MARCELINO LONTOK, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO GORGONIO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, RESPONDENT.

This case is about the propriety of an
information containing the charge of “reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries”.

On March 29, 1973,
Marcelino Lontok, Jr. was
charged with that delito compuesto
in the municipal court of San Juan, Rizal.  In the information, it was alleged that on
November 14, 1972, while Lontok was recklessly
driving his Mercedes Benz car, he bumped a passenger jeep and caused damage to
it in the sum of P780 and that the bumping also caused physical injuries to
three passengers who were incapacitated from performing their customary labor
for a period of less than ten
days (Criminal Case No. 26116).

Lontok filed a motion to quash that
part of the information wherein the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence is
charged.  He contended that, because that
offense prescribes in two months and it was committed on November 14, 1972, the last day of the sixty-day
period for filing the charge as to that offense was January 14, 1973. 
He prayed that the information be amended by excluding that light
offense.

The fiscal opposed the
motion to quash.  The municipal court
denied it.  Lontok
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.  But
instead of going to trial, he filed in this Court on August 30, 1973 a petition wherein he prayed that
the amendment of the information be ordered by deleting the portion thereof
wherein the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence is
charged.

The Solicitor General in his comment agrees with Lontok’s view that damage to property through reckless
imprudence cannot be complexed with a light offense,
that the light offense had already prescribed, and that two informations
should have been filed.  He manifested
that he would ask the prosecuting fiscal to amend the information.  Nevertheless, he concluded that since Lontok did not raise any jurisdictional issue, his petition
for certiorari was not proper and, therefore, it should be dismissed.

The issue is whether Lontok, over his objection, can be tried by the Municipal
court on an information charging the complex crime of
damage to property in the sum of P780 and lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence.

We hold that he should be
tried only for damage to property through reckless imprudence, which, being
punished by a maximum fine of P2, 340, a correctional penalty, is a less grave
felony (Arts. 9, 25 and 26 and 365, Revised Penal Code).  As such, it cannot be complexed with the light offense
of lesiones leves
through reckless imprudence which, as correctly contended by Lontok, had already prescribed since that crime prescribes
in sixty days.

There is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies or when a grave or less grave offense is a
means of committing another grave or less grave offense.

As originally enacted, article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provided that the crime is complex when a single act constitutes two or more
crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other.  Commonwealth Act No. 4000
amended article 48 by substituting the words “grave or less grave
felonies” for the word “crimes” in the original version, thus
eliminating a light felony as a component part of a complex crime.

Parenthetically, it may be noted in passing that the concept of
complex crime was applied in criminal negligence or quasi-offenses (People vs.
Lara, 75; Phil. 786 and People vs. Agito, 103 Phil.
526, regarding multiple homicide through reckless imprudence; People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294, regarding malversation
through falsification by reckless negligence; Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 103
Phil. 277, regarding estafa through falsification by
reckless negligence; Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151; Lapuz
vs. Court of Appeals, 94 Phil. 710 and People vs. Vendiola,
115 Phil. 122, regarding homicide, grave physical injuries and grave damage to
property, all through reckless imprudence).

In all the foregoing cases, it is assumed that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but is simply a way of committing a crime
and it merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability.  Negligence becomes a punishable act when it
results in a crime (People vs. Faller, 67 Phil. 529).

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light,
there is no complex crime.  The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the
grave felony.  Thus, the light felonies
of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a
single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime.  They cannot be charged in
one information.  They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla,
50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil.
513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000
and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a
separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

A chief of police likewise did not err in filing separate
complaints for slight physical injuries and grave oral defamation committed on
the same occasion by one person against the same victim (Manduriao
vs. Habana, L-28069, August 18, 1977, 78 SCRA 241).

Where a complaint for slight physical injuries and grave threats
was filed in the justice of the peace court under the old Judiciary Law, the
said court had jurisdiction to try the slight physical injuries case and could
only undertake the preliminary investigation of the latter offense (People vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 586. 
See People vs. Acierto, 57
Phil. 614 and People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil. 671).

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by the
investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case
the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones
menos graves and damage to property
which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex
crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have
been charged in a separate information.  And since, as a light offense, it prescribes
in two months, Lontok’s s criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91,
Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of
Court).  The trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok’s
motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light
offense.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s orders of May 21 and July 12, 1973 are set aside.  It is ordered to try Lontok
only for damage to property through reckless imprudence.  The information need not be amended, it being
understood that Lontok has no more culpability for
the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence charged
therein.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Acting C.J., Barredo,
(Acting Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., did not take part.