G.R. No. L-24146. February 22, 1968
MIGUEL MABILIN, VICTORIANO MABILIN, AND MARIA DE LA PAZ MABILIN, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
ANGELES, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Reg. No. 614, Cad. Case
No. 26, dated October 5, 1964,
in connection with a petition filed therewith for Cancellation of Liens or
Encumbrances on Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22749 and 22918 of the Land
Records of Quezon Province. The order reads as follows:
“Acting on the petition filed by the petitioners, through
counsel, and the opposition thereto filed by Atty. Luis B. Viloria,
and finding the allegations in the opposition to be without merit, the petition
is hereby granted and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
is hereby ordered, upon payment of the fees required by law, to cancel the
liens and/or encumbrances annotated on the back of Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 22749 and 22918 both of the land records of Quezon.
“SO ORDERED.
“City of Lucena,
October 5, 1964.
(Sgd) MANOLO L.
MADDELA
Judge”
The legality and validity of the said order is directly assailed
here by Eusebio S. Millar who had opposed the
petition in the court below, alleging that the court below fell into error in
issuing the above-quoted order on the basis merely of the pleadings (Second
Assignment of Error), thereby sustaining the contention of the petitioners that
the obligation secured by the liens or encumbrances mentioned in the order had
already prescribed (Third Assignment of Error), without stating or making
findings of fact upon which the order is predicated (First Assignment of
Error), and in resolving the petition without or in excess of its jurisdiction
(Reply Brief).
The environmental facts that gave rise to the controversy are
gleaned from the pleadings of the parties in the lower court and the respective
briefs they have submitted in this proceeding.
It appears that one Camilo Cabuyao originally owned two(2) parcels of land in barrio Ibabang Palale, municipality
of Tayabas,
province of Quezon, which are registered
in his name under Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22749 and 22918, both of
the Land Records of Quezon Province. Annotated on the back of Original Certificate
of Title No. 22749 are the following liens or encumbrances, to wit:
“29502 Writ of Attachment in favor of Eusebio
S. Millar – of all properties covered by O.C.T. Nos. 22749 and 22918 to secure
the payment of the amount claimed for in Civil Case No. 1593 J. P. Court of Tayabas, Tayabas, entitled ‘Eusebio S. Millar, plaintiff, vs. Cabuyao
& Susana Reyes, defendants’ File No. C-22749 (date of instrument – Sept. 2, 1936.)
“43054 Writ of Execution in favor of Eusebio
S. Millar – Issued in Civil Case No. 1593, J. P. Court of Tayabas,
Tayabas, entitled ‘Eusebio
S. Millar, plaintiff, vs. Camilo Cabuyao,
et al., defendants,’ by virtue of which all properties in this title is levied
for P68.50, plus P20.00 as damages; P13.70 as attorney’s fee and P12.36 as cost
of suit. File No. C-22749. (date of instrument – July 13, 1940)”
On the back of the other Original
Certificate of Title No. 22918 also appears an annotation of a similar lien or
encumbrance which reads:
“29502 Writ of Attachment in favor of Eusebio
S. Millar – Of all properties covered by O.C.T. Nos. 22749 and 22918 to secure
the payment of the amount claimed for in Civil Case No. 1593 J.P. Court of Tayabas, Tayabas, entitled ‘Eusebio S. Millar, plaintiff, vs. Camilo
Cabuyao & Susana Reyes, defendants.’ File No.
C-22749. (date of instrument – Sept. 2, 1936.”
Under date of August 27, 1964, Miguel Mabilin,
Victoriano Mabilin and
Maria de la Paz Mabilin filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon a petition for cancellation of the
liens or encumbrances above-quoted wherein they alleged, among others, that
they are the grandchildren of Camilo Cabuyao, the registered owner of the parcels of land
covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22749 and 22918 of the Land
Records of Quezon Province; that said Camilo Cabuyao had died in 1946,
leaving them as his only heirs to succeed him in the ownership of the land;
that although there still exist annotations of writs of attachment and
execution on the back of the Torrens certificates of title to the said parcels
of land, it does not appear that the land had ever been sold at public auction
to implement the said writs in favor of Eusebio S.
Millar; and that the said writs of attachment and execution having been entered
as early as 1936 and 1940, respectively, the obligations secured thereby had
prescribed. Petitioners then concluded
by praying that an order issue directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel the said liens or encumbrances
annotated on the certificate of title referred to in the petition.
On September 15, 1964,
the encumbrancer, Eusebio
S. Millar, filed through counsel, an opposition to the petition wherein he
admitted Camilo Cabuyao’s
ownership of the land. He also affirmed
the allegation in the petition that since the annotations of the writs of
attachment and execution in his favor in the years 1936 and 1940 on the back of
the certificates of title referred to in the petition, the land subject of his
lien had not actually been sold at public auction by the sheriff of the
province to satisfy the judgment. He
denied, however, for lack of sufficient information thereof, petitioners’
allegation that they have succeeded to the rights and interest of the
registered owner over the encumbered property.
