IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE MARGARITA DAVID. CARLOS M. SISON, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD SIDECO,IN HER CAPACIT…

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the lower court
ordering the executor of the estate of Margarita David to pay the
estate of Crispulo Sideco P17,010.43, with legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from March 11, 1945, until the same is .fully paid.

On October 29, 1936, Margarita David gave Crispulo Sideco an
option to repurchase twelve (12) parcels of land within a period of
three years for the sum of fl91,000 (Exhibit “A”). On March 20, 1939,
Crispulo Sideco sold and assigned his right to repurchase three (3)
parcels of land to Adriano Tanjangco for the sum of f224,000, payable
in five installments, with the conformity of Margarita David (Exhibit
BB”). By virtue of an express stipulation of the parties, the initial
payment of P35,000 was divided between Margarita David and Crispulo
Sideco as follows: P19,010.43 to Margarita David and P15,989.57 to
Crispulo Sideco. It was also agreed upon that all the payments would be
made direct to Margarita David but all for the account of Crispulo
Sideco in view of his obligation to Margarita David under the written
option to repurchase. .On February 24, 1941, Margarita David died and
the corresponding testamentary proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of her estate. On March 26, 1943, Crispulo Sideco also died
and the corresponding intestate proceedings have also been instituted,
and on April 10, 1943, the estate of Sideco filed a claim for
P17,010.43 against the estate of Margarita David.

It should be stated that Adriano Tanjangco paid all the
installments due under his contractof assignment with Crispulo Sideco
and all the payments were made to Margarita David or her estate. The
difference between the amount of P224,000 paid by Adriano Tanjangco
under the assignment and the amount of P191,000 representing the
obligation of Crispulo Sideco to Margarita David is P33,000, but
inasmuch as Crispulo Sideco already received the sum of P15,989.57, the
estate of Crispulo Sideco now claims the balance of P17,010.43 against
the estate of Margarita David. The probate court allowed the claim in
its order of October 10, 1947, from which order the estate of Margarita
David appealed to the Court of Appeals.

It is claimed that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
order of the probate court because the undisputed documentary evidence
available in this case shows that said order is erroneous. And in
support of his claim, counsel for petitioner Invites the attention of
the court to paragraph 5 of the contract (Exhibit “B”), wherein It was
expressly stipulated that in the event Adriano Tanjangco satisfies in
full the payments of the amount of the obligation as expressly agreed
upon therein, Margarita David will execute a deed of sale of the three
parcels of land in favor of Adriano Tanjangco, and another deed of sale
of the nine (9) parcels of land in favor of Crispulo Sideco. This
express stipulation, according to counsel, clearly means that the
obligation of Margarita David, after Adriano Tanjangco had paid the
amount of P224,000, was only to execute the necessary deed of sale in
favor of Adriano Tanjangco and Crispulo Sideco over the lands specified
therein. Nowhere in the contract does it appear that Margarita David
shall reimburse Crispulo Sideco the amount of P17,010.43 now being
claimed.

This claim is apparently correct if we will consider the payment of
the sum of P224,000 to Margarita David Independently of the obligation
of Crispulo Sideco to her under the option to repurchase the twelve
(12) parcels of land. But the two transactions cannot be considered one
independent from the other, for they are directly connected and
dependent one from the other. There are many reasons in support of this
view. One is the fact that the only obligation of Crispulo Sideco to
Margarita David is P191,000. This is the only amount to which Margarita
David was entitled. If the conformity of Margarita David to the
assignment of the option to buy the three parcels of land was found
necessary, it was because said parcels of land were still in the name
of Margarita and were covered by the option to repurchase given to
Crispulo Sideco. Otherwise her intervention was not necessary and there
was no need for her to sign the agreement. It is precisely for this
reason why it was expressly agreed in the contract that all the
payments to be paid by Adriano Tanjangco should be made direct to
Margarita David with the express understanding that the payments would
be made for the account of Crispulo Sideco. And this arrangement was
found necessary for the obvious reason that the right of Tanjangco to
these three parcels of land was dependent upon the fulfillment by
Sideco of his obligation to Margarita David. Tanjangco wanted that
arrangement obviously for reasons of security. Inasmuch as the amount
paid to Margarita David, or her representative, is more than the amount
owed by Crispulo Sideco under the contract, it is but Just and proper
that she should return the difference to Crispulo Sideco.

Counsel also invites the attention of the court to the receipt
signed by Crispulo Sideco when he received the sum of P5,989.57 from
Margarita David (Exhibit “1-Executor”). This exhibit recites that
Crispulo Sideco received the aforesaid amount “representing my
participation on the profit obtained ‘ by me from the sale of my right
of option to repurchase the three (3) parcels of land”. This means,
according to counsel, that Crispulo Sideco agreed to divide with
Margarita David the P33,000 profit realized in the transaction covering
the sale of the three parcels of land to Adriano Tanjangco. We do not
agree to this interpretation. In the first place, Crispulo Sideco at
that time was in such financial straight that he aould hardly afford to
give to Margarita David part of the profit that he was lucky enough to
realize out of the transaction. The payment of the sum of P35,000,
which was divided between Margarita David and Crispulo Sideco, was the
first installment to be made under the assignment and so it is not
strange if Sideco had considered it as his first participation in the
profit. As the balance was more than enough to pay Sideco’s obligation
to Margarita, there was also nothing strange if Margarita had agreed to
pay him part of the money to help him ease up his financial situation.
At any rate, there is no clear evidence that the difference of
P17,010.43 was given by Sideco to Margarita as a gift, or an act of
gratitude, and in the absence of a clear proof to this effect we have
to interpret it In the light of the provisions of the two contracts
affected (Exhibits “A” and “B”). Under these two contracts, Margarita
David was only entitled to collect P191,000, and having received more,
she is in duty bound to return the difference.

The contention that the claim of the estate of Crispulo Sideco was
filed out of time has no merit, it appearing that the objection
Interposed by the estate of Margarita David has been overruled and the
claim was admitted by the court. Under section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the
time fixed by law, the court may, for cause shown, allow such claim to
be filed within a time not exeeeding one month. This matter is,
therefore, discretionary on the part of the court, and there being no
showing that the court has abused its discretion, there is no valid
reason to disturb its ruling.

Wherefore, the Judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo,Bengzon, Padilla, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.