J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO AND GRACE VINZONS-MAGANA, PETITIONERS, VS. LT. COL. EDGAR GUEVARA, AS CAMP COMMANDANT, CAMP BAGONG IBALON, REGIONAL COMMAND V, RESPONDENT.

It is the claim of petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and Grace
Vinzons-Magana in this application for the writ of habeas corpus filed on July
20, 1981, that their detention at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City is illegal,
there being no valid authority for the warrants of arrest respectively issued
against them on July 2 and 3, 1981.  The
Presidential Order of Arrest was allegedly signed on June 26, 1981 for the
violation of Art. 138 of the Revised Penal Code dealing with incitement to
rebellion, Presidential Decree No. 885, the amended Anti-Subversion Law, and
Presidential Decree No. 33 on the possession and distribution of subversive
materials.  It was further alleged that petitioners were only shown a
copy of what appeared to be a radiogram, no signed copy of the order having
been furnished them.  It was then alleged
that there was no justification for their detention, that martial law having
been terminated on January 17, 1981 and President Marcos himself having “banned
the use of military processes of arrest and issued a letter of instruction
ordering that, thenceforth, all arrests, even for alleged crimes involving
national security, must undergo normal judicial processes.”^[1]

The next day, on July 21,
1981, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring respondent to make a
return not later than Tuesday, July 28, 1981 and setting the case for hearing
on July 30, 1981.  In the return of the
writ, the detention of petitioners was characterized as “lawful and valid,
having been done by virtue of a presidential commitment order, issued pursuant
to the reserva­tion of power under Presidential Proclamation 2045, exercised by
the President on the strength of the evidence before him.”^[2] Nonetheless, at the hear­ing on July 30,
1981, to quote from the language of the resolution of
this Court of that date:  “The
Solicitor General manifested that President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued an order
yesterday directing the temporary release of detainees-petitioners J. Antonio
M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana on recognizance of Assemblyman Marcial
Pimentel.  On his part, Senator Diokno
(a) manifested that yesterday morning, after he met the petitioners at the
airport, they all reported to the military authorities and in such conference,
Deputy Minister Carmelo Barbero turned over the custody of
petitioners-detainees to Senator Diokno for which he signed a receipt to
produce them in today’s hearing, and (b) requested that the hear­ing of this
case be postponed until further orders of the Court, with the petitioners-detainees in the meantime to stay in his
custody.”^[3]

The Court then resolved
to:  “(1) postpone the hearing of
this case until further notice; (2) declare that pending the full
implementation of the order of release and on the authority of this Court,
aforesaid detainees-petitioners shall remain in the custody of Senator Diokno
on his recognizance; and (3) grant the Solicitor General until 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of Monday, August 3, 1981 within which to submit a manifestation
as to whether or not said release has been implemented, with the certificate of
release therein included.”^[4] There­after, on August 3, 1981 this
manifestation and motion was filed by Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza:^[5] “1. That he received today, August 3,
1981, a letter from the Constabulary Judge Advocate, a copy of which is
attached herewith as Annex 1, informing him that petitioners J. Antonio M.
Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana have been ordered released by the Chief of the
Office of Detainee Affairs on July 31,
1981.  The copies of the release orders
of petitioners are attached herewith as Annexes 2 and 3.  While petitioners’ release is to be
formally made by the Regional Command 5, Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City as
soon as they present themselves thereat, petitioners have in fact been released
from military custody as early as on July 30, 1981 per the letter of the
Constabulary Judge Advocate.  3. In view
of the temporary release of petitioners, the present petition for habeas corpus
should be considered moot and academic.”^[6]

His prayer is for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of its moot and academic character.

The plea is impressed with merit. 
With the release of petitioners, the prayer is justified.  No further action need be taken on the
application for the writ of habeas corpus except to dismiss it for having
become moot and academic.  It is re­assuring
to note that the President, upon being informed of the circumstances of the
case, decided to set petitioners at liberty. 
With the lifting of martial law, the people have a right to expect that
reliance on the constitutional right to peaceable assembly would not be visited
with adverse consequences.  It should be
safeguarded and res­pected not only by courts but by other public officials,
especially those entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and order.  The danger to public security that could
conceivably arise by people gathering en masse is certainly much
less.  It is quite true that turbulence
may mark such an event.  One who is
responsible certainly can be held accountable if the assembly is utilized for
illegal purposes.  The guilty parties can
be duly proceeded against.  In the
absence of such a show­ing, it is of the essence in a constitutional government
that no encroachment on the rights of an individual is permissible.

What was said by Chief Justice Hughes with force and eloquence in
De Jonge v. Oregon^[7]
possesses relevance:  “These rights
may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to
violence and crime.  The people through
their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse.  But the legislative intervention can find
constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse.  The rights themselves must not be
curtailed.  The greater the importance of
safeguard­ing the community from incitements to the overthrow of our
institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve
inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free
assembly in order to maintain the oppor­tunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.  Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government.  It follows from these considerations that,
consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful
discussion cannot be made a crime.  The
holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.  Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as
criminals on that score.  The question,
if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not
as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.  If the persons assembling have committed
crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against
the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or
other violation of valid laws.  But it is
a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such
offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”^[8]

It is understandable for the members of the Armed Forces, duty
bound to maintain public peace, to display a certain degree of apprehension
under conditions that could lead to the disruption of public order on a big
scale.  At the same time, zeal in the
performance of their duties cannot justify any erosion in the respect that must
be accorded the liberties of a citizen. 
At any rate, with the President ordering the release of petitioners, an
untenable situation has been resolved and the grant of the petition rendered
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed for being moot and
academic.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Barredo and Abad Santos,
JJ., on official leave.

^[1]
Petition, par. 4.02.

^[2]
Return to the Writ, par. 11.

^[3]
Resolution dated July 30, 1981.

^[4]
Ibid.

^[5]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor
General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.

^[6]
Manifestation and Motion, 1-2.

^[7]
299 U.S. 353 (1936).

^[8]
Ibid, 364-365.