ROLANDO LANDICHO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, BRANCH I, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with, pre­liminary
injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a
civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the
first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial
question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent Judge Relova answered in the negative.  We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense of bigamy.  It was alleged in the information that
petitioner “being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay,
which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.” On March 15, 1963, an action was filed
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
likewise presided by respondent Judge, by plaintiff Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as
null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.  On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in
said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his
marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the
ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to
appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Thereafter, on October
7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend hearing of the criminal case
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages
involved in the pend­ing civil suit. 
Respondent Judge on November
19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit.  Then came a motion for reconsi­deration to
set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. 
Hence this petition, filed on March
13, 1964.

In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge
was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a pre­liminary injunction
being issued to restrain him from further pro­ceeding with the prosecution of
the bigamy case.  In the meanwhile,
before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the
amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines
as another respondent.  This Court
admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that
year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the
qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first
spouse Elvira Macatangay.  It alleged as one of its special and
affirmative defenses that the mere fact that “there are actions to annul
the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
‘prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.”^[1]
The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. 
It continued, referring to Viada, that
“parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competence courts
and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.  Therefore, according to
Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty
provided for in this Article * * *.”^[2]

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in
authoritative decisions of this Court. 
In Merced v. Dlez,^[3]
what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, “which must be
determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can
proceed.” According to the opinion of Justice Labrador:  “We have a situation where the issue of
the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the cri­minal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted.  The question of the validity
of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the
civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.” It was the
conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced
to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted
“must first be declared valid.” Its validity having been questioned
in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case “before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed.”

To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza.^[4]
As explained, in the opinion of Justice Dizon:  “We have heretofore defined a
prejudicial question as that which arises in a case’, the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal * * *. 
The prejudicial question – we further said – must be determinative of
the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in
another court * * *.  These requisites
are present in the case at bar.  Should
the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner’s consent thereto was obtained by means
of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary
and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which
he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.  Thus the issue involved in the action for the
annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or
innocence of the crime of bigamy.  * *
*.”

The situation in this case is markedly differently.  At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963,
the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indis­putable.  Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not peti­tioner
who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation.  It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when
petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint
against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.  As was correctly stressed in the answer of
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. 
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question.  A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner.  There is no occasion to indulge in the
probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought
almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been
inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an
alleged prejudicial question.  The above
judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada
preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his
discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolve. 
With costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., reserves his vote.

^[1] Special
and Affirmative Defenses, Answer, par. 1.

^[2]
Idem, citing 3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 275.

^[3]
L-15315, August 26, 1960.

^[4]
L-14534, February 28, 1962.