ANGELICA VIAJAR AND CELSO VIAJAR, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, VS. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH III, RICARDO LADRIDO AND ROSE…

Appeal from the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch III, issued in Civil Case No. 9660 entitled “Angelica Viajar and Celso Viajar, plaintiffs, versus Ricardo Ladrido
and Rosendo Te, defendants.”

On February
15, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of property premised on the allegations that they were
the registered owners pro-indiviso
of a parcel of agricultural land at Guibuangan, Pototan, Iloilo
with an area of 2.0089 hectares, more or less, identified as Lot No. 7340, Pototan Cadastre and more particularly described as
follows:

“A parcel of land (Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, with improvements thereon situated in the
Municipality of Pototan and bounded on the Northeast
by Lot No. 7339; in the Southeast by Lot No. 7342; Southwest by Lots Nos. 7341
& 7470 and on the West by the Suage River.”

their ownership
thereof being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-77367 of the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo, (par. 2, Complaint); that the above-described
parcel of land was acquired through purchase by the plaintiffs on September 6,
1973 following which they caused to be undertaken by a licensed Geodetic
Engineer the relocation survey of the property for the purpose of determining
the exact metes and bounds thereof. (par. 3, Complaint); that as a result of
the said relocation survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the
northeastern half portion of Lot No. 7340 has been eaten up and occupied by the
new waterbed of the Suage River as a result of the
natural change in its course, while the remaining southwestern portion of the
property is occupied and possessed by defendant Ricardo Ladrido
(par. 4, Complaint); that plaintiffs also later came to know that the defendant
has occupied and possessed for more than (2) years not only the aforesaid
Parcel 2 but also the old abandoned riverbed of the Suage
River which was the original boundary on the West of the land in question, Lot
No. 7340 (par. 5, Complaint); that the northeastern portion of their property
having been occupied by the new riverbed of the Suage
River, as aforestated, plaintiffs have become by law ipso
facto the owners of the aforesaid abandoned riverbed in proportion to
the area they lost (par. 6, Complaint); that notwithstanding demands made by
the plaintiffs, defendant without any justifiable reason has refused and until
now still refuses to vacate the aforesaid area occupied by him or surrender the
possession thereof to the plaintiffs to the latter’s great damage and prejudice
in the amount of P6,000.00 per year, P5,000.00 for moral damages and P500.00
for expenses of litigation (pars. 7, 8 and 9, Complaint).

In his answer dated March 12, 1974, defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido denied the substantial allegations in the complaint
and averred as special and affirmative defenses that he is the owner of Lot No.
7511 situated at Barrio Cawayan, Pototan,
Iloilo, which lot is bounded on the east by Suague
River (par. 6, Answer); that since 1926 or 1927, the Suague
River gradually deposited soil accumulations on the eastern portion of Lot 7511
which the defendant promptly took possession and worked the same as his own as
soon as said Suague River gradually, slowly and
consistently moved farther to the East (par. 7, Answer); that Lot 7340 claimed
by plaintiffs and allegedly titled in their names, is separated from Lot 7511
of the defendant by the Suague River, and the gradual
action of the Suague River, admitted by the
plaintiffs in their complaint, had eaten up said lot 7340 (par. 8, Answer);
that the land in dispute which is indicated as parcel 2, Lot 7340, of Annex
“A” of the complaint, as well as the old Suague
River bed, is the soil accumulation or accretion attached to Lot 7511, owned by
the defendant (par. 9, Answer); that defendant possessed the portions formed by
the accumulations of soil deposits made by the Suague
River gradually from 1926-27 up to 1940, at the latest, when the Suague River remained on a more or less stationary course
up to the present (par. 10, Answer); that defendant is owner of the soil
accumulations and the dried up riverbed now attached to his Lot 7511 (par. 11,
Answer).  Defendant-respondent filed as
counterclaim the amount of P1,500.00 for attorney’s
fees and P5,000.00 as moral damages.

