ALLAN L. GO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, SOUTHERN LEYTE CHAPTER AND ERIC G. MACABUHAY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
LAGURA-YAP, J.:
“WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby GRANTED. The case filed against the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) – Southern Leyte Chapter and Eric G. Macabuhay is hereby DISMISSED.
“SO ORDERED.”
On September 20, 2006, plaintiff Allan[2] L. Go (plaintiff) filed a Complaint[3] before the RTC against defendants Philippine National Red Cross, Southern Leyte Chapter and Eric G. Macabuhay for Collection of Money in Civil Case No. R- 3486.
Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he is the proprietor of Advance Petron Service Station, a duly-licensed gasoline station with address at Bo. Mantahan, Maasin City, Southern Leyte while defendant Southern Leyte Chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a chartered corporation (with power to sue and be sued under Presidential Decree No. 1264 amending Republic Act No. 95 as amended by Republic Act No. 855 and 6373)[4]. The office of defendant PNRC is in Abgao, Maasin City, Southern Leyte where the Officer-in-Charge is Mr. Edwin Pamonag.
During the period from February 2003 to November 2004, the defendant PNRC owed plaintiff, a total amount of Four Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Five Pesos & 92/100 (P455,795.92) for fuel intake, lubricants, etc. From February 2005 to August 2006 plaintiff sent written demands to the defendant PNRC whose officer-in-charge then was Eric G. Macabuhay. The latter promised that the amount shall be paid on April 30, 2005 but no payment were made.
The Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim[5], alleged that defendant is properly named as “The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)”; its Southern Leyte Chapter is not a separate entity but only a chapter among many formed and existing throughout the country. The defendant has its principal office at Bonifacio Drive, Port Area, Manila.
Defendant PNRC specifically denied that it entered into transactions with plaintiff regarding the items mentioned in paragraph 3 of the complaint i.e., regarding the purchase of fuel intake, lubricants, etc., worth Four Hundred Fifty-five Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Five Pesos & 92/100 (P455,795.92). But defendant PNRC admitted the existence of the receipt of the Demand Letters (Annexes “A”[6] and “B”[7]). The demand letters were addressed to Mr. Edwin Pamonag/Mr. Eric Macabuhay. However, defendant PNRC denied any knowledge of the truth of Annex “C”[8] regarding the promise to pay made by Mr. Eric G. Macabuhay.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, defendant asserted that plaintiff has no cause of action as there is no showing that defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff for the supply of the items stated in the Complaint. Defendant had not authorized any person to enter into any kind of contract with plaintiff since it is only the Secretary General of the Philippine National Red Cross who has authority to commit its funds and approve expenditures. The defendant said it was never in receipt of, nor was it ever benefited by the items or products the value of which Mr. Eric G. Macabuhay promised to pay.
As to plaintiff’s counterclaim, defendant asserted that the filing of the action was intended to trick defendant into paying a non-existent debt, which is a clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 20 and 21 thereof.
On December 21, 2006, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint[9] praying that he be allowed to to implead Eric G. Macabuhay, an indispensable party defendant.
On December 28, 2006, the court a quo issued an Order[10] granting plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint[11] dated December 11, 2006 which was attached to the Motion for Leave, etc.
On February 14, 2007, defendant Eric G. Macabuhay (defendant Macabuhay) filed his Answer[12] wherein he stated that he did not purchase on credit fuel, lubricant and other products from the plaintiff in his personal capacity but as officer-in-charge of the Southern Leyte Chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross. He acted with prior consent of the Board of Directors of the Chapter and upon the instructions of the late James Sian, Manager of the Disaster Management Services of the PNRC National Headquarters. Defendant Macabuhay admitted that he signed the Promise to Pay, which is Annex “C” of the Amended Complaint upon assurance of then Secretary Victor Liozo, Jr. and then Director for Finance, Ms. Eliza Iguiron that they will make available the funds for the settlement of the obligation. Up to his (Macabuhay) resignation from the PNRC, Liozo, Jr. and Iguiron failed to fulfill their promise. Lastly, Macabuhay asserted that it should be the PNRC National Headquarters which must be held liable to pay the obligation.
On May 12, 2008, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order[13] wherein the issues to be resolved are:
1. Whether or not the chapter is a juridical person or entity authorized by law to be a party to a judicial action.
2. Whether or not the chapter has duly authorized co-defendant Eric Macabuhay to transact by credit with plaintiff as regards the latter’s oil products from February 2003 to November 2004.
3. Whether or not plaintiff should be held liable in damages and attorney’s fees to the Chapter as may be proven during the trial and in accordance with the prayer in its Answer.
