NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARTIN ARTOZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from two (2) orders of the Court of Industrial
Relations.

On November 22, 1957, said court issued an order in Case No. 1058-V thereof,
in which the National Shipyards and Steel Corporation, hereinafter referred to
as the NASSCO, was respondent, and Jose Abiday and fifty-eight (58) other
persons, hereinafter referred to as Abiday et al., were petitioners, the
dispositive part of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
petitioners an additional 25% for work rendered in excess of eight (8) hours on
ordinary days including Sundays, legal holidays and nighttime—(See Luzon Marine
Department Union vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. Case No. 147-V).

“For the purpose of determining the amount due to each of the petitioners,
the Examiner of the Court or his duly authorized representative is hereby
directed to make the computation, taking as basis, in accordance with the
stipulation of parties, the logbook of the vessels, time sheets and other
pertinent records of the respondent.”

On Appeal to this Court, taken by the NASSCO, said order was affirmed, in G.
R. No. L-13888,^* on April 29, 1960.
Meanwhile, on or about March 7, 1960, Ramon Dimanalata, Renato Reynoso, Martin
Artoz, Herberto Amane, Lucio Guinoo, Nicasio Murzo, Antonio Zacarias, Vicente
Venturillo, Dionisio Diana, Jose Vicente and Hermogenes Sangalang, hereinafter
referred to as Dimanalata et al., had filed, in said Case No. 1058-V of
the Court of Industrial Relations, a petition stating that they are and/or were,
like Abiday, et al., employees of the NASSCO, and that Dimanalata et
al. are in the same position as Abiday et al., in relation to the
NASSCO, and, praying, therefore, that the benefits, rights and privileges
granted to Abiday et al., in the order of November 22, 1957, be extended to
Dimanalata et al. Despite the opposition of the NASSCO, the Court of
Industrial Relations issued an order, dated May 31, 1960, granting said
petition. A reconsideration of this order having been denied by the court en
banc, on July 22, 1960, the NASSCO, filed the present petition for review of
the resolution of that date and of the order of May 31, 1960. Although, on
September 9, 1960, we dismissed the petition, the same was, on motion for
reconsideration filed by the NASSCO, given due course on October 4, I960.

The NASSCO maintains that the order and resolution of the lower court dated
May 31 anjd July 22, 1960, are null and void: (1) because said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the claims of Dimanalata et al.;
and (2) because said claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

The first ground is based upon the theory that five (5) of the present
claimants were no longer employees of the NASSCO when their petition of March 7,
1960 was filed, they having been separated from the service on the dates given
after their respective names, to wit:

	Martin Artoz………………………………………………..	May 15, 1959
	Herberto Amane …………………………………………..	May 15, 1959
	Vicente Venturillo ……………………………………….	June 16, 1954
	Dionisio Diana …………………………………………….	May 15, 1959
	Hermogenes Sangalang ………………………………	May 7, 1954

The second ground is predicated upon Republic Act No. 1993, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 444 (The EightHour Labor Law), by inserting therein a
section 7-A, reading:

“Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced
within three years after the cause of action accrued, otherwise such action
shall be forever barred: Provided, however, That actions already
commenced before the effective date of this Act shall not be affected by the
period herein prescribed.”

It should be noted, however, that the validity of the orders complained of
cannot be affected by the aforementioned statutory period, even if applicable.
An improper refusal to apply the statute of limitations would render said orders
erroneous, but not null and void. At any rate, Republic Act No. 1993 was
approved and became effective on June 22, 1957, and “actions already commenced”
before its effectivity “shall not be affected by the period” prescribed
therein, pursuant to the proviso thereof. Abiday et al. filed their
petition for overtime pay on April 10, 1957. Hence, their action was already
pending in the lower court before said Act became effective and was not subject
to the prescriptive period set forth therein.

Neither is said period applicable to Dimanalata et al., for theirs is
not a new or separate “action”. The present proceedings is a mere incident of
the execution of the order of the lower court of November 22, 1957, as affirmed
by this Court, on April 29, 1960, in L-13888. Dimanalata et al. ask no
more than the extension to them of the benefits, rights and privileges granted
in said order of November 22, 1957 to Abiday et al.

As regards the question of jurisdiction, it is obvious that the same cannot
affect those who, admittedly, are still in the employment of the NASSCO, namely,
Ramon Dimanalata, Renato Reynoso, Lucio Guinoo, Nicasio Murzo, Antonio Zacarias
and Jose Vicente; Moreover, in paragraph (2) of its opposition to the petition
of Dimanalata et al, the NASSCO admitted, also, that these claimants are its
employees, although as “ordinary seamen” to whom, it maintained, Commonwealth
Act No. 444 was inapplicable. Hence, the order appealed from says:

“Respondent corporation did not present evidence to deny or controvert the
proof adduced by the present 11 claimants and submitted its case relying on the
grounds of its opposition that (a) the order of November 22, 1957 could hot be
made applicable to Dimanalata and 10 companions because they are not parties to
the above-entitled cases; (b) C.A. No. 444, otherwise known as the Eight Hour
Labor Law, does not apply to the present claimants, they being ordinary seamen;
(c) this case is now on appeal with the Supreme Court, docKtaed as G.R. No.
L-13888, to determine the legality of the order of this Court afore-quoted; and
(d) the cause of action has already prescribed and barred by the statute of
limitations as provided for by R.A. No. 1993, amending C.A. No.
444.”

Again, it appears that the stipulation of facts submitted in connection with
the claim of Jose Abiday et al. stated specifically that some of them
were “formerly employed” by the NASSCO; that the latter objected to the
jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the claim of Abiday et al.;
that said court overruled the objection; that the NASSCO appealed by certiorari
to this Court in G. R. No. L-13732, upon the ground, among others, of said
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the lower court; that, on April 11, 1958, the
petition for review in said case L-13732 was dismissed by this Court, for lack
of merit; that in case No. L-13888, the NASSCO again raised said question of
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the lower court; and that this Court, in its
decision of April 29, 1960 in L-13888, once more affirmed the order of the lower
court asserting its jurisdiction to entertain the claim of Abiday et al.
Said decision in L-13888 and our resolution dismissing the petition in L-13732,
constitute, therefore, part of the law of the case, insofar as the jurisdiction
of the lower court to adjudicate on claims for overtime of former employees who
do not seek reinstatement is concerned and bars the NASSCO from raising the same
issue for the third time in the same case No. 1058-V of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Jalandoni vs. Martir-Guanzon, 102 Phil., 859; 54 Off. Gaz. [9] 2907;
Tantongco vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, 106 Phil., 198; 57 Off.
Gaz. [29] 5229; Tanda vs. Aldaya, L-13423, November 23, 1959; Testate Estate of
Narciso Padilla, Vda. de Padilla vs. Paterno, 113 Phil., 656.

Wherefore, the order and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed,
with costs against the National Shipyards and Steel Corporation. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes,
and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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* 107 Phil., 1006; 58 Off. Gaz., (36) 5875.