THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. DAMASO ATIENZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from the order of dismissal of the Municipal Court
of the City of Cagayan de Oro in its Criminal Case No. 6612.

Defendant-appellee, Damaso
Atienza, was charged with grave oral defamation in
the said Court upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee.  The
defamatory words allegedly uttered by the defendant were: “Pauli na, puta
ka.  Oo, puta
ka, puta kat bilaw.” The translation given in the complaint itself is:  “Go
home, you prostitute.  Yes, you are a
prostitute, really a prostitute.” Below the verification and the list of
prosecu­tion witnesses, the complaint likewise had the signature of the special
counsel, acting as public prosecutor.

The trial of the case, after the defendant’s plea of not guilty,
was already well advanced, with only the sur-rebuttal
witness for the defense still to be presented, when counsel moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction aver the offense
charged.  Specifically, the
jurisdictional objection was based on the fact that the case was being
prosecuted upon complaint signed by the offended party herself instead of upon
information signed by the prosecuting officer.

The lower court sustained the motion and issued the order of
dismissal on March 30, 1962, citing Article VII, Section 24 of the charter of
the City of Cagayan de Oro
(Republic Act No. 521), which provides that the City attorney shall
“investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws
and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations
or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused.” The theory
ad­vanced is that since the offense of prostitution imputed by the defendant to
the offended party for which imputation the complaint for oral defamation was
lodged, is a public crime, it cannot be prosecuted except by information signed
by the public prosecutor himself. 
Consequently, it is pointed out, the complaint here, having been, signed
by the offended party herself, did not effectively and validly launch the
criminal action. 

There is a misapprehension both of law and of fact in the order
of dismissal appealed from.  The
provision of the charter of the City of Cagayan de Oro
aforecited is not restrictive in character.  While it imposes upon the City attorney the
duty to investigate offenses and to sign the corresponding informations
or complaints, it does not say that the victim of the offense may not himself
file a complaint.  The law of more
immediate relevancy is Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:  “No criminal action for defamation which
consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of
and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.” As construed by
the lower court, invoking People vs. Martinez,
L-50, April 30, 1946, the
foregoing provision sets up a prohibition against the pro­secution of a charge
of defamation upon complaint by the offended party when the defamation consists
of the imputa­tion of a crime which may be prosecuted de officio.  The decision in People vs. Martinez
does not support this con­clusion.  It
simply underlines the indispensability of such a complaint where the crime
imputed cannot be prosecuted de oficio
such as adultery, concubinage, rape, seduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness. 
The more recent case of Balite vs. People,
L-21475, September 30, 1966,
is more apropos, its facts being similar to those in the case before us now.  Speaking through Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, this Court there said:

“Read as it should be, the plain import of the statute just
reproduced is that where defamation imputes a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the general rule must give way, the
criminal action must have to be brought solely “at the instance of and
upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.” The converse pro­position,
however, cannot be true.  Reasonable
construction will not permit a deduction which could constrict criminal
prosecution of defamation which can be pro­secuted de oficio by means of information.  We do not propose to undertake the
impermissible task of writing into the statute an alien concept:  that which would exclude criminal action
started by complaint.  Nor should we
attribute to the law an occult content.”

The misapprehension of fact on the part of the lower court lies
in its having overlooked two circumstances: 
(1) the word “puta” alleged to have
been uttered by the defendant in referring to the offended party does not
necessarily connote the crime of prostitution as defined in the Revised Penal
Code.  (Art. 202); and (2) the subject
complaint, while signed and sworn to by the offended party herself, is also
signed by the special counsel, as public prosecuting officer, who retained
supervision and control of the case for the State and in fact conducted the
cross-examination of the witnesses for the defense and the presentation of the
rebuttal witness for the prosecution. 
Besides, the technical objection raised by the defense should have been
deemed waived under those cir­cumstances and at that late stage of the case.

Wherefore,
the order of dismissal appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded for
further proceed­ings, with costs against defendant-appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on official leave.