4. Whether or not the charge accounts are legitimate expenses of the Philippine National Red Cross.
What follows is the long chronology of the incidents before the RTC that culminated to the issuance of the assailed order:
On July 2, 2009, defendant PNRC Southern Leyte Chapter filed a Motion to Dismiss[14].
On July 6, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order[15], directing the plaintiff to file a comment.
On July 13, 2009, plaintiff filed its Comment/Objection to Show Cause[16] stating that defendant’s allegation that plaintiff lacks interest is not true. On the same date, the court a quo issued an Order[17], setting the parties for hearing on September 10, 2009.
On July 17, 2009, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint[18], stating that despite written demands since February 2005 up to August 2006, the account was not paid and that the failure of the defendant to pay has caused damage and financial reverses to plaintiff.
On July 22, 2009 defendant PNRC filed a Motion to Deny Admission of Second Amended Complaint.[19]
On August 3, 2009, plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant PNRC’s Motion to Deny Admission of Second Amended Complaint.[20]
Subsequently, defendant PNRC filed a Reply to Objection[21] dated August 6, 2009.
On September 11, 2009, plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint.[22]
On the same date, defendant PNRC, filed a Comment on Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint.[23]
On October 16, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order[24] which granted the Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint.
On April 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Formal Offer of Exhibits[25] within a period of fifteen (15) days from the time of filing. Subsequently, the court a quo issued an Order[26] granting the Motion for Extension filed by plaintiff.
On April 19, 2010, defendant PNRC filed a Motion to Consider Plaintiff to have Rested his Case.[27]
On April 21, 2010, the court a quo issued an Order[28] granting the defendant’s Motion to Consider Plaintiff to have Rested his Case.
On April 26, 2010, defendant PNRC-Southern Leyte Chapter filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[29], citing that the only evidence of plaintiff is his sole testimony. He did not formally offer the pre-marked exhibits during the preliminary conference. The exhibits are self-serving and hearsay because these all originated from plaintiff’s files.
On May 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a Comment/Objection to Demurrer Evidence[30]. Plaintiff argued that his testimony was very clear and categorical, that defendant PNRC entered into a credit transaction with him through its co-defendant Macabuhay, then Officer-in-charge, Eric G. Macabuhay, which amounted to P455,795.92.
On May 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Formal Offer of Exhibits.[31]
On June 9, 2010, the court a quo issued an Order[32] granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff.
On June 16, 2010, the court a quo rendered the assailed Order[33] granting defendant’s demurrer to evidence and thus, dismissing the case against the defendants.
Aggrieved, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] but it was denied by the RTC in the Order[35] dated October 7, 2010. Hence, this appeal anchored on the lone assignment of error:
I.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANtS – APPELLEES’ DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE CITING THAT IT DID NOT FIND THE CREDIT INVOICES AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS PRESENTED AND IDENTIFIED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO BE EVIDENCE OF INDEBTEDNESS OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO IDENTIFY THE SIGNATURES AND THE PERSONS WHO SIGNED THE CREDIT INVOICES AND OBTAINED THE PRODUCTS ON CREDIT.
Did the lower court err in granting the demurrer to evidence due to insufficiency of evidence by plaintiff-appellant?
Plaintiff-appellant argues in his Brief[36] that with the admissions from the defendant-appellee Macabuhay in his Answer that the debt existed, he (plaintiff-appellant) has been relieved of the burden of proving the fact of indebtedness. Proof is required only on disputed matters. On points which either or both parties have admitted, there is no need to present evidence.
Defendants-appellees counter that the records show that the case is devoid of facts that would give rise to a cause of action against them or an actionable document hence, they moved for a Demurrer. They claim that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his entitlement to the relief prayed for in the complaint.
Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence
A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action,[37] thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings. It is defined as “an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.”[38]
Is the evidence presented by plaintiff-appellee sufficient to prove his cause of action against defendants-appellees on the alleged unpaid credit purchases of fuel intake and lubricants, etc?
We have reviewed the records and We are convinced that the lower court did not err in its finding that plaintiff-appellant failed to prove his claim against defendants-appellees.
First. The lower court gave due consideration to the manifestation by plaintiff-appellant’s counsel that the indebtedness incurred by and charged to the PNRC Southern Leyte Chapter from January 2002 up to March 2004 have already been paid[39]. Plaintiff-appellant himself testified that though there are still unpaid accounts covering the period and even prior thereto, these were chargeable to other entities affiliated with the PNRC such as IFRCC, USAID, and ICDPP. Plaintiff-appellant even identified the credit invoices and statements of account of each entity indicating the amounts that were charged and the period when the debts were incurred. These factual circumstances definitely indicate that the evidence is not enough to establish defendants-appellees’ unpaid purchases of fuel products worth P455,795.92.
