TERESA F. DACILLO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JULITO D. ELMA AND RUBEN SAVELLANO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
REYES, JR., J.C., J.:
Teresa F. Dacillo (herein appellant) filed a complaint on August 28, 2012 against Julito De Elma, Jr. and Ruben Savellano (herein appellees) alleging that on February 29, 1988, appellant’s husband, Rodrigo Dacillo, without appellant’s knowledge and consent, entered into a Contract to Sell with appellees, selling a conjugal property, particularly a portion of Lot 7[1] covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44049 situated in Brgy. San Pedro, Puerto Princesa. She claimed that under the Family Code, such contract was void from the beginning. Consequently any transaction derived therefrom is void for lack of basis. (Records, pp. 1-3).
Appellee Julito D. Elma (Elma) filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that: appellant’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment; the complaint states no cause of action, and; the appellant is guilty of forum-shopping. (Records, pp. 33-35).
Elma pointed out that there was a prior civil case filed by appellant’s husband, entitled “Rodrigo Dacillo v. Julito D. Elma, Jr.” docketed as Civil Case No. 2342 which sought the rescission of the Contract to Sell dated February 29, 1988, the very same contract subject of the instant case. Rodrigo could have raised in Civil Case No. 2342 the absence of appellant’s signature on the contract, but he did not. Thus the spouses could no longer raise such matter in another case by reason of res judicata and/or conclusiveness of judgment. (Records, pp. 33-34)
Elma also argued that the appellant incorrectly invoked the Family Code, which became effective on August 3, 1988 since the contract was executed on February 29, 1988. Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the wife has 10 years from the date of transaction to file a complaint for the annulment of a contract of a husband without the wife’s consent. She cannot feign ignorance of the transaction as her husband filed Civil Case No. 2342 way back August 1990 and it is recorded that she personally received a court order in said case dated January 15, 1998. (Records, p. 34).
Finally Elma averred that appellant failed to mention in the Certification against forum-shopping the pendency of Civil Case No. 2342 which involved the same property. Such failure constitutes forum-shopping. (Records, pp. 34-35).
The appellant filed a Comment arguing that res judicata does not apply in this case since the present case involved different issues and parties. Also, a void contract is imprescriptible. (Records, p. 59).
On March 15, 2013, the RTC rendered the herein assailed Resolution holding:
“WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED and the complaint in this case is hereby DISMISSED due to lack of cause of action in virtue of the latter’s extinctive prescription.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 13-14).
The RTC held that since the subject contract was executed before the effectivity of the Family Code, the contract shall be governed by Art. 173 of the Civil Code which provides that the disposition of a conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 further provides that an action for the annulment of any contract entered into by the husband without the wife’s consent must be filed: (1) during the marriage, and; (2) within ten years from the transaction questioned. Where any one of these two conditions is lacking, the action will be deemed filed out of time. As the contract in this case was executed on February 29, 1988, plaintiff only had until March 1998 to challenge the contract’s validity. In the present case, plaintiff filed her complaint only after 24 years from the time her husband executed the contract. Thus, her cause of action has already prescribed. (Rollo, pp. 9-11).
The appellant is now before the Court with the following assignment of errors:
A. The trial court (Regional Trial Court of Palawan Branch 49, Palawan) erred in applying the new civil code to the case;
B. The trial court erred in concluding appellant’s cause of action had prescribed. (Rollo, p. 20).
Appellant argues that while the contract was executed on a date when the civil law provision was effective, the existence of such contract was discovered by her only when the Family Code was already in force. Thus, the Family Code should prevail over the civil code since the occurrence of appellant’s cause of action started upon discovery of the fraud perpetrated against her. (Rollo, p. 20).
Appellant continues that the rescission case filed by her husband effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period of her cause of action. This is because prescription of an action is interrupted by a filing of an action, a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. (Rollo, p. 21).
The Court finds NO MERIT in the appeal.
Jurisprudence has declared, in no uncertain terms, that when a sale of the conjugal property was made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the law that shall govern it is the Civil Code particularly Art. 173 thereof. (Alfredo v. Borras, 404 SCRA 145, 159 [2003]; Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, 608 SCRA 394, 411 [2009]; Villanueva v. Chiong, 554 SCRA 197, 204 [2008]).
Article 173 of the Civil Code states:
“Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.”
Applying the said provision, the Supreme Court has declared that alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wife’s consent is not null and void but merely voidable. (Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, supra, p. 412).
There is no ambiguity in the way the law was worded. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by a husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. To annul the contract, the action must be brought: (1) during the marriage, and; (2) within ten years from the questioned transaction. Where any one of these two conditions is lacking, the action shall be considered as having been filed out of time. Consequently, failure to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction shall render the sale valid. (Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, supra, pp. 413-415).
Indeed, if the wife fails to exercise her right within the specified period, Art. 173 of the Civil Code is explicit in that the wife or her heirs can only demand the value of the property after the dissolution of the marriage provided they prove that the husband fraudulently alienated the property. (Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo, 465 SCRA 244, 257-258 [2005]).
Appellant tries to convince the Court that the Family Code should apply in this case as it was during the effectivity of the Family Code that she learned of the contract’s existence.
The Court does not agree.
Cases are clear that it is the date of execution of the contract that determines whether it is the Civil Code or the Family Code that shall govern the transaction. (See Alfredo v. Borras, supra, p. 159; Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, supra, p. 413; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, p. 204; Aggabao v. Parulan, 629 SCRA 562, 572 [2010]; Fuentes v. Roca, 618 SCRA 702, 709 [2010]); not the date of its discovery. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, only application. (Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, supra, p. 413)
Elma has pointed out, in his Motion to Dismiss before the trial court, that appellant personally received an Order dated January 15, 1988 in Civil Case No. 2342 which involved the subject lot. (Records, p. 34). If We are to reckon her knowledge of the contract from such date, still, it was only on August 28, 2012 or fourteen years later that she filed the instant case before the trial court.
The time-honored rule, anchored on public policy, is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become “stale” or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. Public policy requires, for peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion. Laches bars the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit. (Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa, supra, p. 415).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated March 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49 of Puerto Princesa City in Civil Case No. 4858, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Lopez, M.V., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.
[1] “described on plan H-195521, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. H. Pat No. 36669”, Records, p.5.