ILUMINADO HANOPOL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PERFECTO PILAPIL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is a case of double sale of the same parcel of unregistered land decided
by the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Civil Case No. 21) in favor of
defendant-appellee Perfecto Pilapil, originally appealed by plaintiff-appellant
Huminado Hanopol to the Court of Appeals, but later certified to this Court for
proper adjudication, the issued involved being exclusively of law.

Appellant Hanopol claims ownership of the land by virtue of a series of
purchases effected in 1938 by means of private instruments, executed by the
former owners Teodora, Lucia, Generosa, Sinforosa and Isabelo, all surnamed
Siapo. Additionally, he invokes in his favor a decision rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Leyte (in Civil Case No. 412) on a complaint he filed on June
16, 1948, against the same vendors who, according to his own averments, took
possession of the said property in December, 1945 through fraud, threat and
intimidation, pretending falsely to be the owners thereof and ejecting the
tenants of Hanopol thereon, and since then had continued to possess the land.
Decision declaring him the exclusive owner of the land in question and ordering
therein defendants to deliver possession thereof was rendered on September 21,
1948.

On the other hand, appellee Pilapil asserts title to the property on the
strength of a duly notarized deed of sale executed in his favor by the same
owners on December 3, 1945, which, deed of sale was registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Leyte on August 20, 1948 under the provisions of Act No. 3344,

The case was submitted for decision without any testimonial evidence, both
parties relying exclusively on their documentary evidence consisting, on the
part of Hanopol, of the private instruments alluded to and a copy of the
decision in the revindicatory case, and on the part of Pilapil, the notarized
deed of sale in his favor hearing annotation of its registration under Act No.
3344. As thus submitted, the trial court rendered the decision adverted to at
the beginning of this opinion, mainly upon the authority of the second paragraph
of Article 1544 ^[1] of the New Civil Code,
which is a reproduction of Article 1478 of the old Civil Code, the law in force
at the time the transactions in this case took place.

* * * * * * *

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.

* * * * * * *

Appellant Hanopol in his appeal from the decision of the trial court presents
two questions of law: firstly, whether or not the judgment in the former case
No. 412 against the vendors Siapos is binding upon the defendant-appellee as
their successor-in-interest; and secondly, whether or not the registration of
the second deed of sale in favor of appellee Pilapil affects his right as the
first vendee.

Under the first assignment of error the appellant contends that inasmuch as
appellee claims to be the successor-in-interest of the vendors, he is bound by
the judgment rendered against the latter. This contention is without merit,
because it appears from the documentary evidence that appellee Pilapil derived
his right to the land from the sale to him of the said property on December 3,
1945, long before the filing of the complaint against the vendors in 1945. He
was not made a party in the case against the Siapos, and there was not even a
claim that he had knowledge of said litigation. He cannot, therefore, be bound
by such judgment in view of the provision of paragraph (b), Section 44 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which speaks of the effect of judgment as follows:

“* * * the judgment so ordered is, in respect to the matter directly
adjudged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity.” (Italics supplied) Since Pilapil was not a party to the action and is
not a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action, having acquired his title in 1945 and the action filed in 1948, the
decision in said case cannot be binding on him.

Appellant argues under the second issue raised by him that the registration
of Pilapil’s notarized deed of sale in 1948 under Act No. 3344 “shall be
understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right”. He
contends that since at the time the Siapos sold the land in question in 1945 to
Pilapil, the former were no longer the owners as they had already sold the same
to appellant since 1938, the first sale to him is a better right which cannot be
prejudiced by the registration of tha second sale.

We do not think the quoted proviso in Act No. 3344 justifies appellant’s
contention. If his theory is correct, then the second paragraph of Article 1544
of the New Civil Code (formerly Article 1473 of the old Civil Code) would have
no application at all except to lands or real estate registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or the Land Registration Act. Such a theory would thus
limit the scope of that codal provision. But even if we adopt this latter view,
that is, that Article 1544 (formerly Article 1473) only applies to registered
land, still we cannot agree with the appellant that by the mere fact of his
having a previous title or deed of sale, he has acquired thereby what is
referred to in Act No. 3344 as the “better right” that would be unaffected by
the registration of a second deed of sale under the same law. Under such theory,
there would never be a case of double sale of the same unregistered
property.

An example of what could be a better right that is protected against the
inscription of a subsequent sale is given in the case of Lichauco vs. Berenguer
(39 Phil. 643). The facts in that case are succinctly stated in the syllabus
thereof as follows:

“* * *—In 1882 B sold to S a piece of land. After the sale B continued in the
possession of the land in the capacity of lessee of S through payment of rent,
and continued as such until his death when be was substituted by the
administrator of his property. In 1889 B sold again the same piece of land to L
who leased it to B himself under certain conditions. Both sales were executed in
a public instrument, the one executed in favor of L being registered only in
1907. Thus, S and L acquired possession of the land through the same vendor upon
the latter’s ceasing to be the owner and becoming the lessee of said S and L,
respectively, Held: (1) That, with reference to the time prior to 1907,
the preference should be in favor of the purchaser who first took possession of
the land, because this possession, according to the law in force prior to the
promulgation of the Civil Code, constituted the consummation of the contract,
and also because afterwards the Civil Code expressly establishes that possession
in such cases transfers the ownership of the thing sold. (2) That, when a person
buys a piece of land and, instead of taking possession of it, leases it to the
vendor, possession by the latter after the sale is possession by the vendee, and
such possession in case of a double sale, determines the preference in favor of
the one who first took possession of it, in the absence of inscription, in
accordance with the provision of article 1473 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding
the material and personal possession by the second vendee. (Bautista vs. Sioson,
39 Phil. Kep., 615.)

“* * * Because L had to receive his possession from B who was a mere lessee
of S and as such had no possession to give inasmuch as his possession was not
for himself but in representation of S it follows that L never possessed the
land.

“* * *The effect which the law gives to the inscription of a sale against the
efficacy of the sale which was not registered is not extended to other titles
which the other vendee was able to acquire independently as, in this case, the
title by prescription.”

It thus appears that the “better right” referred to in Act No. 3344 is much
more than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first vendee. In the
Lichauco case just mentioned, it was the prescriptive right that had supervened.
Or, as also suggested in that case, other facts and circumstances exist which,
in addition to his deed of sale, the first vendee can be said to have better
right than the second purchaser.

In the case at bar, there appears to be no clear evidence of Hanopol’s
possession of the land in controversy. In fact, in his complaint against the
vendors, Hanopol alleged that the Siapos took possession of the same land under
claim of ownership in 1945 and continued and were in such possession at the time
of the filing of the complaint against them in 1948. Consequently, since the
Siapos were in actual occupancy of the property under claim of ownership, when
they sold the said land to appellee Pilapil on December 3, 1945, such possession
was transmitted to the latter, at least constructively, with the execution of
the notarial deed of sale, if not actually and physically as claimed by Pilapil
in his answer filed in the present case. Thus, even on this score, Hanopol
cannot have a better right than appellee Pilapil who, according to the trial
court, “was not shown to be a purchaser in bad faith”.

Wherefore, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J. I concur but reserve my vote to the effect of
registration under Act 3344.