VENERANDO SANTOS AND ROLANDO SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. DAYAL NANDWANI AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
BARRIOS, M. M., J.:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case Nos. 79039, 79040 and 79041 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THE FACTS
Petitioners Venerando Santos and Rolando Santos are directors of Ultra-Tech Corporation, a firm engaged in construction business. In order to jumpstart and revitalize the operations, additional capital was needed. Hence, petitioners, as officers of the company, loaned from private respondent the total amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). Petitioners issued and delivered to private respondent three (3) postdated Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) checks: PSB Check No. 0000120170 dated 23 September 1998 for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); PSB Check No. 0000120171 dated 24 September 1998 for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and PSB Check No. 0000120206 dated 03 January 1999 for Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).
It is contended, however, that said checks were not meant to serve as payment to the latter when said checks become due and demandable, but were issued to serve as evidence of their indebtedness to private respondent. Moreover, petitioners argue that they have substantially settled their obligation with private respondent in the total amount of Four Million Two Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Nine and 90/100 (P4,280,799.90) evidenced by several checks, vouchers and summary of payment; thus, novation had set in which obliterated incipient criminal liability.
When presented for payment, the aforesaid checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds and/or closed account. On 08 March 1999, private respondent sent a demand letter to petitioners asking them to settle the obligation.[2] On 11 March 1999, petitioner Venerando Santos sent a letter to private respondent offering a construction equipment as payment of their obligation.[3] Obviously rejecting the offer, private respondent sent another demand letter dated 15 March 1999, but to no avail.[4]
Consequently, private respondent initiated three (3) criminal complaints against petitioners, and thereafter, three (3) Informations for Violation of BP Blg. No. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Mandaluyong City. In Criminal Case No. 79039[5] the accusatory portion of the Information against petitioners read:
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That sometime in September, 1998, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Dayal Nandwani, to apply on account or for value the check described below:
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make an arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice to the damage and prejudice of the said payee in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information in the other two (2) criminal cases (Nos. 79040 and 79041) are similarly worded, except for the dates, check numbers and amounts thereof as aforementioned.
When arraigned, petitioners pleaded not guilty to three (3) counts of violation of BP Blg. No. 22. After due proceedings, the MeTC of Mandaluyong City rendered a Joint Decision[6] convicting petitioners for the offense charged.
On appeal by herein petitioners, the court a quo rendered the now assailed Decision affirming in toto the decision of MeTC of Madaluyong City. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
In this petition, petitioners argue:
I
IT MISERABLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING BOTH ACCUSED NOT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22.
II
IT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE AMOUNTS OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS HAD ALREADY BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY SETTLED.
III
IT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FACT AND IN LAW IN NOT FINDING THAT NOVATION HAS SET IN TO OBLITERATE ANY INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON THE PART OF BOTH ACCUSED.
IV
IT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FACT AND IN LAW IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LOANS REPRESENTED BY THE SUBJECT CHECKS ARE CORPORATE LIABILITY OF ULTRA-TECH AND NOT THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED IN CONSONANCE WITH THE WELL-ESTABLISHED SEPARATE JURIDICAL PERSONALITY OF A CORPORATION, AND IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT DENY THAT THE LOANS WERE THEIR OBLIGATIONS.
V
IT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED VENERANDO F. SANTOS DID NOT RECEIVE THE REQUISITE NOTICE UNDER B.P. BLG. 22.
OUR RULING
The petition has no merit.
For Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. No. 22 to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements, namely:
1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.
In the instant case, petitioners argue that the first element is lacking because subject checks were issued only as evidence of their indebtedness and should not be applied for account or for value. Petitioners contention is untenable. In People vs. Nitafan[7], the Supreme Court declared that a check issued as an evidence of debt – though not intended to be presented for payment – has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of BP Blg. No. 22. Moreover, it has long been ruled in Lozano vs. Martinez[8] that the mere act of issuing a worthless check – whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt – is malum prohibitum. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. Thus, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[9]
To prove the second element, there must be showing of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. In this case, it is conceded that petitioner Venerando Santos had received a notice of dishonor. In his letter dated 11 March 1999, petitioner Venerando Santos categorically acknowledged the receipt of the demand letter dated 08 March 1999 informing both petitioners that their checks were dishonored. The demand letter also stated that subject checks were twice dishonored by drawee bank. During the first presentment, the checks were dishonored for having being drawn against insufficient funds; and later, the banks accounts have already been closed. Likewise, the trial court had also found that petitioner Rolando Santos made an open court admission that the demand letter was shown to him and that he received the same. Although this is now belied by petitioner Rolando, without credible evidence to prove his claim, this Court gives full faith and credence to the findings made by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court. In Our view, there is sufficient evidence to establish knowledge on the part of petitioners-drawees that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks, and despite thereof, did not make good the amount of the delivered checks.
Furthermore, there is a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds when the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he still failed to pay the amount of the check. All that is required for this presumption under Section 2 of BP Blg. No. 22 to arise is that a written notice of dishonor be given to the accused.[10] As had been above-stated, this requirement was complied with.
Finally, there is no doubt that the element of dishonor is admitted.
Moreover, it is also the position of petitioners that the obligation covered by the dishonored checks is corporate liability, and since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, they should not be held personally liable. Again, this argument is untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22 Blg. No. 22 pertinently provides:
x x x
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
x x x
As explained by the Supreme Court, this provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory: that the person or persons who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.[11]
Thus, being the drawers of the dishonored checks, petitioners cannot escape from the criminal and civil liabilities imposed under BP Blg. No. 22.
Furthermore, petitioners’ contention that novation had already extinguished their incipient criminal liability for violation of BP Blg. No. 22 is clearly misplaced. Petitioners must be reminded that the instant case does not pertain to the crime of estafa, but that of violation of BP Blg. No. 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP Blg. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. Thus, it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.[12] Besides, as found by the courts below, petitioners’ allegation of payment has not been satisfactorily proven.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 January 2012[13] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City is SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., (Chairperson) and Pizarro, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 37-43.
[2] Id., p. 139.
[3] Id., p. 140.
[4] Id., p. 141-142.
[5] Id., pp. 120-121.
[6] Id., pp. 207-211.
[7] G.R. No. 75954, 22 October 1992.
[8] G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986.
[9] Yap vs. Cabales, et. al., G.R. No. 159186, 05 June 2009.
[10] Lourdes Azarcon v. People of the Philippines and Marcosa Gonzales, GR No. 185906, 29 June 2010.
[11] Mitra vs. People of the Philippines and Felicisimo S. Tarcelo, G.R. No. 191404, 05 July 2010.
[12] Panlilio, et. al. vs. Regional Trial Court, etc., People of the Philippines and Social Security System, G.R. No. 173846, 02 February 2011.
[13] Rollo, pp. 37-43.