He likewise denied the allegation in the petition that the obligation
secured by the liens or encumbrances sought to be cancelled had prescribed,
alleging that the running of the period of prescription was suspended by the
levy and execution made on the properties of his judgment debtor and his right
to payment had thus been preserved by the lien on the land created by the
annotation of the attachment and levy on execution in the corresponding
certificates of title of the property in question. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
Under date of September 15, 1964, the petitioners filed a reply
to the opposition alleging, that the original registered owner of the land, Camilo Cabuyao, was married to
Susana Reyes; that they begot Dolores Cabuyao as
their only child; that Dolores Cabuyao, in turn,
married a certain Pantaleon Mabilin,
and were born to them the petitioners, namely Miguel L. Victoriano
and Maria de La Paz, all surnamed Mabilin; that
Dolores Cabuyao died sometime in 1933, while her
mother, Susana Reyes died after, but before the last world war; and that Camilo Cabuyao, died sometime in
the year 1946. In support of these
allegations, certain annexes were attached to the reply namely: Annex “A” which
is a certificate of the local civil registrar of Tayabas,
Quezon to the effect that the records or the Civil
Registry of Tayabas Quezon
were burned during the last world war, hence, the non-production of the
corresponding certification of marriages, births, and deaths of the persons
referred to in the allegations; and Annexes “B” and “C” which
are affidavits of Maria de la Paz Mabilin and Victoriano Mabilin, respectively,
tending to sustain the allegation in the petition that petitioners are the
grandchildren of Camilo Cabuyao,
and their claim that they have succeeded to the ownership of the land, the
cancellation of the liens or encumbrances of which is the subject of the
petition.
The record further shows that without setting the petition for
hearing, and without receiving any evidence on the matter, the lower court,
based on the pleadings of the parties granted the petition in its order of
October 5, 1964 which, as earlier quoted in the first paragraph of this
opinion, ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to
cancel the liens or encumbrances as annotated in the certificates of title to
the land in favor of the oppositor. Not satisfied with the said order, the oppositor in the court below interposed this appeal.
There are several grounds relied upon by herein, appellant in
support of his claim that the order of the lower court directing the Register
of Deeds of Quezon to cancel the liens or
encumbrances under consideration was illegally and irregularly issued, the
most important of which is that which strikes at the jurisdiction of the said
court to resolve the petition. The
resolution of this question alone, We believe, would justify the setting aside
of the order complained of.
An examination of the petition filed in the court below would
readily show that the same was based upon the provisions of section 112 of the
Land Registration Act which provides, as follows:
“Sec. 112. No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation
of the same by the clerk or any register of deeds, except by order of the
court. Any registered owner or other
person in interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate,
or that any error, omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate, or
any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of
any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner
has been married; or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated; or that a coloration which owned registered land aid has been
dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution;
or upon any reasonable ground; and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear
and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper: Provided, however, That this section shall
not be construed to give the court authority to open the original decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate
for value and in good faith, or his heir of assigns, without his or their
written consent.
“‘Any petition filed under this section and all petitions and
motions filed under the provisions of this Act after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered.”
But it is well to remember, in this
connection, that proceedings under the foregoing provisions have beep aptly
described as summary in nature, and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the
allegations discloses that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be
tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as not to be genuine issues.[1]
This may be explained by the fact that when there is no disagreement as to the
facts alleged therein, the petition is considered a mere incidental matter in
the land registration case which maybe validly acted upon by the land
registration court.[2]
Thus, this Court has invariably held in a line of cases,[3]
that relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act can only be granted if
there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case become
controversial and should he threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case
where the incident properly belongs.
Upon the pleadings of the parties, on the other hand, We find
that real and substantial issues are raised by their respective
allegations. We note that the opposition
to the petition filed in the lower court denies not only the alleged rights of
herein appellees to succeed to the ownership of the
land subject of the liens or encumbrances sought to be cancelled, but herein
appellant also disputes the claim of the petitioners that the obligation
secured by the liens on the said land had prescribed. These matters put in issue are undoubtedly
controversial and are beyond the limited authority of a land registration court
to pass upon after the entry of the original decree of registration. To this effect was the holding of this Court
in a similar case,[4]
where prescription was the main issue raised by the parties:
“As may be noted, the main issue raised by the parties is not
whether the lower court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition concerning
the cancellation of the alleged encumbrances and the approval of the agreement
relative to the sale of the land to the herein petitioners but whether said
cancellation should be effected upon the ground that the right of the
Government to enforce said encumbrance has already prescribed. And the lower court, while at first ruled
that it had jurisdiction to act on the petition, it later reconsidered its
position and held that it has no such jurisdiction because the petition
involves a matter which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
“We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in
finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the
single reason that it involves a controversial issue which takes this case out
of the scope of Section 112 of Act 496.
x x x.”
We have to declare, therefore, under the
circumstances of this case and in the light of the authorities above-cited,
that the court below does not have jurisdiction to grant the petition and order
the cancellation of the liens and encumbrances on the certificates of titles in
question.
WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1961 is set aside, with costs against appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Enriquez, et al., v. Atienza, et al., 100
Phil. 1072.
[2]
See, Castillo, et al. v. Ramos, 45 O. G. 183.
[3] Lagula, et al. v. Casimiro,
et al., 98 Phil. 102; Tangunan, et al. v.
Republic of the Phil. 94 Phil. 171; Jimenez v. de Castro 40 O. G. (No.
3) 1st Sppl. p. 80; Gov’t
of the Phil. v. Jalandoni, 44 O. G. 1837.
[4] Tangunan, et al. v. Republic of the Phil. supra.