IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF FERNANDO, FRANCISCA, RAFAEL, AND MARIA CANDELARIA, ALL SURNAMED BAUTISTA, MINORS. FELISA PANGILINAN VDA. DE BAUTISTA, GUARDIAN. UNITED STATE…

Special proceedings No. 7688 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila is the proceeding for the guardianship of the minors Fernando, Francisca,
Rafael, and Maria Candelaria, all surnamed Bautista, instituted in said court on
March 17, 1949. The People’s Bank and Trust Company is the guardian appointed by
the court of their properties, and Felisa Pangilinan Vda. de Bautista, the
mother of the minors, of their persons. Letters of guardianship were issued to
the above-mentioned bank on April 27, 1949; the record does not disclose when
the corresponding letters were issued to the minors’ mother.

On December 13, 1949, the minors’ mother signed a document
entitled “Deed of Loan” (Annex A), wherein she declares having borrowed and
received from Adela Bustos, for the support of her minor children, rice,
clothing, and money from May 3, 1945, to January 1, 1949, by way of loan, with a
total value of P6,525, which “will be paid in full in favor of Miss Bustos * * *
as soon as the claim for pension in favor of the above-named six children shall
have been approved and received.” On February 28, 1950, Adela Bustos filed a
claim in the special proceedings for the total sum of 16,525 on the basis of the
above-described “Deed of Loan,” alleging that the expenses for the maintenance
and education of the wards during the period from May 3, 1945, to January 1,
1949, were shouldered and advanced by the claimant, as evidenced by said “Deed
of Loan.” Opposition to this claim was filed by the U. S. Veterans
Administration. Without any evidence having been offered or submitted, the court
disallowed the claim, and against this disallowance an appeal has been taken
directly to this court.

The gist of claimant’s appeal is that the minors’ mother was
the de facto guardian of the minors properties, and may, therefore, validly
encumber the same for “necessaries” furnished said minors for their support, and
that equity and justice demand that as the minors benefited from the loan,
technicalities should be brushed aside and the claim paid.

Neither the arguments of claimant-appellant nor the authorities
cited by her in support thereof can apply to the facts of the case at bar. The
minors mother was their natural guardian, entitled to their custody and care and
responsible for their education, but such guardianship did not extend to their
properties. (Section 553, Code of Civil Procedure; Palet vs. Aldecoa & Co.,
15 Phil., 232; Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil.,
236.) She was not a de facto guardian; her acts were made as mother of the
children, not as a de facto guardian. It is further to be noted that the claim
is predicated exclusively on the “Deed of Loan,” which was executed even after
the judicial guardian of the minors’ properties had already been appointed and
after she had also been appointed judicial guardian of their persons, for
supposed expenses prior to the institution of the guardianship proceedings. No
evidence was offered to prove that the necessaries mentioned in the deed of loan
were actually given and were actually used or spent for the minors. The deed of
loan itself is not sufficient to prove the above facts or competent as against
the minors.

Assuming, arguendo, that the mother and her natural children
secured loans from claimant-appellant with which to purchase the food, clothing,
and necessaries of her minor wards or to provide them with education, she
certainly has no power nor authority to encumber the property of the wards to
guaranty the loan thus secured, or to bind for the payment of the loan the
pensions that the minors may be entitled to receive thereafter. Only a judicial
guardian of the ward’s property may validly do so, and even then only with the
court’s prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by
the rules. (Rule 96, Rules of Court.) The execution of the “Deed of Loan” in the
case at bar is, therefore, clearly beyond the scope of a natural guardian’s
power or authority.

The authorities cited are beside the issue. They refer to
contracts for the purchase of necessaries entered into by judicial guardians,
not by natural guardians, or to allowances paid to them (judicial guardians) for
necessaries supplied or purchased for the ward. These questions, entirely
different and distinct from the issue involved in the case at bar, we are not
asked to decide. Assuming, without deciding, that the minors herein should be
made to pay for the necessaries furnished them before their pension was
approved, and that justice supports claimant’s demand because she furnished such
necessaries, the appropriate remedy to enforce their liability is not through
the written promise that their natural guardian made.

The appeal must be, as it hereby is, dismissed, with costs
against the claimant-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo,
and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.