EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ENGRACIO CASTILLO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This case is about the effectiveness of the service of a court’s
decision by registered mail.

Eusebia Barrameda
sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of
Lopez, Quezon
Province in Civil Case No. 269.
(The record does not show the nature of the suit).  A copy of the court’s decision, which was
adverse to Barrameda, was sent by registered mail on January 28, 1966 to her lawyer at San
Pablo City.  That mail was received in the city post
office on the following day, January 29. 
On that day and on February 3 and 9, 1966 the city postmaster’s office
supposedly sent to Barrameda’s counsel three notices
regarding the registered mail.

Barrameda’s lawyer did not claim that
mail.  It was returned to the municipal
court and was received there on March
3, 1966 as unclaimed mail.

Eusebia Barrameda
must have been informed that the adverse decision could not be served upon her
lawyer.  On March 9, 1966 she received personally a copy of the
decision.  (Whether she got it or it was
served upon her is not clear in the inadequate record on appeal.)

Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a
notice of appeal on March 11, 1966.  Castillo did not interpose in the municipal
court any objection to her appeal.  The
court gave it due course.  The record was
transmitted to the Court of First Instance where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. C-232.

On April 21, 1966
Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that it was filed out of time. 
His theory was that the fifteen-day reglementary
period within which Barrameda could appeal should be
counted from the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice sent
by the postmaster to Barrameda’s lawyer.

In this case, the supposed first notice was sent on January 29, 1966, when the mail in
question was received in the San Pablo
City post office (not January 28, 1966, as erroneously
assumed by Castillo and the lower court). 
The five days counted from that date expired on February 3, 1966 when the second notice was
allegedly sent to Barrameda’s lawyer.

Eusebia Barrameda
opposed Castillo’s motion to dismiss her appeal.  She contended that Castillo failed to prove
that her counsel actually received the supposed three notices sent by the
postmaster.  She argued that because in
the municipal court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no
longer be entertained in the Court of First Instance.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.  It assumed that the fifteen-day period should
be counted from February 7, 1966,
the date of the third notice (the third notice was allegedly sent on February 9, 1966) and the period
expired on February 21, 1966,
according to the trial court’s computation.

Eusebia Barrameda
appealed to this Court.  She specified
that she was going to question the legality of the order of dismissal.

Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court provides:

“SEC. 7.  Service of final orders
or judgments. – Final orders or judgments shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. x x
x.

“SEC. 8 Completeness of service.
– Personal service is complete upon actual delivery.  x x x Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post
office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster,
service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.”

In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service
is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee.  The exception is that when the addressee does
not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the
postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of such time.

As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon,
if the first notice is received by the addressee on December 1, and he gets his
mail on December 3, the service is complete on December 3, the date of the
actual receipt (general rule).

But if the addressee gets his mail only on December 15, service
is deemed complete on December 6 or five days from December 1, the date of the
first notice (exception).

If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed
complete on December 6, as provided in the exception to the general rule.  If he receives his mail two months after it
is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is
complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general rule.  (Grospe
vs. Court of Appeals and Uera, 106 Phil. 1144, 1148-9).

Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail
refers to constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident
that the fair and just application of that exception depends upon conclusive
proof that a first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee.  The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed should not be applied to such a situation.

Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party,
who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary was
served with a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five
days from the first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster, to prove
that that first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee.  A certification from the postmaster would be
the best evidence of that fact (Grafil vs. Feliciano,
L-27156, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 616). 
The mailman’s testimony may also be adduced to prove that fact, as was
done in Aldecoa vs. Hon. Arellano and Siguenza, 113 Phil. 75, 78.

The postmaster’s
certification as to the sending of the first notice “should include
the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or
sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made.” (Hernandez vs. Navarro, L-28296, November 24, 1972, 48 SCRA 44, 64,
per Barredo, J.).

As stressed by Justice Barredo in a
recent case, “there must be clear proof of compliance with the postal
regulations governing the sending and receipt of the notice referred to
in” section 8 of Rule 13 (Vecino vs. Court of
Appeals, L-38612, March 29, 1977).  The
mere exhibition in court of the envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not
sufficient proof that a first notice was sent.

Note that in a certain case a first notice was sent but it was
received by the addressee’s eleven-year old child who did not deliver it to the addressee himself.  It was held that to apply the
presumption in that case and to insist on constructive service would work an
injustice rather than promote justice (Cabuang vs.
Hon. Bello, 105 Phil. 1135, 1138).

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice
was sent to Barrameda’s lawyer and that it was
delivered to him or should have been received by him.  The envelope containing the unclaimed mail
was presented in court.  The face of the
envelope contains the notation “Returned to sender.  Reason:  Unclaimed”.  Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope,
with the legend “City of San Pablo, Philippines,
Jan. 29, 1966”, are written the dates, “2-3-66 and 2-9-66”.  Written also on the back of the envelope are
the following: “R to S, notified 3/3/66″.

Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court
literally and rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive service.  It did not require appellee
Castillo to present the postmaster’s certification that a first notice was sent
to Barrameda’s lawyer and that the notice was received by
the latter.

Under those circumstances, the trial court’s order dismissing Barrameda’s appeal is fraught with injustice.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal is
reversed and set aside.  It is directed
to give due course to the appeal of Eusebia Barrameda.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., see concurring
opinion.