FLORENTINA ZAFRA VDA. DE VALENZUELA, PLAINTIFF AND PETITIONER, VS. BERNABE DE AQUINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LA UNION, AND IRENE ZAFRA DE AGUILAR, DEFENDANTS AN…

On June 12, 1946, Florentina Zafra Vda. de Valenzuela, the
present petitioner, as plaintiff in civil case No. 52 of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, filed an amended complaint against her sister Irene Zafra
de Aguilar, alleging that they are the only heirs of their mother Agustina del
Castillo who died on February 7, 1934, leaving to them three parcels of land
described in said complaint and designated as items (a), (b), and
(c), and asking for the partition of the said three parcels between them.
In addition, she asked for the collection of the sum of P810 said to be owing to
her by the defendant. Irene in her answer to the amended complaint asserts that
in addition to parcels (a) and (b) described in the complaint,
there were other properties left by their mother and therefore owned in common
by them and she asks that all of these properties be partitioned including their
fruits and earnings. As to parcel (c), Irene claims that it is her
exclusive property having been conveyed to her by her mother during her lifetime
and consequently, was not subject to partition. Hearings were held on July 17
and November 8, 1947 and on January 6, 1948, on which last date, the parties
after having finished adducing their evidence, submitted the case for
decision.

On February 20, 1948, Judge Bernabe de Aquino, then presiding
over the Court of First Instance of La Union which received the evidence in the
partition case and before whom it was submitted for decision, issued an order of
the same date, stating that in going over the evidence for the purpose of
pronouncing judgment in the partition case No. 52, he found that there had
previously been instituted intestate proceedings known as civil case No. 1993,
for the estate of Agustina del Castillo, mother of the parties, involving the
same properties included in the complaint for partition, and that plaintiff
Florentina Zafra Vda, de Valenzuela had been appointed administratrix in that
case. The order cited the parties to apppar before the court on March 3, 1948,
in order to inform it of the status of that civil case No. 1993. On the date
set, counsel for plaintiff Florentina informed the court that the record of
civil case No. 1993 had been lost and there had been no reconstitution; that the
administratrix therein was making the inventory and was beginning to make a
report, and that in view of the destruction of the record, Florentina filed
civil case No. 52 for partition.

At the request of the court, the clerk of court made an
affidavit, undated, entitled “Information to the Court,” stating that according
to his best recollection Florentina Zafra Vda. de Valenzuela had duly been
appointed administratrix in civil case No. 1993; that she duly qualified as such
administratrix; that the necessary notice to creditors was published calling on
possible creditors to file their claims against the estate of the decedent
Agustina del Castillo, but notwithstanding the lapse of several years, no
creditor’s claim has ever been filed except the claim presented by present
defendant Irene Zafra de Aguilar, wherein she contended that a certain parcel
listed in the administratrix’s inventory as part of the estate of their mother
Agustina del Castillo, was no longer part of the intestate estate for the reason
that said parcel had already been donated to her by her mother during her
lifetime; and that as far as said Clerk of Court could recall, the
administratrix had not yet submitted her final report and accounting and that
the properties under administration had not as yet been distributed and that
consequently, special proceedings No. 1993 was still pending and unclosed at the
time the record was destroyed during liberation.

Acting upon the information given by counsel for plaintiff
Florentina already referred to and upon an authenticated copy of an order dated
September 2, 1936, appointing Florentina administratrix in the intestate
proceedings, which copy had been presented by her as an exhibit in the partition
case, including the affidavit of the clerk of court, Judge Bernabe de Aquino
issued an order dated May 27, 1948, in the intestate proceedings, civil case No.
1993, allegedly reconstituted and designated as reconstituted case No. 11-R, to
the effect that the order of the court dated September 2, 1936, appointing the
plaintiff administratrix in the intestate proceedings was declared
reconstituted, as well as the status of that case at the time of the destruction
of the records as certified to by the Clerk of Court in his affidavit. In the
same order, Judge Aquino ordered that the proceedings in said civil case No.
1993 shall continue upon the portion of the records as therein reconstituted, at
the same time enjoining the administratrix Florentina Zafra Vda. de Valenzuela
within fifteen days from notice to (a) renew her bond in the amount of
P500 as fixed in the order of her appointment in 1936; (b) file a new
inventory of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina del Castillo; (c)
render final accounting as administratrix, and (d) submit a project of
partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Agustina del Castillo.

