NIXON Q. DELA TORRE, BENHUR Q. DELA TORRE, QUINTIN DELA TORRE (DECEASED) AS REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE CATALINA DELA TORRE AND HIS CHILDREN STELLA T. NAGDALE, DWIGHT DELA TORRE, VI…

Dela Torre versus Cabanglasan Elementary School

The Case

This is a case about a registered parcel of land in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, and the school building that sits on a portion of it. The registered owners, Nixon dela Torre and his co-heirs, sued the Cabanglasan Elementary School and two other occupants to recover possession of the land and to collect damages. The school resisted, claiming that it had possessed the land since the 1950s, that it had paid realty taxes, and that the former owner had donated a portion of the land to it. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules a Bar candidate must know on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, on the formal requirements of a donation of immovable property, on the effect of a party's waiver of the right to present evidence, and on why laches cannot defeat a registered owner.

Procedural History

The owners filed their complaint for recovery of possession and damages, with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9. The school was given repeated opportunities to present its evidence but never did, and the trial court eventually declared it to have waived that right and submitted the case for decision. The trial court ruled for the owners, declaring Nixon dela Torre the owner with a better right to possession, and ordering the school and the other defendants to remove their structures, vacate the area, and reconvey possession. It also gave the owners alternative options regarding the school buildings, and directed Nixon to deliver the portions sold to his brother and father or to their heirs.

Aggrieved, the school appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's failure to appreciate its long possession and prior title, its failure to declare the action barred by laches, and its order to vacate the donated property despite the owners' statements about donating the land. The Court gave the parties further chances to settle amicably, but those efforts proved futile.

Facts

The land, a large parcel of more than one hundred thousand square meters, was originally registered in the name of Maria Penserga. In January 1998, Maria executed a deed of absolute sale of the registered land in favor of Nixon dela Torre, and the original certificate of title was cancelled and a transfer certificate of title was issued in Nixon's name. Earlier, in November 1994, Nixon had sold portions of the land to his brother Benhur and his father Quintin, and those deeds were annotated at the back of the title.

In the meantime, Maria had sued Nixon, Benhur, and Quintin to annul the deed of sale she had executed in Nixon's favor. Quintin passed away in October 1995. In February 2000, Maria and Nixon executed an agreement before the barangay captain stating that Maria would no longer pursue the annulment case.

In June 2000, the owners had a relocation survey conducted. The survey showed that the school occupied the western portion of the land, and that two other defendants occupied other portions. The owners then filed this complaint in February 2001. The school answered that it had possessed the land since the 1950s and had paid realty taxes, and that in December 1979 Maria had executed a deed of donation of a four-hectare portion in its favor. The other defendants eventually vacated the land, leaving only the school building. Despite more than seven years of opportunities, the school never presented its evidence, and it was declared to have waived that right.

Issues

• Whether or not the school, by its long possession since the 1950s and its tax payments, acquired a prior or better title than the registered owners.
• Whether or not the owners' action for recovery of possession is barred by laches.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the school to vacate the property, or in the alternative to avail of the rights under the Civil Code, despite the owners' statements that they were donating the property to the school.

Applicable Provisions

Article 745 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void.

This governs the requirement of acceptance, which the school's donation never showed.

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

This supplies the formal requirements for a valid donation of immovable property, which the donation to the school failed to meet.

Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

This is the basis for disregarding the school's evidence, which it never formally offered after waiving its right to present evidence.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the owners had the better right to possession. A certificate of title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title in favor of the person whose name appears on it, and it is the best proof of ownership. Anyone dealing with registered land may rely on the title and need not go beyond it. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing and the right of action against the holder and possessor to recover it. Against this, the school offered only the deed of donation and two tax declarations. The Court held that the school had waived its right to present evidence by an order that had become final, and under Section 34 of Rule 132 no evidence not formally offered may be considered. Even if the donation had been presented, it was void because there was no showing that it had been duly accepted in a public instrument. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that title to immovable property does not pass from donor to donee until the donation has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified, and that where acceptance is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document, the deed is patently void. The tax declarations, for their part, are mere indicia of a claim of ownership and are not sufficient proof of ownership.

On the second issue, the Court held that laches did not bar the action. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. The owners lost no time: they filed the complaint in February 2001, after the relocation survey conducted in June 2000 revealed the encroachment. More fundamentally, the Court held that laches may not prevail against a certificate of title, since under the Property Registration Decree no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

On the third issue, the Court held that the owners' repeated statements about donating the land could not help the school, because no deed of donation was ever executed, and it is such a deed, with compliance with the formalities for its validity, that transfers title. The initiative to execute the deed should have come from the school, which stood to be benefited.

Doctrine

A Torrens certificate of title is evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title in favor of the person named in it, and it is the best proof of ownership; the registered owner is entitled to possession as an attribute of registered ownership and may recover the property from any holder.

A donation of immovable property is void unless it is made in a public document and the acceptance is made in the same deed or in a separate public document during the lifetime of the donor, with notice to the donor in authentic form noted in both instruments, as Articles 745 and 749 of the Civil Code require. Title does not pass until these formalities are met.

Realty tax payments are not sufficient proof of ownership; they are mere indicia of a claim of ownership.

No evidence not formally offered may be considered by the court, under Section 34 of Rule 132; a party declared to have waived its right to present evidence cannot rely on evidence it never offered.

Laches cannot prevail against a certificate of title, because prescription and adverse possession do not run against registered land.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the school's appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Nixon dela Torre and the other registered owners.

Remember This

Memorize this line: laches and adverse possession cannot defeat a Torrens title, and a donation of land without acceptance in a public instrument is void. Examiners use this case for bar questions on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles, the formal requirements of donations of immovables under Articles 745 and 749, and the rule that tax declarations are not proof of ownership.