Second. In his testimony, plaintiff-appellant did not identify the signatures found on the credit invoices. Although plaintiff-appellant insisted that he had personal knowledge of credit invoices, it was established that the person who had personal knowledge thereof was his cashier or employee on duty when the withdrawal of the fuel products were made. Plaintiff-appellant should have presented his cashier to identify the contents of the credit invoices particularly on the signatures that appeared thereon. Otherwise, plaintiff-appellant’s testimony carries no probative value as it is hearsay. It is crystal clear that personal knowledge by the witness (plaintiff-appellant) which is material in the identification of documentary evidence, is absent in this case.
In Lea Mer Industries, Inc., vs. Malayan Insurance Co.[40], the Supreme Court reiterated the settled rule, that witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial and that their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge as required by the rules on evidence, viz:
“Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.”
Third. We cannot consider the credit invoices as entries made in the course of business and take these out from the ambit of the hearsay rule to be regarded as admissible evidence. In Canque v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court laid down the requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The above exception to the hearsay rule cannot be applied in this case as there is no showing that the one who made the entries in the credit invoices, whether it was the cashier of the gas station or another, is unable to testify. It has not been also affirmed that this person made the entries in the credit invoices in the ordinary course of performing his duties. As the lower court aptly said in its Order:
Nonetheless despite plaintiff’s identification of the marked credit invoices and statements of account, the court does not find said documentary evidence sufficient to be considered as evidence of indebtedness primarily because plaintiff failed to identify the signatures and the persons who signed the credit invoices and obtained the products on credit. Plaintiff should have presented the cashier or other personnel from his gas station to identify the signatures. Otherwise, plaintiff’s allegations remain to be such for which reason defendants cannot be made liable over the same. Well settled in the rule that he who alleges must prove his case by preponderance of evidence.
Without those documentary exhibits being given weight, the testimony of the plaintiff would only be self-serving. Be it noted that plaintiff opted not to present any other witnesses at least to corroborate his testimony. Thus, being a self-serving one, the same cannot be given weight.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto[42]. In the instant case, the lower court found, and so have We, that the evidence of plaintiff-appellant does not preponderate in his favor.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Order dated June 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte in Civil Case No. R-3486 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ingles,* and Lopez, JJ., concur.
* In lieu of Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos who is on wellness leave per Office Order No. 13-14-GTI.
[1] Records, pp. 214-216, penned by Judge Bethany G. Kapili.
[2] In the assailed order, the first name of plaintiff is spelled Alan.
[3] Records, pp. 2-4.
[4] “An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross”
[5] Records, pp. 38-40.
[6] Demand Letter (2nd Indorsement), Records, p. 5.
[7] Demand Letter (3rd Indorsement), Records, p. 6.
[8] Letter dated March 15, 2005, Records, p. 7.
[9] Records, pp. 20-21.
[10] Ibid, p. 28.
[11] Ibid, pp. 22-24.
[12] Ibid, pp. 32-33.
[13] Records, pp. 105-109.
[14] Records, pp. 148-150.
[15] Ibid, p. 151.
[16] Records, pp. 152-153.
[17] Records, pp. 154-155.
[18] Ibid, pp. 156-157.
[19] Ibid, pp. 162-163.
[20] Ibid, p. 164.
[21] Ibid, pp. 165-167.
[22] Ibid, p. 169.
[23] Ibid, pp. 171-172.
[24] Ibid, pp. 173-174.
[25] Ibid, p. 178.
[26] Records, p. 179.
[27] Records, pp. 180-181.
[28] Ibid, p. 183.
[29] Ibid, pp. 184-189.
[30] Ibid, 192-195.
[31] Ibid, pp. 196-197.
[32] Ibid, pp. 212-213.
[33] Records, pp. 214-216.
[34] Records, pp. 217-218.
[35] Ibid, pp. 229-233.
[36] Rollo, p. 19.
[37] Nepomuceno vs. Commission on Elections, 126 SCRA 472, 478 (December 29, 1983).
[38] Leni O. Choa, vs. Alfonso O. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002.
[39] TSN, June 16, 2008, p. 11.
[40] G.R. No. 161745, September 30, 2005.
[41] 365 Phil. 124, 131 (1999).
[42] Ching vs. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2002.