In a reply filed on April 4, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners averred
that they never admitted that the change in the course of the Suague River was through a gradual action resulting to an
accumulation of soil deposits to the eastern part of Lot No. 7511 owned by the
defendant.  Plaintiffs had emphatically
and continuously insisted that the Suague River
changed its course through natural action by passing through the northeastern
portion of Lot No. 7340 owned by plaintiffs (par. 1, Reply); that said lot in
question indicated as Parcel 2 of Lot No. 7340 of Annex “B” is not
the soil accumulation or accretions attached to Lot No. 7511 owned by defendant
inasmuch as parcel 2 retains its identity, and in fact the old river bed of Suague River formerly running between Lot No. 7511 and Lot
No. 7340 is still existing (par. 2, Reply); that the defense of accretion
interposed by defendant in the instant case does not apply; instead it falls
within the contemplation of Article 461 of the New Civil Code on change of
course of rivers (par. 4, Reply); and that by reason of the natural change of
the course of the Suague River, the abandoned river
bed which is existing as admitted by defendant himself, exclusively belongs to
the plaintiffs for reasons above stated (par. 5, Reply).

On June 14, 1974,
plaintiffs-petitioners amended their complaint by impleading Rosendo Te as
defendant from whom they purchased the land in question upon the latter’s assurance that the title is
clean and the landholding is not
possessed nor subject to any lien, encumbrances or claims by third
persons.  Plaintiffs-petitioners prayed
in the alternative that should possession of defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido be sustained, an order be issued annulling the
contract of sale and direct the vendor Rosendo Te to
return the purchase price thereof with interest from the date of execution of
the sale.

Defendant-respondent Rosendo Te filed
his own answer to the amended complaint acknowledging the deed of sale but
alleging that he only sold to plaintiffs-petitioners whatever rights he had
over the property under the Torrens Title and Tax Declaration over the land
transferred to him by the original owner; that complainants are precluded from
including defendant Rosendo Te in the case because
the former had never previously demanded from the said vendor the cancellation of
the sale, but on the contrary, plaintiffs-petitioners have always maintained
that they were entitled as a matter of right to the ownership of the remaining
portion of Lot No. 7340 and the dry riverbed which are under the possession of
defendant Ladrido.

On August 8,
1975,
defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment dismissing the action of plaintiffs and declaring
defendant Ricardo Ladrido the owner of the land in
question on the basis of the alleged admission of the plaintiffs in their
complaint as well as of the law and jurisprudence on the matter.  Quoting par. 4 of the complaint which reads:

“That as a result of
the said relocation survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the northeastern half portion of Lot No.
7340 has been eaten up and
occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River
as a result of the natural change in its course, while the remaining
southwestern portion of the property is occupied and possessed by defendant
Ricardo Ladrido,”

movant Ricardo Ladrido argues that said allegation
of plaintiffs is an admission on their part that the change of course of the
river was gradual and not sudden or abrupt; that it is therefore a case of alluvion in Article 457 of the Civil Code (366 of the Old
Civil Code) and not abandoned river bed in Article 461 of the Civil Code (370
of the Old Civil Code) as in the latter the change of course is sudden or
abrupt; that being alluvion, the land in question is
accreted land on Lot 7511 (Article 457 of the Civil Code; Article 366 of the
Old Civil Code).

Defendant Rosendo Te filed his
“Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment” on the ground that there
is a clear controversy between the parties as to how the Suague River
had changed its course, whether abruptly as contended by the plaintiffs and
defendant Rosendo Te or gradually as contended by
defendant Ricardo Ladrido.  Moreover, oppositor
claims that the abandoned river bed which in reality does not form part of Lots
Nos. 7511 and 7340 is likewise involved in the case and the question as to whom
such land should now belong is also a matter of controversy.

On August 19, 1975,
respondent Judge issued the Summary Judgment, which is quoted fully hereunder:

“SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of the amended complaint read, as follows:

x        x          x          x          x

“5.   That as a result of the said relocation
survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the northeastern half portion
of Lot No. 7340 has been eaten up and occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River as a result of the natural change in its
course, while the remaining southwestern portion of the property is occupied
and possessed by defendant Ricardo Ladrido.  The portion now occupied by the Suage River is identified as Parcel 1 and the portion
occupied by the defendant Ricardo Ladrido is
identified as Parcel 2 in the sketch marked as Annex “B” and is found
attached to the original complaint;