Dissatisfied with this action of Judge Bernabe de Aquino,
Florentina Zafra filed the present petition for certiorari, asking that we
require the court of La Union to certify to this Court among other things, a
copy of the record of civil case No. 52, for review, and after due consideration
of the petition, that we annul the order of the respondent Judge, dated May 27,
1948, on the ground that in issuing the same, respondent had acted in excess of
his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of his discretion.

On the basis of this order of May 27, 1948, in civil case No.
1993, Judge de Aquino in the partition case, civil case No. 52, issued an order
on the same date, May 27, 1948, dismissing said case on the ground that the
plaintiff had no cause of action for partition. The reason given was that
inasmuch as the proceedings in civil case No. 1993 had been ordered continued on
the basis of the reconstitution declared by the court in said case, and because
the properties now sought to be partitioned are included in the intestate
proceedings, said properties were to be regarded as in the hands of the court
and so could not be touched or be subject of an ordinary action, and the
plaintiff in the partition case had ho right to ask for partition but must await
the result of the intestate proceedings. Plaintiff Florentina appealed from said
order of dismissal to this Court.

As a result of said appeal, we now have here before us the
record of that civil case No. 52. Consequently, there no longer is any need of
requiring the Court of First Instance of La Union to certify to us copy of said
record for our review and for purposes of reference in the consideration of the
petition for certiorari.

On the basis of the facts already stated and those to be
gathered from the pleadings in this certiorari case, as well as the record of
civil case No. 52, we entertain grave doubts as to the legality and propriety of
respondent’s order of May 27, 1948, ordering the reconstitution of the order of
the Court of La Union of September 2, 1936 appointing the plaintiff
administratrix In civil case No. 1993, as well as reinstating said case as of
the time of the destruction of its record in 1945, as certified to by the Clerk
of Court in his affidavit, and ordering the proceedings in said civil case No.
1933 to continue. On September 1, 1945 Judge Antonio G. Lucero of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, issued an order advising parties litigant and their
attorneys and other interested persons of the complete destruction of the
judicial records of the Court and giving them six months from the date of the
order within which to apply for the reconstitution of said records, otherwise
they shall be deemed to have relinquished the reconstitution and may file their
action anew. This order was duly published. Then on October 14, 1946, the
Supreme Court passed a resolution published in the Official Gazette, Vol.
42, No. 10, page 2446, extending up to June 30, 1947, the time within which
petitions for reconstitution of judicial records heretofore destroyed may be
filed in any court of the Philippines under Act No. 3110. Despite the order and
the resolution aforementioned, the parties interested in the intestate
proceedings have failed to ask for the reconstitution of the record of said
civil case No. 1993. It is clear that the parties therein had lost all interest
in that case. Moreover, instead of filing a new action for intestate proceedings
like civil case No. 1993, Florentina Zafra filed an entirely different suit for
partition, a sort of short-cut to the goal or objective, namely, distribution of
the properties left to her and her sister. And this sister defendant Irene
Zafra, far from objecting on the ground of the existence of the intestate
proceedings, was perfectly agreeable to the proposed partition. Furthermore, the
affidavit made by the Clerk of Court already referred to as to the status of
said civil case No. 1993 based on his recollection can hardly be regarded as
reliable and may not bind the parties who did not intervene in its preparation
and had no opportunity to check up on its correctness. Consequently, the record
of civil case No. 1993 cannot be considered as validly reconstituted under the
terms of Act No. 3110.

In explanation of his action in ordering the reconstitution of
the record of civil case No. 1993 and in ordering its reinstatement, respondent
Judge invokes the inherent power of the court as provided in Rule 124, section 5
(h) of the Rules of Court which reads as follows:

“To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other
paper to be filed and used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply
deficiencies in its records and proceedings.”

