THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SANTIAGO RAQUEL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Following a Filipino custom, Francisco Dador and his wife, Julita Arboso,
went on June 1, 1959 to barrio Tinambacan, Jaro, Leyte to attend its fiesta on
the following day. They left their place in barrio Catubuan between three and
four in the afternoon, arrived in Tinambacan before dark, and stayed in the
house of Segundina Arboso, sister of Julita Arboso.

At about eight that evening, Francisco Dador was taking supper with twelve
other guests in the above-stated house. He was at the head of the table. The
house was small, it had no room but the sala, and the floor was about 30 inches
above the ground. Shortly after eating started, a gun report was heard.
Francisco Dador exclaimed “Aray!” and fell from his seat. Commotion broke inside
the house.

When Francisco Dador fell, his wife was a meter away from him, lying on a
mat, feeding her infant. Realizing that her husband had been shot, she
immediately took a flashlight and ran to get help from the police. However, upon
going out of the door and on her way downstairs, she saw the accused, Santiago
Raquel, aiming at her a gun “two feet” long. The accused then told her in the
dialect: “Deri man iton imo asawa sosog-on,” or as translated, “Your husband
will not live again.” She ran to her husband and told him that it was Santiago
Raquel who shot him. The latter answered: “Yes, I know, formerly he promised
that he will kill me if I would testify as government witness in the case
against them because they were accused in that case of the killing of Tuazon.”

Soon after, two policemen arrived. They questioned Francisco Dador and Julita
Arboso on what transpired, and searched for the accused but could not find him.
After taking a signed statement from Francisco Dador, the policemen carried him
in a hammock to their headquarters in the poblacion, and from there to the Leyte
Provincial Hospital in Tacloban City.

Francisco Dador was admitted to the hospital on June 2, 1959 where he was
treated and confined for his injury, described in his medical certificate as:

“Wound, gunshot
Point of Entrance — oval to circular shape with contusion
collar, posterior lumbar, left.
Point of Exit —none.” (Exh. D)

On June 11, 1959 an operation was performed. The result appears in the
medical certificate thus: “Slug removed from the level of the 3rd lumbar.” (Exh.
D) Francisco Dador was discharged from the hospital on July 2, 1959 upon the
instance of his wife. She took him to the house of her brother in Carigara,
Leyte, where on the next day, July 3, 1959, he died.

Dr. Francisco 0. Ronda, the attending physician, testified (unrebutted) that
Francisco Dador’s wound was fatal enough to cause his death.

Prosecuted for murder before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, wherein
the foregoing facts were established by the evidence for the prosecution, the
accused interposed an alibi, his version being as follows:

From seven in the morning to four in the afternoon on June 1, 1959 lie and
ten others were cutting grass in a field in barrio Oguiao, municipality of Jaro.
After working, he went to his house in said barrio, two kilometers from the
above-stated field, lie did not stay long in his house, for upon the request of
Fernando Cabelin, the overseer, he gathered some coconuts and bananas and then
went with him to the poblacion to deliver them to his landlady, Catalina
Zabala-Lopez, in her residence. They reached the poblacion at about five in the
afternoon and went first to Fernando Cabelin’s house therein.

Later, they proceeded to the house of Catalina Zabala-Lopez, arriving at
seven in the evening. Defendant delivered the four coconuts and two bunches of
bananas to his landlady and borrowed from her money to purchase viands for the
men working in the field. Leaving the house of Catalina Zabala-Lopez at
eight-thirty that evening, defendant and Fernando Cabelin repaired to the
latter’s house and passed the night there.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted the accused of murder
and sentenced him “to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessories provided for by law, indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Francisco Dador, [in] the amount of P5,000.00, and to pay the costs.”

Here on appeal, the accused assigns only one error: The court erred in basing
its judgment on the unlikely, unbelievable and unusual testimony of the
deceased’s wife, Julita Arboso, and on Francisco Dador’s statement on accused’s
motive in shooting him.

It is argued that for Julita Arboso to take a flashlight and courageously go
out to seek help from the police upon seeing her wounded husband, is against the
natural and ordinary course of things and thus incredible. Appellant contends
that her natural reaction should have been to come to the side of her husband.

