RCBC SAVINGS BANK, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. FE B. ZULUETA AND DENNIS B. VILLACORTA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
LANTION, J.A.C., J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, As (sic) prayed for, let a writ of possession be issued addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City as Ex-Officio Sheriff or her duly authorized representative for her to place petitioner RCBC SAVING (sic) BANK in possession of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103774 of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
SO ORDERED.
THE FACTS
On 14 April 2000, Respondents-Appellants obtained a loan in the amount of one million three hundred fifty thousand pesos (P1,350,000.00) from Petitioner-Appellee RCBC Savings Bank (Petitioner-Appellee).[3] As a security for the transaction, Respondents-Appellants executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land (subject property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-75101.[4] It was agreed by the parties that in the event that Respondents-Appellants breached any of their obligations in accordance with their loan, Petitioner-Appellee may extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.[5]
Subsequently, Respondents-Appellants defaulted in the payment of their obligations, which prompted Petitioner-Appellee to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged property.[6] Ultimately, the said property was sold via a public auction held on 15 September 2003, with Petitioner-Appellee as the highest bidder therein.[7] Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued to Petitioner-Appellee and the same was registered with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City on 07 September 2005.[8]
On 21 February 2007, Petitioner-Appellee filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC.[9] Petitioner-Appellee alleged that, after it registered the aforesaid Certificate of Sale,[10] the redemption period lapsed without Respondents-Appellants having successfully redeemed the property. Further, Petitioner-Appellee pointed out that it obtained title over the subject property, under TCT No. T-103774,[11] and that, despite having sent Respondents-Appellants a notice to vacate, the latter did not heed the same.[12] Thus, Petitioner-Appellee prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor.
On 22 May 2007, Atty. Jose R. Zulueta (Intervenor) filed an Urgent Motion to Intervene with Motion for Consolidation and Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Possession[13] before the RTC. Intervenor opposed the writ of possession sought by Petitioner-Appellee alleging that his wife and stepson (herein Respondents-Appellants Fe B. Zulueta and Dennis B. Villacorta, respectively) obtained a loan and executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property without his consent and conformity. Intervenor claims that he will be prejudiced by the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Petitioner-Appellee because the subject property is conjugal in nature and he is in actual possession of the same. Moreover, Intervenor claimed to have filed another case pertaining to the said property (Civil Case No. 07-0038), which is pending before a different branch of the same court. Thus, Intervenor prayed for the suspension of the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession until judgment is rendered in Civil Case No. 07-0038.
On 05 June 2007, Petitioner-Appellee filed an Opposition[14] to the above Motions. Citing jurisprudence, Petitioner-Appellee pointed out that intervention is not allowed in an ex-parte petition for writ of possession and, thus, prayed for the denial of the Urgent Motion to Intervene with Motion for Consolidation and Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Possession.
In an Order[15] dated 15 June 2007, the RTC denied the aforesaid Motions of Intervenor ratiocinating that, in accordance with Act No. 3135, it is a ministerial duty on its part to issue a writ of possession to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
Unsatisfied, Intervenor filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the above Order. Essentially, Intervenor submitted that the rule cited by the RTC admits of an exception, wherein a writ of possession cannot be enforced as against a third person in actual possession of the property and who is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession is applied for.
Following the filing of a responsive pleading by Petitioner-Appellee, the RTC issued an Order[17] dated 22 October 2007 denying Intervenor’s Motion for Reconsideration and setting the hearing for the reception of Petitioner-Appellee’s evidence on 15 January 2008.
After due proceedings, on 30 July 2008, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision granting Petitioner-Appellee’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The RTC found that more than one (1) year had lapsed since the subject property was sold at a public auction and that Respondents-Appellants have failed to redeem the same. The said court further noted that Petitioner-Appellee had obtained title over the subject property as evidenced by TCT No. T-103774. As such, since Petitioner-Appellee had become the undisputed, absolute, and registered owner of the subject property, the RTC decreed that the former is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession.[18]
On 26 August 2008, Intervenor filed Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Intervention and Consolidation with Alternative Motion for Allowance of Intervention and/or Deferment of Issuance of Writ of Possession,[19] but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order[20] dated 18 September 2008.
On 16 September 2008, Respondents-Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] of the questioned Decision and, subsequently, filed a Supplemental Motion[22] on 23 January 2009. Respondents-Appellants averred, inter alia, that the sale by Petitioner-Appellee of the subject property to a third person makes the latter an indispensable party to the case. Since Petitioner-Appellee did not join the third party buyer to the action, the dismissal of the petition is warranted for non-joinder of an indispensable party.
However, in an Order[23] dated 02 February 2009, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for the reason that the challenged Decision had already become final and executory.
Aggrieved, on 13 February 2009, Respondents-Appellants filed a Joint Notice of Appeal[24] and a Joint Record on Appeal.[25]
Hence, this Appeal.
ISSUES
Respondents-Appellants, including Intervenor, raise the following issues in their Consolidated Appellants’ Brief:[26]
- When appellant was able to file a timely motion for reconsideration, since it received the Decision on September 1, 2008 and filed for reconsideration on September 16, 2008, can the Decision of July 30, 2008 be correctly declared to have become final and executory?
