FRANCISCO S. DIZON, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, RESPONDENT.

Honorable Juan de Borja, Presiding
Judge of Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
is charged by complainant Atty.
Francisco S. Dizon with serious mis­conduct and
inefficiency on five counts, namely:  (1)
grave abuse and/or misuse of his power
as Judge; (2) neglect of duty; (3) rendering a manifestly unjust and patently
erroneous judgment; (4) gross ignorance of the law; (5) partiality.  Pursuant to this court’s resolution of December 17, 1969 respondent filed
his answer to the com­plaint, denying the specific charges and explaining the
facts on which they are predicated.

1. The charge of grave abuse and/or misuse of power arose out of
an incident in the course of the trial of Civil Case No. 295-V, “Alfredo
Villanueva vs. Simeon Claridades.”
Complainant Francisco S. Dizon is a son-in-law of the defendant and was acting as his counsel. 
For certain remarks uttered by him, which respondent then considered and
now alleges as “belligerent, pro­vocative and arrogant,” said
complainant was declared in contempt of court and ordered to pay a fine of
P50.00, raised to P100.00 a short while later. 
It appears from the transcript of record reproduced in the complaint that when an objection was interposed
by opposing counsel to a question
propounded by Atty. Dizon to the witness who was on
the stand, the Judge sustained the objection, whereupon Atty. Dizon made his remark: 
“I observed here that almost all of the objections are sustained,
your Honor.” The following colloquy then ensued:

“COURT:  Put that on record.  For making insinuations about the
impartiality of the court you are fined P50.00 for con­tempt of court.

“ATTY. DIZON:  I move for a
reconsideration.  Your Honor.  I am
trying to safeguard…I just want to make my manifestation complete, Your
Honor, and the Court has prevented me from making my manifestation complete,
Your Honor.

“COURT:  Do you blame the Court if the Court believes
that your questions are objectionable?

“ATTY. DIZON:  I am asking the Court to study carefully the
line of my questioning.

“COURT:  You are insinuating again that the Court does
not study the case? You are declared in contempt of Court.  You are ordered to pay the fine of One
Hundred (P100.00) pesos for contempt of court.”

On the bare face of the record the court’s ruling would indeed
seem rather harsh.  But the incident must
be viewed in its entire setting.  Another
portion of the transcript, reproduced in respondent’s answer, shows that
complainant was intolerant to the point of being pugnacious in his remarks
directed at opposing counsel –
remarks which should not have been made at all since a lawyer
should always address himself to the Court and ask for
the proper ruling or instruction.  The
point is that
there was an element of subjectivity which could not be ignored under the
circumstances, taking into account not only the words
uttered but also the manner of their utterance as well as the general demeanor of counsel in the conduct of the trial. 
So when he said that
“he observed that almost all the objections (of his opponent) are
sustained;” that the Court “has prevented me (him) from making his
manifestation com­plete,” although he had made no manifestation at all;
and when he asked the court “to study carefully the line of my (his)
questioning,” respondent was not entirely without justification in viewing
his statements as contumacious.

In any case, respondent’s
actuation does not con­stitute serious misconduct, which is the charge alleged
in the complaint and the ground (the other being ineffi­ciency) mentioned in
Rule 140 as a basis for administrative complaint against Judges of First
Instance.

2. The second charge is neglect of duty, in that respondent failed, for more than the
ninety-day period fixed in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, to decide or
resolve two incidents in Special Proceeding No. 1362 (Intestate Estate of Concepcion Claridades Villanueva)
pending before him, wherein the parties litigating were the same parties in
Civil Case No. 295-V.  Those incidents
refer to:  (a) the project of partition
and (b) motion for reconsideration of order denying petition for removal of
administrator.

The deceased Concepcion
Claridades Villanueva, whose estate was the subject
of the said special proceeding, was the wife of Alfredo Villanueva and the
sister of Simeon Claridades (plaintiff and defendant,
respectively,
in Civil Case No. 295-V).  Respondent’s
answer contains a chronological statement of the relevant
incidents in the intestacy; and they show that since some of the properties included in the
project of partition submitted by the administrator of the estate (Alfredo
Villanueva) were in­volved in Civil Case No. 295-V, the outcome of which would affect the
efficacy of the project insofar as said proper­ties are concerned, the
deferment of action thereon appears to be justified.

With respect to the motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for removal of the ad­ministrator, respondent held action thereon
in abeyance, according to his order of July 24, 1968, “pending the substitution of
parties since oppositor Simeon Claridades
had died;” and it is not denied that no such substitution had
yet been made
in Special Proceeding No. 1362.

In
any event, it is clear that respondent acted in the exercise of his
judgment and discretion, and any
error committed by him is correctible by other remedies than administrative disciplinary
action.

3. The third charge is that
respondent rendered a manifestly unjust and erroneous decision in Criminal Case
No. 321-V, “People vs. Petra Villanueva.” The defendant there,
a sister of Alfredo Villanueva, was
charged with the offense of simulation of birth under Article 347 of the Revised
Penal Code, in that she caused to be entered in the civil registry of Obando, Bulacan, the birth of the
twins Maria Teresa Villanueva and Maria Luisa Villanueva as the children of the
spouses Alfredo Villanueva and Concepcion Claridades Villanueva notwithstanding the fact that the
said spouses were not the real parents.

The decision rendered by respondent was one of acquittal.  It contains a detailed discussion of the
evidence, and on the basis of the facts found to have been established – which
of course are not here under review – the verdict is far from erroneous.

What complainant refers to as objectionable is the statement in
the decision that “even if Petra Villanueva (the accused) is held
responsible for said birth certi­ficates, it remains that the fraud was erased,
or papered over, as it were, when the children were adopted by the spouses, so
that what was false under the birth certificates became a fact in law.”
The logic of the statement, taken out of context, may be somewhat strained, but
it was only obiter in nature and does not detract from the correctness of the
judgment.  Besides, respondent evidently
had in mind the legal effect of the adoption on whatever hereditary claims to
the estate of the deceased Concepcion Claridades Villanueva her collaterals – such as her brother
Simeon Claridades – might have had if the false
registration of the birth of the two children had not been cured by such
adoption.

(4) The fourth charge, namely, gross ignorance of the law, cites
several rulings of respondent sustaining the objections of opposing counsel to
questions propounded by complainant on cross-examination of a witness who was
testifying during the trial of Civil Case No. 295-V.  It should be stated as a basic proposition that the conduct of a trial is under the control of the
judge who is pre­siding.  There are rules to guide him, of course; but
how to apply them depends to some extent upon his own inter­pretation and
understanding of such rules.  Judges
inevitably differ in this respect:  some
are strict where others are liberal in limiting the scope of counsel’s
cross-examina­tion.  Respondent may
belong to one or the other category, but we find nothing in the record
reproduced in the com­plaint to show that he-was guilty of the charge of ignorance.  If complainant disagreed with respondent’s
rulings, his remedy was to point out the errors on appeal from the deci­sion.  To hold a judge administratively accountable
for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.

5. The last charge, that of partiality,
is based on
the preceding ones, and need not
be considered separately.

In
view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed without further
investigation.

Concepcion,  C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., did not take part.