The contention would ignore the fact that different persons respond to crises
differently. The impulse to call the police upon the occurrence of an incident
like the one described above is, rather than extraordinary, quite natural. And
this is especially so with regard to Julita Arboso, whose courage, presence of
mind and practical, independent judgment are shown in the record.

When asked on cross-examination why she was not afraid as the others were,
she answered: “I was not scared because I am the wife.” (Tsn., p. 14, Reyes.)
When her husband was taken by the policemen to the poblacion and then to the
hospital, she remained in the barrio to attend to her infant, following her
husband the next day (Tsn. pp. 30-31, Reyes). And a month later, she took her
husband out of the hospital, although the doctor advised further confinement,
and brought him to her brother’s house, following her own judgment of how to
care for him. Thus it cannot be deemed incredible that Julita Arboso, upon
realizing that her husband had been shot, should act in the manner depicted by
the prosecution.

Needless to add, we cannot agree with appellant’s view which would find it
difficult to concede acts of valor and courage on the part of women in the face
of crisis. Our history is full of such instances. Not that we here propose to
range Francisco Dador’s wife with heroines. But merely to show the fallacy of
appellant’s argument, v/e may refer to the well known role played by women in
the Katipunan, which has been aptly recorded by historian Zaide thus:

“. . . The women supported the Katipunan with all the ardor and sincerity of
their hearts and souls, working for its success with Spartan valor and
patriotism, and inspired their husbands and brothers to carry on the cause for
freedom and happiness. Their was not merely a moral support to the Katipunan nor
lip-patriotism of the vociferous kind, but a genuine, daring, and death-defying
adherence to the national aspiration and libertarian cause of the fatherland.
The women of the Katipunan were truly great women— worthy daughters of a
fighting race.”

We cannot therefore subscribe to appellant’s reasoning that what is not
ordinary is not credible.

Appellant would also deem incredible Julita Arboso’s testimony that she saw
him near the door after the shooting, and would contend that his being there
would have been a deliberate disclosure of identity on his part. On this, it
would suffice to mark that accused’s position near the door in fact concealed
him, and Julita Arboso saw him only because she defied danger by attempting to
go out to look for help.

As to the filing of the complaint on August 8, 1959 nr two months after the
shooting, this is understandable. Francisco Dador died only on July 3, 1959, the
medical certificate (Exh. D) was seemed on August 5, 1959, and the death
certificate on August 7, 1959.

Appellant’s last argument is that Francisco Dador’s statement regarding the
accused’s motive for killing him cannot be properly taken into account.
Accused’s motive for killing the deceased is not important here because he was
clearly and positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime by a witness,
Julita Arboso, whose testimony we find no reason to disbelieve. She named him
spontaneously and without hesitation, first to her husband, then to the
policemen when they investigated her soon after the shooting. And it may be
mentioned in this regard that appellant admits lack of motive on the part of
Julita Arboso to falsely impute the crime against him. ( U. S. vs. McCann, 4
Phil. 561; U.S. vs. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47; People vs. Paladin, 54 Off. Gaz., 1440;
People vs. Solaña, L-13967, Sept. 29, 1962.)

The defense of alibi was correctly rejected by the court a quo.
Coupled with the fact that appellant has been clearly and positively identified
as stated above, it must be noted that the accused’s own witnesses testified
that the distance from the poblacion of Jaro and the barrio of Tinambacan is
about four and one-half kilometers only. There was therefore no physical
impossibility for accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. While defense witnesses testified that the accused left the house of
Catalina Zabaia-Lopez at eight-thirty in the evening of June 1, 1959, the exact
and uniform time given by said witnesses, their having noticed said time without
special reason for doing so, and their close association with the accused,
Catalina Zabala-Lopez as his landlady and Fernando Cabelin as his friend since
childhood days (Tsn., p. 25, Gaviola), render their testimony unconvincing.

Appellant having shot the victim from behind during nighttime and while the
latter was taking his supper, the act was attended with treachery, qualifying
the offense to murder. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua,
which was properly imposed below. The indemnity of P5,000.00, however, should be
raised to P6.000.00. (People vs. Segovia, 92 Phil. 1080).

Wherefore, with the modification indicated above, the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs.

So ordered.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ. concur.