- When appellant files a Supplemental Motion (to the Motion for Reconsideration) while the move for reconsideration is undecided, calling the attention of the lower court to appellee’s failure to implead an indispensable third party buyer to the Property, can this motion, which could have led to the dismissal of the case for failure to join an indispensable party, be properly dismissed by the lower court for the reason that its Decision has (sic) become final and executory?
- When appellee failed to establish evidence or show by competent evidence that the redemption period had expired and it failed to establish such other evidence showing its right to possession, can it be given a writ of possession by the lower court?
- When intervention is sought by an applicant intervenor in the proceedings below on the ground that he is holding possession of the property adversely against the judgment debtor but such intervention is denied by the lower court, can this point that possession by a third person of the propertyserves (sic) to deny grant of writ to appellee be taken up on appeal even if applicant intervenor is not a party in this appeal?
OUR RULING
Before delving into the substantive issues, this Court deems it necessary to resolve relevant procedural matters raised by Respondents-Appellants.
Respondents-Appellants contend that they had timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the challenged Decision of the RTC dated 30 July 2008 within the fifteen (15) day period provided in the Rules.[27] As such, the court a quo erred when it denied their motion for reconsideration on the ground that the said Decision had already become final and executory.[28]
We agree.
The records show that Respondents-Appellants received a copy of the assailed Decision on 01 September 2008.[29] Conformably with Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, Respondents-Appellants had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until 16 September 2008 within which to file a motion for reconsideration.[30] True enough, Respondents-Appellants filed their Motion for Reconsideration on 16 September 2008, which is within the fifteen (15) day reglementary period.[31] Thus, since a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, it was erroneous for the court a quo to rule that its Decision dated 30 July 2008 had already attained finality.
Respondents-Appellants further point out that, during the course of the proceedings, the subject property was sold by Petitioner-Appellee to a third party buyer, but the latter was not made a party to the suit. By virtue thereof, the third party buyer is an indispensable party as any decision would affect his or her rights. As such, Respondents-Appellants opine that the RTC erred in not dismissing the petition for failure to join an indispensable party.[32]
Respondents-Appellants’ arguments are misplaced.
The non-joinder of the alleged indispensable party does not ipso facto merit the dismissal of Petitioner-Appellee’s petition. It is settled under the Rules and jurisprudence that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.[33] As stated by the Supreme Court in Limos v. Sps. Odones, “[p]arties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint.”[34] Moreover, the records are bereft of any such order having been issued by the RTC directing Petitioner-Appellee to join the supposed third party buyer. Thus, the RTC was correct in not dismissing Petitioner-Appellee’s case for non-joinder of an indispensable party.
Having disposed of the foregoing procedural matters, resolution of the substantive issues is in order.
Essentially, the crux of the instant controversy rests upon the answer to the following query: Is Petitioner-Appellee entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession?
We answer in the affirmative.
Act No. 3135 provides that in cases of extrajudicial sale of a property subject to a real estate mortgage, the mortgagor or his/her successor-in-interest may redeem the said property within one (1) year from the date the certificate of sale is registered with the register of deeds.[35] During the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may secure a writ of possession pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135;[36] the purchaser may also be issued a writ of possession upon the expiration of the same period. In the latter scenario, jurisprudence holds that the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute, the basis therefor is the purchaser’s ownership of the property.[37] Thus, the mere filing of an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is sufficient because possession becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner.[38]
At bench, the records show that Petitioner-Appellee was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale of the subject property held on 15 September 2003[39] and, by virtue thereof, was subsequently issued a Certificate of Sale.[40] Petitioner-Appellee then registered the said Certificate with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City on 07 September 2005.[41] Pursuant to Act No. 3135 and jurisprudence, Respondents-Appellants had one (1) year therefrom or until 08 September 2006 within which to redeem the subject property. However, the said period lapsed without Respondents-Appellants having exercised their right of redemption. Consequently, Petitioner-Appellee acquired an absolute right to the writ of possession. Bolstering Petitioner-Appellee’s right to the subject property is the fact that, at the time it filed its ex-parte petition for writ of possession before the court a quo on 21 February 2007, Petitioner-Appellee had obtained title to the subject property in its own name as evidenced by TCT No. T-103774.[42] Verily, Petitioner-Appellee, as the owner of the said property, is clearly entitled to the possession thereof. We quote Chu v. Laqui, viz:[43]
In the present case, the certificate of sale of the foreclosed property was annotated on TCT No. 22990 on 7 June 2002. The redemption period thus lapsed on 7 June 2003, one year from the registration of the sale. When private respondent applied for the issuance of a writ of possession on 18 August 2004, the redemption period had long lapsed. Since the foreclosed property was not redeemed within one year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, private respondent had acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession. It had become the ministerial duty of the lower court to issue the writ of possession upon mere motion pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
Moreover, once ownership has been consolidated, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court, upon proper application and proof of title. In the present case, when private respondent applied for the issuance of a writ of possession, it presented a new transfer certificate of title issued in its name dated 8 July 2003. The right of private respondent to the possession of the property was thus founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale, in whose name title over the property was already issued, the right of private respondent over the property had become absolute, vesting in it the corollary right of possession.
