G.R. No. L-23654. March 28, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. VICENTE MARQUEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by the People from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Albay in its Criminal Case No. 3544, granting the
motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Vicente
Marquez.
On November 12, 1962,
a complaint for frustrated homicide was filed with the then Justice of the
Peace Court of Camalig, Albay,
against appellee Vicente Marquez. The said complaint was signed by one Consolacion Musa Solano, mother
of the offended party, Wenceslao Solano, who was then
confined in the Albay
Provincial Hospital,
in consequence of the crime charged. A
warrant of arrest was issued, but this was not carried out because the accused
had filed a bail bond in the amount of P12,000.00. When the case was later called for purposes
of conducting the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the accused,
thru counsel, waived his right thereto; accordingly, the record of the case was
remanded to the court a quo; and on July 9, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal of Albay
filed the corresponding information with the said court.
Upon being arraigned on August
22, 1964, appellee entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge.
On the day of the trial on September 25, 1964, without asking for
leave to withdraw his previously-entered plea, appellee
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Albay – based on the complaint
signed by Consolacion Musa
Solano in behalf of her victim-son or offended party – was null and void and
the court had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the case.
Resolving the grounds raised in said motion to dismiss as well as
those in the oppositions thereto, separately filed by the private prosecutor
and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Albay, on October 1, 1964, the court dismissed
the case, with costs de oficio, and ordered the
cancellation of the bail bond of appellee. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal concerned has
appealed from the dismissal aforesaid directly to this Court.
The People’s appeal is premised on the following assignment of
errors:
“I. The lower court erred in dismissing the case
after the appellee had already pleaded to the
information.
“II. The lower court erred in holding that it did
not acquire jurisdiction to try the case.”
On the other hand, as herein earlier intimated, the main point of
appellee which was sustained by the trial court is
that the complaint signed by the mother of the offended party which initiated
the proceedings in the justice of the peace court was invalid because under
Section 2 of Rule 110, a complaint may be subscribed and sworn to only by
“the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government
or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the
law violated” and, consequently, the information based on the said
complaint filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Albay,
without said fiscal having conducted another preliminary investigation, did not
grant jurisdiction to the court.
The People’s appeal should be sustained.
We do not hesitate to agree with the Solicitor General that the
trial court’s questioned order of dismissal is erroneous, being based, as it
is, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over this case because the
initial complaint filed with the justice of the peace court was not signed by
the offended party and was, therefore, invalid.
It may be conceded that, as appellee argues,
apart from what is provided in the Rule cited, there are precedents to the
effect that, except as to the government officers authorized by said Rule, the
filing of a complaint is personal to the offended party.[1]
This is not, however, the only principle involved under the complete factual
setting of this case. It must be
remembered that appellee did not attack the said
complaint while his case was still in the justice of the peace court, where, on
the contrary, he waived the preliminary investigation proper; he allowed the
case to be remanded to the court of first instance and folded his arms when the
provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information; and, he did not object
to his being arraigned, instead he merely entered a plea of not guilty at said
arraignment. In these circumstances, We hold that the initial complaint has lost its importance
and the case can be viewed only in the light of the information subsequently
filed by the provincial fiscal, as suggested by the Solicitor General.
We do not lose sight of the fact that in truth the fiscal did not
conduct any preliminary investigation of his own and, as a matter of fact, the
information filed by him with the court a quo did not carry with
it the sworn certification of the fiscal, required by section 14 of Rule 112,
that the appellee was “given a chance to appear
in person or by counsel at said examination and investigation.” Neither
are We overlooking precedents to the effect that
absence of a preliminary investigation is a grave irregularity which nullifies
the proceedings because it violates the right to due process.[2]
We perceive, however, that the situations involved in those precedents cannot
be equated with the circumstances obtaining here, for while there, the
objections to the procedure followed were opportunely raised before the accused
entered their pleas, here, appellee sought the
dismissal of this case long after he had already entered his plea of not guilty
to the information filed by the fiscal.
Therefore, the question to determine in this case is, what was the effect of appellee’s
failure to object to the information before or at the time he entered his plea
of not guilty. Assuming that said
information was defective because it did not contain the requisite certification
regarding the fiscal’s having held a preliminary
investigation where the accused was given an opportunity to be present
personally or thru counsel, such an omission is not necessarily fatal. It should be observed that section 3 of Rule
110 defines an information as nothing more than
“an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by
the fiscal and filed with the court.” Thus, it is obvious that such
certification is not an essential part of the information itself and its
absence cannot vitiate it as such. True,
as already stated, section 14 of Rule 112 enjoin that “no information . .
. shall be filed, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a
preliminary investigation”, but, as can be seen, the injunction refers to
the non-holding of the preliminary investigation, not the absence of the
certification. In other words, what is
not allowed is the filing of the information without a preliminary
investigation having been previously conducted, and the injunction that there
should be a certification is only a consequence of the requirement that a
preliminary investigation should first be conducted. Logically, therefore, inasmuch as the settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the preliminary investigation
itself must be asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed
waived,[3]
it stands to reason, that the absence of the certification in question is also
waived by failure to allege it before the plea.
After all, such certification is nothing but evidence of a fact, and if
the omission of the fact itself to be certified is waived, if not properly
raised before the accused enters his plea, why should the omission merely of
the certification be given more importance than the absence of the fact itself
to be certified to? Is it to be
sustained that if in a given case, there were such a certification although in
fact no preliminary investigation has been held, this
Court is going to hold that the requirement of a preliminary investigation has
been complied with? To ask the question
is to immediately expose the absurdity of the affirmative answer to it.
To be sure, the situation of appellee
may be compared with another case where the fiscal, for one reason or another,
files an information without holding any preliminary
investigation and without any such preliminary investigation having been
conducted, by the municipal court concerned.
After all, under the Rules, a criminal action may also be initiated by
the fiscal filing an in formation with the proper court. (section 3, Rule
110) On the other hand, as already stated, this Court has consistently held
that the defense of absence of a preliminary investigation must be raised
before the entry of the plea, otherwise, it is waived. Accordingly, even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the complaint in the justice of the peace court was void, as
contended by appellee, on the other hand, the filing
of the information in question with the court a quo made the
issue of validity of said complaint already academic, considering that the said
complaint had already been superseded by the said information. And since the said information is sufficient
in form and substance, and the absence of a preliminary investigation may only
be raised before the accused enters his plea, otherwise, it is waived, it
follows that appellee forfeited his right to question
both the complaint and the information under discussion by entering his plea of
not guilty and otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for
trial.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and this
case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs
against appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
[1] U.S. vs.
Malabon, 1 Phil. 731; Guevarra,
et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., 77 Phil. 615.
[2] Albano, et al. vs. Arranz, et al.,
L-24403, December
22, 1965; People vs. Monton, L-23906, June 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 1024.
[3]
People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443; People vs. Oliveria,
supra; People vs. Magpale, 70
Phil. 176; People vs. Lambino, 103 Phil. 504;
People vs. Selfaison, et al. L-14732, January
28, 1961, 1 SCRA 235; People vs. Casiano,
February 16, 1961, 1 SCRA 479.