“6.   That plaintiffs also later came to know that
the defendant Ricardo Ladrido has occupied and
possessed for more than two (2) years not only the aforesaid Parcel 2 but also
the old abandoned riverbed of the Suage River which
was the original boundary on the West of the land in question, Lot No.
7340″;

x        x          x          x          x

“9.   That plaintiffs upon knowing that a
portion of the landholding in question is being possessed by defendant Ricardo Ladrido, immediately informed and complained to the
defendant Rosendo Te that the land sold to them is
not free from any claim and possession of third persons, as it is in fact
possessed and claimed by
defendant Ricardo Ladrido, but instead defendant Rosendo Te when he received the information merely told
plaintiffs that it was their own lookout and for them to fight their own legal
battle;

x        x          x          x

Then paragraphs 2 and 10 of defendant Rosendo
Te’s answer read:

x        x          x          x

“2.    It is admitted that on September 6, 1973
answering defendant executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the plaintiffs herein
selling to the latter for the sum of P5,000 all his
rights, title and interest over Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan of
which he was then the registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-50333; but all and each of the other allegations in Par. 3 of the Amended
Complaint, specially the assurances supposedly given by answering defendant,
are specifically denied, the truth of the matter being as follows:  that answering defendant was only selling to
the plaintiffs all and whatever rights he might have over the said parcel of
land under and by virtue of the aforesaid Torrens title and the tax declaration
covering the land; that the plaintiffs themselves were the ones who approached
and proposed to the defendant the purchase from the latter of his registered rights on the said
land, stating that they would visit the land before the purchase was going to
be consummated; and that answering defendant in turn acquired in good faith his
rights over said land by purchase from its former registered owners, the
spouses Francisco M. Militante and Consuelo M.
Cordova, by virtue of a document of sale executed on January 2, 1966.”

x        x          x          x

“10.  The plaintiffs are precluded by estoppel from including Rosendo
Te as a defendant in the present case because they had never previously
demanded from the latter for the cancellation of the sale in their favor; and,
on the contrary, based on the facts of the case, they have always maintained as
they have so manifested to answering defendant that they were entitled as a
matter of right to the ownership of the remaining portion of Lot No. 7340, as
well as to the dry abandoned bed of the Suage
River.”

x        x          x          x

Then paragraph 1 of the reply reads as follows:

“1.    That plaintiffs never admitted that the
change in the course of the Suage River was through a
gradual action resulting to an accumulation of soil deposits to the eastern
part of Lot No. 7511 owned by the defendant. 
Plaintiffs had emphatically and continuously insisted that the Suague River
changed its course through natural action by passing through the northeastern
portion of Lot No. 7340 owned by plaintiffs”;

x        x          x          x

The foregoing judicial admission of plaintiffs supports the motion
for summary judgment per comments of Chief Justice Moran and Justice Martin
cited by defendant Ladrido.

In the opposition of defendant Rosendo Te
it is contended that no admission has been made as to the ownership of
defendant Ladrido but the foregoing paragraph 1 of
the plaintiffs’ reply clearly indicated and admitted the ownership of defendant
Ladrido on Lot 7511.  Then defendant Te has filed no claim against
defendant Ladrido, so it is Te who is in estoppel to oppose Ladrido’s
motion for summary judgment.

The presence of the clause ‘eaten up and occupied by the new
waterbed of the Suague River’ clearly admitted a case
of alluvion referred to in Article 457 of the New
Civil Code, so that the doctrine laid down in the case of ‘Payatas
Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason,’ (53 Phil. 55) is
applicable to the present claim of defendant Ladrido.

Then plaintiff is a purchaser in bad faith as at the time of the
purchase in 1973, defendant Ladrido was already in
possession of the land for more than 2 years before the filing of the complaint
on February 15, 1974, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the original and amended
complaint pursuant to the ruling in the case of Comspecto
vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144, found on page 316 of the
Philippine Torrens System by Ponce, to wit:

‘Precaution when property is in possession of another.  One who purchases real property which is in
actual possession of others should, at least, make some inquiry concerning the
rights of those in possession.  The
actual possession by others other than the vendor should, at least, put the
purchaser upon inquiry.  He can scarcely,
in the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona-fide purchaser as against
such possessors. (Comspecto vs. Fruto,
31 Phil. 144, 149).’

WHEREFORE, summary judgment is hereby rendered against the
plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants, hereby dismissing this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”

From the above judgment, plaintiffs-petitioners filed the notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals.  This
was followed by the submission of their Record on Appeal on September 25, 1975.  But before the petition for review could be
filed, counsel for petitioners moved for the certification of the case to the
Supreme Court after realizing that the appeal involves pure questions of
law.  The motion was granted by the
Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in the resolution of September 2, 1976 which certified the
case to Us for final determination pursuant to Section
31 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended.  In Our resolution of December 17, 1976, the certified case was
docketed as G.R. No. L-45321 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-43882, a petition
for review on certiorari of the same summary judgment filed by
plaintiffs-petitioners in the meantime on July 2, 1976 and given due course as
a special civil action in Our resolution of September 1, 1976.

