FRANK RAYMOND KRUEGER, ASSISTED BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, FRANCIS AUSTRIA KRUEGER, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BERNARDO O. VALDEZ AND LUCINA SIAPNO, RESPONDENTS.

Krueger versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Frank Raymond Krueger, assisted by his guardian ad litem Francis Austria Krueger, against the Court of Appeals, Bernardo Valdez, and Lucina Siapno. Krueger's complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages concerning a mining claim was dismissed by the trial court, and when he appealed, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for failure to comply with the material data rule under Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The case matters because it marks the Court's liberalized application of that rule, holding that a trial court's approval of the record on appeal cures defects in the material data, and that the date of receipt of the decision need not appear in the notice of appeal.

Procedural History

Krueger filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet against Bernardo Valdez for recovery of a sum of money and damages concerning a mining claim. The complaint was later amended to implead Lucina Siapno to include an alternative prayer for restitution of the mining claim. After trial, the trial court, presided by Judge Feliciano Belmonte, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim. Krueger appealed to the Court of Appeals. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal failed to state the date of receipt of the decision in the notice of appeal, failed to show the kind of appeal bond posted, and failed to show whether the bond was approved by the court. The Court of Appeals, through its Ninth Division, issued a resolution dismissing the appeal for failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 41. Krueger then filed this petition for review, which the Supreme Court treated as a special civil action and resolved without need of memoranda or briefs.

Facts

On January 7, 1970, Krueger filed through his guardian ad litem a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet against Bernardo Valdez for recovery of a sum of money and damages concerning a mining claim. The complaint was later amended to implead Lucina Siapno so as to include an alternative prayer for restitution of the mining claim.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision on March 29, 1974, dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim of the defendants. Krueger appealed to the Court of Appeals. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal failed to state the date of receipt of the decision in the notice of appeal, and failed to show the kind of appeal bond posted and whether it was approved by the court.

Krueger opposed the motion and pointed to page 46 of his record on appeal, which stated that counsel received the decision on April 8, 1974, received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 11, 1974, filed a motion for extension of time on June 13, 1974, filed the notice of appeal and appeal bond on June 13, 1974, and submitted the record on appeal on July 12, 1974. He also explained that when counsel received the decision on April 8, 1974, and filed the motion for reconsideration on May 7, 1974, he had consumed twenty-nine days and had one day left to perfect the appeal. When counsel received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 11, 1974, the last day to appeal was June 12, 1974, but since that date was a holiday, the filing on June 13, 1974 was within the reglementary period. The trial court approved the record on appeal on August 7, 1974, finding it in order and granting the motion to appeal as pauper. Despite these explanations, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for failure of the record on appeal to state the date of receipt of the decision in the notice of appeal.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for failure of the record on appeal to show the kind of appeal bond posted and its approval by the court.
• Whether or not the trial court's approval of the record on appeal cures defects or omissions with reference to Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. — The full names of all the parties to the proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or judgment and necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.

This provision is the material data rule, which requires the record on appeal to contain data showing that the appeal was perfected on time, and its interpretation is the central issue in this case.

Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Notice of appeal. — The notice of appeal shall specify the parties to the appeal, shall designate the judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, and shall specify the court to which the appeal is taken.

This provision shows that the notice of appeal need not state the date of receipt of the decision, as the respondents claimed.

Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 22. Pauper litigant. — Any party may be allowed by the court to litigate as a pauper, and when so allowed, he shall be exempt from the payment of docket fees and other fees, and from the filing of an appeal bond.

This provision exempts a pauper litigant from filing an appeal bond, which addresses the respondents' claim that the record on appeal failed to show the kind of appeal bond posted.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that no rule of procedure requires the date of receipt of the decision to be stated in the notice of appeal. Section 4, Rule 41 only requires the notice to specify the parties, designate the judgment or order appealed from, and specify the court to which the appeal is taken. The Court noted that the date of receipt is material data that should appear in the record on appeal itself, not necessarily in the notice of appeal. Moreover, the Court found that page 46 of Krueger's record on appeal expressly stated that counsel received a copy of the decision on April 8, 1974, which the appellate court ignored despite its attention being called to that fact. The Court also found that the record on appeal stated on page 42 that Krueger filed a motion for reconsideration on May 7, 1974, contrary to the respondents' claim that there was no mention of when the motion was filed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondents' argument was unmeritorious. The truth is that the appellant was not required to file an appeal bond because the trial court had approved his motion to appeal as pauper. The Court quoted the trial court's order:

Considering the motion to appeal as pauper filed by counsel for the Plaintiff to be well founded and there being no objection thereto, the same is hereby granted. Finding the Record on Appeal filed by counsel for plaintiff under date of July 12, 1974, to be in order, the same is hereby approved.

Having been granted the right to appeal as pauper, Krueger was exempt from filing an appeal bond pursuant to Section 22, Rule 3. The Court found it incongruous to expect the appellant to state the kind of appeal bond he posted when such bond is non-existent, and noted that the appellant had explained that he inadvertently mentioned an appeal bond when he meant his motion to appeal as pauper.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court's approval of the record on appeal cures whatever defects or omissions there are with reference to Section 6, Rule 41, especially where the veracity of the trial court's finding has not been disputed by the respondents. The Court traced the liberalization of the material data rule through Berkenkotter versus Court of Appeals, Pimentel versus Court of Appeals, Heirs of Ceferino Morales versus Court of Appeals, Republic versus Court of Appeals, and Luna versus Court of Appeals, which held that when the trial court finds and declares in its order of approval that the record on appeal was filed on time, and the correctness of its finding is not impugned, the non-inclusion of a motion and order for extension is not fatal and does not warrant dismissal of the appeal. The Court quoted from Pimentel:

The reason for Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court in requiring that the record on appeal shall include such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time, was to obviate and eliminate waste of time that would be incurred by the Appellate Tribunal in requiring the lower court to forward the original record and in examining such records to determine the timeliness of the appeal. With the existence of the aforementioned order of January 24, 1974 approving the records on appeal because the trial court found that the notice of appeal, the records on appeal and appeal bonds were all filed within the reglementary period and because of the absence of further objections to the corrected records on appeal, the veracity of the grounds stated in said order not being disputed by herein private respondents, the reason for the rule ceases; because thereby the Appellate Court can rely thereon without need of sending for, and of any further examination of, the original records of the case.

The Court concluded that the trial court's approval of the record on appeal on August 7, 1974, almost a year after the Berkenkotter decision, cured whatever defects or omissions there were with reference to Section 6, Rule 41.

Doctrine

The material data rule under Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court requires that the record on appeal contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. However, the rule is applied liberally. The trial court's approval of the record on appeal as in order and filed within the reglementary period cures defects or omissions in the material data, especially where the veracity of the trial court's finding is not disputed by the adverse party. The date of receipt of the decision need not appear in the notice of appeal, as Section 4, Rule 41 only requires the notice to specify the parties, designate the judgment or order appealed from, and specify the court to which the appeal is taken. A pauper litigant is exempt from filing an appeal bond under Section 22, Rule 3, so the record on appeal need not show the kind of appeal bond posted. The purpose of the material data rule is to obviate the waste of time in requiring the lower court to forward the original record to determine the timeliness of the appeal; when the trial court's approval order supplies that assurance, the reason for the rule ceases.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals' order of dismissal for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Krueger's appeal before the Court of Appeals, with costs against the private respondents.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: the trial court's approval of the record on appeal as filed on time cures defects in the material data under Section 6, Rule 41, where its veracity is not disputed. Examiners use this case to test the liberalized application of the material data rule and the exemption of pauper litigants from filing an appeal bond.