G.R. No. L-25555. March 28, 1969
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO MAGCAMIT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
Appeal by Domingo Magcamit from the
sentence of 17 years and 4 months to life imprisonment imposed upon him for
murder by the Court of First Instance of Marinduque.
Juan Labay and Domingo Magcamit were prosecuted as principals of the murder of Arceo Montemar on June 6, 1962, at barrio Boton, Boac, Marinduque. Both pleaded “not guilty”.
During the trial, Juan Labay moved that
he be permitted to change his plea to “guilty”. The motion was granted and, accordingly, when
arraigned anew, he pleaded “guilty”.
However, pronouncement of the sentence was deferred. Domingo Magcamit
having stood by his plea of “not guilty,” trial proceeded against
both defendants. After trial the
defendants were found guilty. Juan Labay was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 12
years to 20 years of reclusion temporal, and Domingo Magcamit was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months to life
imprisonment. Both defendants were
ordered to pay in solidum the sum of P6,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Arceo Montemar. Domingo Magcamit
appealed.
At about 8:00 o’clock in
the evening of June 6, 1962,
Juan Labay, armed with a bolo, and Domingo Magcamit, stoned several times the house of Lamberto Lazo situated at barrio Boton, Boac, Marinduque. As the stoning became intense, Arceo Montemar, a neighbor, who
was inside the house at the time, came out of the house, and as he walked
towards the neighboring houses of Simeon Matre and Justa Malapad, Domingo Magcamit suddenly placed himself behind Arceo,
held him fast by the waist, and told Juan Labay:
“Upakan me na bayaw, ito ang
kasira ko“. Juan Labay then
struck Arceo Montemar on
the left side of the neck, inflicting a mortal wound. Both assailants then fled from the scene of
the crime. Arceo
staggered back to the house of Lamberto Lazo. Rolando Montemar, who with the aid of a flashlight had seen the
commission of the crime, followed Arceo
as he staggered back to the house of Lamberto Lazo, where he found him bathed in blood and dying. Rolando, with the, help of a friend, took Arceo to the Marinduque
Provincial Hospital,
but Arceo died before their arrival at the
hospital. These facts were proved by the
testimonies of eyewitness Rolando Montemar and the
co-accused Juan Labay, who, after having pleaded
“guilty”, testified for the prosecution. Another witness, Pedro Gubangco,
saw Juan Labay and Domingo Magcamit
flee from the scene of the crime shortly after its commission. The medical certificate reads:
“This is to certify that Mr. Arceo Montemar, 22 years old, resident of Buton,
Boac, Marinduque
was dead on arrival at the hospital last night at 9:50 p.m. The cause
of death was severe hemorrhage and shock secondary to a cut wound 6″ X
3″ X 3″ at the left side of the neck longitudinally severing the
blood vessels and cutting completely the tip of the medial end of the left
clavicle.
“SGD. RAFAEL S. OCAMPO, M.D.
Resident Physician”
Appellant contends that the evidence did not establish
conspiracy and treachery. The contention
is unmeritorious. The foregoing
statement of facts clearly shows that there was treachery because the attack
was sudden and unexpected, and because Arceo Montemar was helpless at the time, and that there was
conspiracy because there was previous concert of criminal design shown by the
concerted action of Labay and Magcamit
and by Magcamit’s words, uttered to Labay, i.e., “Upakan mo na bayaw, ito
ang kasira ko.”
Appellant contends that there was material contradiction between
prosecution witnesses Rolando Montemar and Juan Labay in that while the former said that the words uttered
by Domingo Magcamit were “Tirahin
mo na bayaw,” the
latter declared that the words were, “Upakan mo na bayaw.” The contention is
untenable. Rolando Montemar
was about seven meters away from the place of the attack, and it is not strange
that he must have heard the expression “Upakan
mo na bayaw” as “Tirahin mo na bayaw,”
both expressions having the same meaning.
The additional words “Ito ang kasira ko” heard by Juan Labay must have been uttered in a lower tone, for which
reason they could not have been heard by Rolando Montemar.
Appellant’s contention that the lower court erred in not giving
his testimony credence, lacks merit. In
his testimony, appellant admitted that he and Juan Labay
stoned several times the house of Lamberto Lazo, and that Arceo Montemar came out of the house. However, he continued, when Arceo Montemar reached the place
where they stood, he left the place alone because Juan Labay
refused to leave, and when he had walked about fifty meters away, Labay caught up with him and told him that he had just killed
a man. We find appellant’s testimony unworthy
of credence.
No mitigating or aggravating circumstance having attended the
commission of the crime, the penalty for murder (reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death) should be imposed upon appellant in its medium
degree (reclusion perpetua).
The civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be raised
from P6,000 to P12,000. However, as Juan Labay
did not appeal, his solidary liability with appellant
cannot go beyond P6,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed judgment is modified by
sentencing appellant to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and ordering said appellant to pay the heirs of Arceo
Montemar the sum of P12,000,
P6,000 of which shall be satisfied solidarily with
Juan Labay.
Costs against the appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Clean
Clean
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
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CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur in this decision since it deals only with the appeal of
accused Domingo Magcamit.
It is the case of accused Juan Labay
who did not appeal that needs clarification.
It will be noticed that accused Juan Labay
pleaded guilty. There being not a single
aggravating circumstance alleged in the information, there was no possibility
that he could have been given the capital penalty. Such being the case, it seems to me that the
lower court should not have deferred the pronouncement of the judgment. It is only in cases where, upon a plea of
guilty, the accused can be sentenced to DEATH that I consider it justified for
trial courts not to follow the logical and legal consequence of a plea of
guilty – namely, the acceptance of the plea and imposition of the penalty
provided by law. The rule that allows
the court to further hear witnesses after the accused has entered such plea, in
order to determine what punishment shall be imposed, (Section 5, Rule 118 which
was Section 5, Rule 114 of the old Rules) applies only when, by virtue of the
plea entered, the court would have discretion as to the punishment for the
offense charged.(id.)
I hold, therefore, that as a matter of correct procedure, and lest the
rights of the accused be unduly prejudiced, trial courts should immediately
render judgment and sentence the accused whenever a plea of guilty is duly
entered by the accused, unless the sentence can be DEATH or, under the circumstances
of the plea entered, the court has discretion as to the punishment to be
imposed.
Moreover, it is to be noted that when Labay
offered to and did, in fact, plead guilty, the trial was already in progress
and the prosecution had already presented three witnesses. Accordingly, he was not entitled to have the
said plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court erred in taking such plea as
a mitigating circumstance and imposing sentence upon him on the basis
thereof. Inasmuch, however, as he did
not appeal, the sentence imposed by the court a quo can no longer
be changed.
I am making these observations, albeit without effect on the
judgment, with the expectation that all concerned will be properly guided, in
order to minimize the occasions for error and unnecessary appeal which could be
prejudicial to the state but, most of all, to the accused.