CONSUELO ROXAS AND SALVADOR GOMEZ, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JUAN YSMAEL & CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On January 16, 1950, Consuelo Roxas and her husband Salvador Gomez filed an
action for illegal detainer in the Municipal Court of Manila against Juan Ysmael
& Co., Inc., a local corporation, seeking to eject the latter from a parcel
of land registered in their name, located on Calle Conception and bordering the
Pasig River, near or next to the Ayala Bridge, and the payment of the sum of
P37,700 as back rentals. It would appear that sometime in 1948, portion of the
parcel in question were being occupied and rented by one Louis B. Varney and
Jose Barredo for the deposit of scrap iron; that the defendant corporation later
bought Varney’s and Barredo’s scrap iron and continued the occupation of the
premises or at least a portion of the same for the same purpose; that sometime
before the filing of the complaint the defendant corporation notified the
plaintiffs that it was vacating the premises, but that as a matter of fact,
according to plaintiffs, although it had removed a portion of the scrap iron
deposited, still, it retained a portion of the premises of about 1,000 square
meters in area where it kept what was termed “Mostly Old Stock” (materiales
viejos), by reason of which the plaintiffs could not make use of the land. The
Municipal Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and sentenced the
corporation to pay the former the sum of P37,700 for rents plus interest. The
Municipal Court made a finding that the defendant had vacated the premises on
January 8, 1950, that is, eight days prior to the filing of the action for
illegal detainer.

Upon the case being elevated to the Court of First Instance where the
complaint filed in the Municipal Court was reproduced, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the theory that inasmuch as the
suit for ejectment was filed in the Municipal Court about eight days after the
premises had been vacated, it was evident that there was no case of illegal
detainer and that consequently, the suit was one to collect a sum of
money—P37,700—over which the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction; and the
Municipal Court being without jurisdiction, neither had the Court of First
Instance jurisdiction on appeal. The trial court denied the motion for dismissal
on the ground that the jurisdiction of a court to try a case was determined by
the allegations of the complaint and that according to said allegations, at the
time it was filed the defendant was still occupying about 1,000 square meters of
the land in question.

The Court of First Instance eventually rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, against the defendant but reduced the amount of said judgment to
P12,813.32 “for the use and occupation of plaintiffs’ land, with costs against
the defendant.” The trial court found as a fact that the defendant vacated the
remaining 1,000 square meters only on February 14, 1950, that is to say, about a
month after the filing of the action in the Municipal Court. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court in a resolution found that
the question of jurisdiction was involved in the appeal and so certified it to
us. The theory of the Court of Appeals in making the certification is that
inasmuch as the Municipal Court in its decision found that the land was vacated
on January 8, 1950 and the suit for ejectment was filed about eight days later,
there no longer was a case for illegal detainer but only for the collection of a
sum of money (P37,700) in the form of back unpaid rentals, and that the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction because of the amount; and neither had the
Court of First Instance on appeal; and that although the parties do not raise
this point of jurisdiction before the Court of Appeals, nevertheless, the
parties cannot with their silence or even by their express consent or agreement
confer jurisdiction on a court; and so considering jurisdiction to be in issue,
it held that only this Tribunal can entertain the appeal.

In the first place, when the parties themselves do not raise the question of
jurisdiction on appeal, ordinarily the appellate courts will not pass upon the
same. In the present appeal the defendant-appellant in its brief says that it is
not raising and it does not wish to raise the question of jurisdiction and that
it desires to have this case terminated as soon as possible, and that it is
willing to pay reasonable rents for the land it had occupied. It is true that in
its decision the Municipal Court found that the defendant had vacated the
premises on January 8, 1950. But it should be remembered that on appeal to the
Court of First Instance this decision of the Municipal Court was vacated. As far
as the Court of First Instance was concerned, said decision did not exist
because the case was to be tried de novo. To determine its jurisdiction
the Court of First Instance had to rely on the allegations of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, reproduced in the Court of First Instance, and according to
said complaint at the time of the filing of the suit on January 16, 1950, the
defendant was still occupying about 1,000 square meters of the land; in other
words, there was illegal detainer. And, what is more, as already stated, the
Court of First Instance found as a fact that defendant corporation continued
occupying this portion up to February 14, 1950.

In view of the foregoing, and because we are of the opinion that not only was
the question of jurisdiction not raised in the present appeal but that it would
appear that the court below had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case,
it is hereby ordered that the present appeal be returned to the Court of Appeals
for decision.

Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Case returned to the Court of Appeals for decision.