Having considered the petition as an original action, the
principal issue is whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion
in deciding the case by Summary Judgment dated August 19, 1975. 
Plaintiffs-petitioners contend that the lower court erred in
promulgating summary judgment in view of the questions of fact disputed in the
pleadings.  They maintain that by
invoking Article 461 of the Civil Code in relation to their allegation that
there was a natural change in the course of Suague River,
they, in effect, alleged the abrupt or sudden change in the course of the
waters.  They point out that this
contention was contradicted by defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido
in his answer when the latter claimed that the change was instead gradual under
the contemplation of Article 457 of the same Code.  On the other hand, this defendant-respondent
supports the propriety of the summary judgment on the ground that the complaint
failed to aver categorically the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the
river, but on the contrary, the allegation therein that the land was eaten up by
the current amounts to an admission on the part of complainants that the change
was in fact gradual.

From a careful reading of the complaint and answer, there are two
conflicting theories respecting the occurrence of a natural phenomenon, the
effects and consequences of which are governed either by Article 461^[1]
or Article 457^[2] of the Civil Code.  The obvious task laid
before the trial court is to determine whether there actually occurred an
abrupt and sudden change of the water current, or that the river had gradually
veered through the years leaving alluvial deposit of soil now composing
the portion claimed by the parties.

We cannot subscribe to the interpretation that the phrase
“eaten up and occupied by the new waterbed” imports an admission by
plaintiffs-petitioners of a gradual action of the water current, thus stripping
the complaint of its only contestable issue, and hence, needs only to be
disposed of in a summary judgment.  We
hold that the phrase “eaten up” is a vague expression of what
complainants wanted to convey, since the phrase can either mean gradual or
sudden action of the river.  This
ambiguity, though, cannot deprive the complaint of its merit because the
pleader is required to state only the ultimate facts constituting his cause of
action.  At least, by the reading of the
entire complaint, it is clear enough that the pleader did not take its own
expression to mean the gradual shifting of the river current, so much so that
defendant-respondent in his answer countered with a diametrically opposed
explanation as demonstrated in his factual allegations.  Moreover, plaintiffs-petitioners in their
reply alleged that they never admitted that the change in the course of the Suague River
was through a gradual action resulting to an accumulation of soil deposits to
the eastern part of the lot owned by defendant.

Besides, co-defendant Rosendo Te
conceded in his answer to the amended complaint that the Suague
River suddenly changed its course by channeling its bed at the
northeastern strip of Lot No. 7340 (Records, p.
28).  Considering that the interests of
the parties clashed on the proprietary effect of the natural phenomenon, the
issue all the more became genuine and ripe for adjudication.  Plaintiffs-petitioners claim ownership over
the abandoned riverbed in proportion to the area they lost when the river
opened a new channel within their property. 
On the other hand, defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido
claims ownership to the disputed portion because it consists of accretion
attached to his land as a result of the gradual accumulation of soil brought by
the action of the water current.  With
these conflicting claims, a factual dispute certainly arises which can only be
properly settled by means of a trial on the merits.  Summary judgment was therefore, unwarranted.^[3]

Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.  But if there be a doubt as to such facts and
there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them
can pray for a summary judgment.  Where
the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.^[4]

An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary
judgment is by no means a hasty one.  It
assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a
motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file
an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other
documents (Section 3, Rule 34).  In spite
of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed
after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s
right to a plenary trial of his case.  At
any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue
is resolved against the movant.^[5]

We find that in the case at bar, the aforementioned guidelines
were not observed.  The mere reliance on
an “admission” arrived at by construction and dubitable by its terms,
rather than a clear and positive concession cannot be a basis for a summary
judgment.  Respondent’s motion is not
supported by an affidavit of merit or any document attesting the state of facts
relied upon in the motion.  Neither has
the court afforded the parties a hearing on both the motion and opposition to
the same.  Clearly, the trial court in
cursorily issuing a summary judgment, committed a correctible error.

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment is set aside and the
case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Art. 461.  River
beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. 
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

^[2]
Art. 457.  To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

^[3]
Magallanes
v. Kayanan, 69 SCRA, pp. 28, 34 (1976).

^[4]
2 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, pp. 185-196 (1970); see
also:  Gatchalian
v. Pavilin, 6 SCRA 508 (1962); Agcanas v. Nagum, 32 SCRA
p. 298 (1970).

^[5]
See:  Footnote 4, supra, 2
Moran at pp. 181, 191.