PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CLINT ESTREBA Y ENRIQUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Estreba

The Case

This is People versus Estreba, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Clint Estreba for parricide — the killing of his own two-year-old son, Raven Clive. The accused admitted the killing but raised insanity as an exempting circumstance, so the whole case turns on one question: did the defense prove that he was completely deprived of reason at the very moment he stabbed his child? The case matters for the bar because it restates, with unusual clarity, the stringent quantum and the precise timing required to establish insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, and because it separates a psychiatric finding of fitness to stand trial from a finding of insanity at the time of the crime.

Procedural History

The accused was charged by Information with parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35. He was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty. During trial the court allowed him to be examined at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center and later confined him at the National Center for Mental Health, which reported that he had improved with medication and was competent to stand trial; the hearings then resumed. The trial court rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and awarding damages. Aggrieved, the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which resolved the appeal in the decision before us.

Facts

Olive Tan and the accused lived together beginning in 2004, and their union produced a son, Raven Clive, the victim. Their relationship deteriorated. In August 2006 the accused was taken into police custody after a relative reported that he was acting violently because of trouble with his live-in partner; the arresting officer observed him murmuring, shouting, and behaving abnormally. His father testified that the accused had shown signs of mental disturbance, had been brought to hospitals in Cebu, and had been deeply shaken when made to sign an agreement separating him from his wife and child.

On the morning of 29 September 2006, the accused went to the house of Olive's family in Ormoc City. Olive stayed inside, afraid of him. Her younger brother, Andrew Tan, brought the child out, and the accused asked to take the boy for a stroll. Andrew handed the child over and watched from the chapel across the way. He then saw the accused run with the child toward a vacant lot and stab him repeatedly. Andrew ran over, the accused released the child, and Andrew carried the bloodied boy home and rushed him to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

The physician who examined the body found penetrating stab wounds on the right breast, the left heart area, above the umbilicus, and the right lumbar area, with portions of the mesentery and large intestine protruding, and listed the cause of death as severe hemorrhage from the stab wounds. The accused himself later suffered self-inflicted stab wounds and was confined, and while in detention he again showed mental problems and was confined at the National Center for Mental Health for about a year. A psychiatrist, Dr. Lyn Verona, examined him in November 2007, more than a year after the killing, and diagnosed psychotic depression or organic psychosis, testifying that it was possible he was suffering from psychosis at the time of the crime.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity in favor of the accused.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Lyn Verona finding the accused to be suffering from organic psychosis.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not giving probative weight to the findings of the National Center for Mental Health that the accused was suffering from psychosis classified as schizophrenia.

Applicable Provisions

Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the decision, provides:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

This is the exempting circumstance the accused invoked, and the Court measured his evidence against its requirement of complete deprivation of intelligence.

Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, quoted by the Court, provides:

Insanity is a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.

This is the statutory definition of insanity that anchors the Court's analysis of the accused's mental condition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal must fail. The accused never denied killing his son, so the only question was whether his insanity was creditable, and the Court ruled that it was not. Insanity under Article 12 exists only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act — the accused is deprived of reason, acts without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power to discern, or suffers a total deprivation of the freedom of the will. The burden of proof rests on him who invokes insanity, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The Court stressed that insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof, and can only be measured by behavior, through opinion testimony from one intimately acquainted with the accused, one with rational basis to conclude from his own perception, or a qualified expert such as a psychiatrist. Here the defense failed to discharge that burden: the accused was not completely bereft of reason, discernment, or freedom of will when he mortally stabbed his son.

On the second issue, the Court held that Dr. Verona's testimony did not provide much help. Although she testified that it was possible the accused was already suffering from psychosis at the time of the crime, her supposition rested on his psychotic history in 2005 and 2006, apparently influenced by his father's disclosure of a previous consultation, and she examined him only in November 2007, more than a year after the killing. The Court laid down the governing rule:

Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.

Because the examination came after the incident, it could not be concluded with certainty that he was suffering from psychosis immediately before or simultaneously with the crime.

On the third issue, the Court held that the National Center for Mental Health findings were inapplicable to the defense theory, because they pertained only to the accused's ability to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately before or during the commission of the crime. In sum, the requirements of insanity were not met; his unusual behavior before and after the parricide did not meet the stringent standards, and the presumption of sanity was not overcome. The Court found no reason to reverse the trial court's findings of fact. It did, however, modify the damages: civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to 50,000 pesos each, exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos were granted because the qualifying circumstance of relationship was present, and interest at the legal rate of six percent per annum was imposed on all monetary awards from finality of the decision until fully paid.

Doctrine

Insanity as an exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act — a total absence of the power to discern, or a total deprivation of the freedom of the will. It is never presumed; the presumption is always in favor of sanity, and the accused who invokes insanity bears the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. The inquiry into the mental state must relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed; a psychiatric examination conducted long after the crime cannot, by itself, establish insanity at the time of its commission. Expert testimony is not conclusive, and a finding that an accused is competent to stand trial, or that he suffers from psychosis classified as schizophrenia, does not answer the separate question of whether he was completely deprived of reason when he acted.

Disposition

The appeal was denied, the judgment of conviction for parricide and the penalty of reclusion perpetua were affirmed, and the damages were modified to 50,000 pesos civil indemnity, 50,000 pesos moral damages, and 30,000 pesos exemplary damages, with interest at six percent per annum from finality until fully paid.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that insanity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and must relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. Examiners use this case to test the quantum of proof for the insanity defense and to trap students who confuse fitness to stand trial with insanity at the time of the crime.