VALERIANO A. ABEJERO, ET.AL. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON, REP. BY MARIA FE MELITON, ESPINOSA, ET.AL., DEFENDANTS, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NAGA CITY, DEFENDANT…

Abejero versus Heirs of Julian Meliton

The Case

This is a case about sixty-seven buyers of small lots carved out of one large registered parcel in Naga City, who paid for their land, took possession, built their homes, and paid the taxes, yet could never obtain their own certificates of title because the seller and later his estate kept the owner's duplicate of the mother title. They sued to compel its surrender under the Property Registration Decree. The Register of Deeds, the nominal defendant who was never served with summons at the outset, resisted the judgment on due process grounds. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must know: what due process actually requires before a party may complain of deprivation, and the limited, purely ministerial role of the Register of Deeds in a proceeding for the surrender of a withheld duplicate certificate.

Procedural History

The buyers filed their petition before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 23. Summons could not be served personally on the administratrix, so it was served by publication, and the heirs were declared in default. No summons at all was served on the Register of Deeds. After a commissioner's report recommended relief, the trial court rendered judgment in July 1998 granting the petition. When the buyers moved for execution, the Register of Deeds appeared and attacked the proceedings for want of jurisdiction over it. The trial court reopened the case, and summons was personally served on the Register of Deeds in August 1999. The Register of Deeds still filed no answer, and was declared in default in February 2000. Its petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals was denied, and that denial became final. The trial court then issued the assailed order of May 2001 adopting all the buyers' evidence and the 1998 judgment as binding on the Register of Deeds. Its motion for reconsideration was denied, and the Register of Deeds appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Julian Meliton was the absolute and registered owner of a large tract of land in Barrio Concepcion Pequeño, Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 8027. From March 1974 to October 1983, sixty-seven buyers purchased different and varying portions of that lot on separate dates. After the deeds of absolute sale were executed, the buyers took actual possession, built their houses, declared the lots in their names for taxation, and paid the realty taxes.

Julian Meliton, despite demand, failed and refused to surrender the owner's duplicate of the title so the buyers could register their deeds. The buyers discovered that the duplicate was in the custody of Maria Fe Meliton-Espinosa, who after Julian Meliton's death was appointed administratrix of his estate. In March 1996 the buyers filed their petition against her and the Register of Deeds, invoking the surrender of withheld duplicate certificates provision of the Property Registration Decree.

The Register of Deeds was never served with summons at the inception. When it later appeared and objected, the trial court reopened the case precisely to serve it personally, which was done in August 1999. The Register of Deeds still filed no responsive pleading and was declared in default. The trial court then adopted the buyers' evidence and its earlier judgment as applicable to the Register of Deeds, prompting this appeal on the sole ground that the Register of Deeds was not allowed to present its own evidence.

Issues

• Whether or not the Register of Deeds was deprived of due process when the trial court adopted the buyers' evidence and judgment without giving it the chance to cross-examine witnesses or present countervailing evidence.
• Whether or not the Register of Deeds, having been declared in default, retained the right to be heard, to present evidence, and to examine the witnesses of the other party.
• Whether or not the Register of Deeds has a real and adverse interest in the subject matter of a proceeding for the surrender of a withheld duplicate certificate.
• Whether or not the judgment on the merits, granting the surrender of the title, was supported by the evidence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 107 of Presidential Decree Number 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides the remedy the buyers invoked:

Section 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

This is the very provision under which the buyers sought to compel surrender of the duplicate, or its annulment and replacement, and it defines the court's power to order the Register of Deeds to act.

Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph a of the Rules of Court, as cited by the Court, provides:

Section 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.

This is the rule that stripped the Register of Deeds of its standing to present evidence after it ignored the summons.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no denial of due process. Due process simply requires that every litigant be given an opportunity to be heard, and what is repugnant is the total denial or complete want of that opportunity. The Register of Deeds was personally served with summons in August 1999 and therefore had adequate opportunity to defend itself through pleadings. It chose to ignore the proceedings and file no responsive pleading. Service of summons was sufficient notice, and the opportunity to be heard by way of pleadings satisfies due process.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Register of Deeds was properly declared in default, and that loss of standing in court is the legal consequence of a default order. Being in default, it is considered virtually out of court; it can neither appear and adduce evidence, nor is it entitled to be heard and to take part in the trial. It loses the right to present its defense, to control the proceedings, and to examine the witnesses of the other party. The Court stressed that the Register of Deeds had already lost its earlier challenge to the belated service of summons, yet still refused to file a responsive pleading, and so had only itself to blame.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Register of Deeds is a necessary party, but its principal participation is circumscribed merely to the enforcement of the judgment for the surrender or issuance of the title. It has no material or real interest in the subject matter, and holds no contentious claim adverse to the buyers, so its intention to present rebuttal evidence was improper in the first place. Its fears about lack of a partition agreement, want of detailed descriptions, and unpaid taxes were answered by the trial court's own safeguard, that titles issue only after compliance with all the requirements of law for such registration.

On the fourth issue, the Court found overwhelming documentary evidence that the buyers had acquired the lots for value, and that the seller and later the administratrix failed and refused to deliver the title. The application for surrender under Section 107 was therefore correctly granted.

Doctrine

Due process of law requires only a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard; the total denial or complete want of that opportunity is what offends the Constitution. A party served with summons who deliberately files no responsive pleading cannot later claim that it was denied the chance to present evidence.

A party declared in default loses its standing in court and may not adduce evidence, control the proceedings, or cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses, consistent with Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph a.

In a proceeding under Section 107 of the Property Registration Decree for the surrender of a withheld duplicate certificate, the Register of Deeds is a necessary party but has no real or adverse interest in the subject matter; its role is confined to enforcing the judgment by entering the deeds and issuing titles after compliance with all legal requirements.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the May 24, 2001 order of the trial court, which had adopted the buyers' evidence and the 1998 judgment as binding on the Register of Deeds.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: what is repugnant to due process is the total denial or complete want of opportunity to be heard, not the loss of a chance one deliberately threw away by ignoring summons. Examiners use this case to test default and its effects, the limits of a Register of Deeds' participation in land registration cases, and the Section 107 remedy for a withheld duplicate certificate.