 years. The
Court of First Instance of Manila upheld the validity of the contract providing
for a 50-year lease but declared the rest of the contracts (including the one
extending the period of the lease to 99 years) void for lack of consent and of
consideration. On appeal the Supreme
Court invalidated all the contracts “as a scheme to circumvent the
Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens.” See
21 SC RA at 62-65.
[4]
The reference here is to the judgment for money as to which the lower court
denied execution. Supra,
note 2.
[5]
Rule 39, sec. 11.
[6]
The correct amount is P3,120.
[7]
Effective Sept. 9, 1968.
[8] Cf.
2 M. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 259 (6th ed. 1963).
[9] Civ. Code art. 1670.
[10] Emphasis
added.