Deeming it unnecessary at this time to lay down a rule as to
when to apply the provisions of Act No. 3110 as regards the reconstitution of a
court record that has been completely destroyed and when the court itself,
motu proprio may and should invoke and exercise its inherent power to
restore and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings, under Rule 124,
section 5 (h) of the Rules of Court, we find and hold in the present case
that it was the parties that were called upon to reconstitute the lost record
and restore the case to its status, and when they failed and did not wish to do
so despite the ample opportunity given to them, but instead gave up and ignored
said old case and sought a remedy and solution to their problem in an entirely
new case (civil case No. 52) which they diligently attended to and prosecuted to
its end, and submitted for the Court’s decision, said court may not correctly
and legally invoke and utilize its inherent power on this point and matter.

We cannot agree to the action of the respondent Judge in
ordering the reconstitution of the record of civil case No. 1993, and
reinstating said case without any petition or expressed desire therefor by the
parties interested. Stripped of all technicalities and non-essentials, the case
here may be succinctly described thus: In the year 1936 the plaintiff had
commenced intestate proceedings civil case No. 1993, seeking the administration
of the properties left by her mother to her and her sister defendant, the only
heirs. She was duly appointed administratrix. We do not know for sure what
happened thereafter in relation to said proceedings or what steps were taken in
and during her administration, for the reason that the only information on this
point is the affidavit of the Clerk of Court based merely on his recollection,
prepared without the intervention of the parties interested and so, from the
point of view of the law, unacceptable and unreliable and not binding on the
parties interested, in spite of the fact that it was prepared honestly and in
good faith. About 9 years later, or rather during the last phase of the last
war, on the occasion, of the liberation of the provincial capital, the
courthouse was burned and all the court records including that of the intestate
proceedings were completely destroyed. The parties interested in said case were
given plenty of time and opportunity to petition for the reconstitution of the
record of said case both by order of the Court of First Instance and also by a
resolution of the Supreme Court. But, they neither took steps nor adopted any
measure looking toward said reconstitution. In other words, they evinced no
interest whatsoever in the reinstatement of said case in the court docket. And,
instead of instituting another intestate proceedings as contemplated by Act No.
3110, to take the place of civil case No. 1993, whose record had been destroyed
and could not be reconstituted, the administratrix in said intestate proceedings
filed, an entirely new action, one against her sister and coheir for partition,
of the same properties included in the intestate proceedings. Said sister making
no mention of or reference whatsoever to the previous institution of the
intestate proceedings, expressed her willingness to the proposed partition.
Hearings were held in the partition case; both sisters presented evidence and
finally submitted the case for decision. Instead of deciding said partition
case, respondent Judge motu proprio, and on the basis of a copy of the
appointment of the plaintiff in the partition case, as administratrix in the
intestate proceedings, which copy he found among the evidence in the partition
case, ordered the reconstitution of the said appointment of administratrix in
the intestate proceedings and on the basis thereof, as well as of an affidavit
made by the Clerk of Court based entirely on his recollection of what had
happened in the intestate proceedings case, ordered the reinstatement of said
intestate proceedings and its continuance, directing the administratrix therein
against her objection to file a new bond and a new inventory of the properties
under administration and to render an accounting. And, on the basis of all this,
respondent Judge on May 27, 1948, dismissed the case for partition.

It was neither necessary nor proper for the Court, motu
propio to reconstitute the record of civil case No. 1993 and revive the
same. We believe and we hold that the intestate proceedings, civil case No.
1993, was dead and non-existent as far as the court and the parties were
concerned, and that as a result, the properties subject of the suit for
partition are not now in the hands of the Court as erroneously believed by
respondent Judge. We find the order of reconstitution and reinstatement of May
27, 1948 to be illegal and improper as having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction, and it is hereby declared and ordered annulled. Writ of certiorari
granted. No costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla,
Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.