Nonetheless, Respondents-Appellants argue that Petitioner-Appellee failed to prove by competent evidence that the redemption period had expired. Respondents-Appellants highlight, inter alia, that the stamp of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City showing the date when the Certificate of Sale was registered was not identified or marked in evidence by Petitioner-Appellee. As such, the reckoning of the redemption period was not sufficiently established.
Respondents-Appellants’ contentions are not well-founded.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states that “[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”[44] A perusal of the records reveals that the Certificate of Sale was offered in evidence as shown by Petitioner-Appellees’ Formal Offer of Evidence,[45] marked as Exhibit “K,” and admitted by the court a quo in its Order[46] dated 16 July 2008. Although the stamp of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City showing the date of the registration in the Certificate of Sale as 07 September 2005,[47] the same was not given a separate marking. The fact that the same appears on the face of the said Certificate of Sale constitutes sufficient compliance with the Rules. Indeed, nowhere in the Rules of Court is it required that the parties must specifically mark and/or identify each and every paragraph, signature, or other pertinent item, which already forms a part of or clearly appears on the face of a duly offered and admitted document as evidence. As such, when the Certificate of Sale was identified and/or marked by Petitioner-Appellee, the stamp was likewise considered to have been identified and/or marked along with it. Thus, the reckoning point of the redemption period was established by competent evidence.
Respondents-Appellants, however, insist that Petitioner-Appellee is not entitled to possession of the subject property because Intervenor Atty. Jose R. Zulueta (the alleged husband of Respondent-Appellant Fe B. Zulueta) claims a right adverse to that of Petitioner-Appellee. Respondents-Appellants cite jurisprudence which holds that an ex-parte writ of a possession cannot be enforced as against a third person who is holding the property adversely to the purchaser.
We disagree.
In Madriaga, Jr. v. China Banking Corp., the Highest Court teaches:[48]
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third-party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third-party, but also held by the third-party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor.
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., the Court discussed the meaning of a “third-party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” —
“The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.” (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the records are barren of any evidence to support the theory that Intervenor holds the subject property adversely to Petitioner-Appellee, other than his own bare allegations of the same. Intervenor’s claim that he owns part of the subject property, due to his supposed marriage to Respondent-Appellant Fe B. Zulueta, is unsubstantiated. The only evidence submitted by him in support thereof is a Certificate of Marriage[49] issued in Hong Kong. However, it is noted that the same is an unauthenticated machine copy, which is inadmissible in evidence.[50] That Intervenor is not married to Respondent-Appellant Fe B. Zulueta is bolstered by the fact that in a certain Credit Agreement, the latter’s civil status plainly reads “single.”[51] Thus, absent any evidence to corroborate the claim that a third party, such as Intervenor, holds the subject property adversely to Petitioner-Appellee, the latter is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession.
All told, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in issuing the questioned Decision, which would warrant the reversal of the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision dated 30 July 2008 rendered by the RTC, Branch 201 of Las Piñas City in LRC No. LP-07-0025 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
De Leon, M.M., Chairperson and Antonio-Valenzuela, N.G., JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Lorna Navarro Domingo (Records, pp. 285-287).
[2] Records, p. 287.
[3] Id. at 83-84, 285.
[4] Id. at 85, 285.
[5] Id. at 83.
[6] See Records, p. 218.
[7] Records, p. 219.
[8] Id. at 4.
[9] Id. at 1-2.
[10] Id. at 4.
[11] Id. at 5.
[12] Id. at 6.
[13] Id. at 34-39.
[14] Id. at 56-58.
[15] Id. at 64.
[16] Id. at 70-75.
[17] Id. at 114-115.
[18] See Records, p. 287.
[19] Records, pp. 291-298.
[20] Id. at 307.
[21] Id. at 320-323.
[22] Id. at 333-335.
[23] Id. at 346.
[24] Id. at 356.
[25] Id. at 357-358.
[26] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[27] Id. at 28-29.
[28] See the Order issued by the RTC dated 02 February 2009 (Records, p. 346).
[29] As per Registry Return Receipt (Records, p. 290).
[30] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule 37 § 1.
[31] Records, p. 324.
[32] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[33] See 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule 3 § 11; Navarro v. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009 citing Macababbad v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009.
[34] G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010.
[35] An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages, Act No. 3135 as amended, Section 6 (1924); See Sps. Landrito, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 133079, August 9, 2005.
[36] Act. No. 3135, Section 7.
[37] See Fernandez v. Sps. Gregorio, G.R. No. 156421, April 14, 2008.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Records, p. 219.
[40] Id. at 4.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Id. at 5.
[43] G.R. No. 169190, February 11, 2010.
[44] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule 132 § 34.
[45] Records, pp. 234-236.
[46] Id. at 267-269.
[47] Id. at 4.
[48] G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012. See also Darcen v. V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 199747, April 3, 2013.
[49] Records, p. 82.
[50] In Wild Valley Shipping Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000), the Supreme Court held:
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. (Emphasis supplied)
[51] Records, p. 76.