PERLITA L. OBANAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN (PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BR. 92) AND FITZGERALD DELA CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY …
MACALINO, J:
a) the October 15, 2012 Order[2] which declared petitioner Perlita L. Obanan in default;
b) the December 14, 2012 Order[3] which denied petitioner’s Omnibus Motion; and
c) the February 18, 2013 Order[4] which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the above Orders.
The facts as related by petitioner in her Memorandum[5] are hereunder reproduced as follows:
“PERLITA L. OBANAN is the registered owner of a passenger jeepney with Plate No. PVR 379 which was involved in an accident on February 6, 2012.
At the time said incident took place, petitioner’s jeepney was driven by her driver ROWHEIN M. EROJO.
Consequently, a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed by private respondent FITZGERALD DELA CRUZ, as represented by his father ARMANDO S. DELA CRUZ against EROJO which case is now pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 42.
Later, private respondent also filed an Action for Damages against EROJO, OBANAN, MARIA THERESA ARIZOBAL (“ARIZOBAL”) AND OLIMPIO ACAIN (“ACAIN”), which case was raffled before the Public Respondent, Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 92, Quezon City. xxx.
In the above complaint Private Respondent, as Complainant, alleged among others that Petitioner should be made to answer for damages caused by EROJO on account of the fact that Petitioner was negligent in the selection of her driver/s specifically in taking steps necessary to determine or ascertain their driving proficiency and history.
On September 14, 2012, Petitioner OBANAN went to undersigned counsel’s law office to engage its legal services. She presented a copy of private respondent’s complaint which she claimed to have received on September 5, 2012.
Assessing the impossibility of the filing of Petitioner’s Answer on time considering the handling counsel’s heavy workload and hectic work schedule, she immediately filed on that same day of September 14, 2012 the undersigned law office’s Formal Entry of Appearance with Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. xxx.
On October 3, 2012, Petitioner filed her Verified Answer. xxx.
However, on October 5, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel received a copy of private respondent’s Motion to Declare Defendant Perlita L. Obanan in Default dated 25 September 2012. xxx.
In the said motion, counsel for Private Respondent excitedly moved to declare Petitioner in default for allegedly failing to file her Answer on time. Further, the motion stated that petitioner’s Entry of Appearance with Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer does not contain notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as it is considered as a mere scrap of paper and it would not stop the running of the period to file Petitioner’s Answer. Private Respondent therefore prayed that defendant Perlita L. Obanan be declared in default and that the plaintiff be allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.
On October 15, 2012 Public Respondent, Hon. Eleuterio L. Bathan, issued an Order which was received by Petitioner’s counsel on November 27, 2012. xxx.
In the said Order, Public Respondent among others GRANTED Private Respondent’s Motion to Declare Defendant Perlita L. Obanan in Default and at the same time refused to admit Petitioner’s Answer on the ground that it was belatedly filed, hence considered as a mere scrap of paper. xxx.
On December 12, 2012, Petitioner, through counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion praying for the Honorable Court to issue an order to (a) Lift Order of Default dated October 15, 2012; (b) Admit Defendant (herein Petitioner) OBANAN’s Verified Answer filed on October 3, 2012 and (c) Dismiss the Complaint for Damages with Prejudice for Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping, committed by Plaintiff’s counsel. xxx.
On the date of hearing, December 14, 2012, of the Omnibus Motion however, Petitioner’s handling counsel was indisposed. She was not able to attend the scheduled hearing. Moreover, on that same day, there were no other associates of the undersigned law office available on her stead.
Hence, on December 14, 2012, for failure of Petitioner to appear, her Omnibus Motion was denied by the Honorable Court. xxx.
On January 18, 2013, Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of the Honorable Court denying her Omnibus Motion, stating therein that Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to appear was due to sickness. xxx.
The hearing for said Motion for Reconsideration was set on January 17, 2013. During the hearing, the Honorable Court ordered the Plaintiff/Private Respondent to file his Comment/Opposition on Petitioner’s Omnibus Motion. xxx.
On March 20, 2013, Petitioner received a copy of an Order issued by the Honorable Court denying her Omnibus Motion on the Order dated October 15, 2012 and Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated December 14, 2012. xxx.”[6] (Citations omitted.)
The issuance of the above-mentioned Orders prompted petitioner to file this petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
“I. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING PETITIONER IN DEFAULT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.”[7]
Petitioner insists that her “Verified Answer”[8] should have been admitted by the trial court. She argues that the “Formal Entry of Appearance with Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer”[9] does not need notice of date and place of hearing because it does not prejudice private respondent’s rights. She further insists that she should have not been declared in default considering that her answer was filed prior to the issuance of the order declaring her in default.
Private respondent on the other hand, contends that a notice of hearing is not a procedural rule that may be arbitrarily disregarded. He points out that even if the trial court relaxed the rule on notice of hearing and petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file answer was granted, the answer was still belatedly filed. Private respondent elaborates:
“It bears stressing that the Sheriff’s Return of Summons clearly shows that petitioner was served with summons on September 1, 2012. Applying Section 1, Rule 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the last day for the filing of the Verified Answer is September 16, 2012, or September 17, 2012, considering that the former date falls on a Sunday.
xxx
Recall that petitioner’s Formal Entry of Appearance with Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the answer. Assuming that the said motion can be given due course despite the absence of notice of hearing, the period of fifteen (15) days should be reckoned from September 16, 2012, and not on September 20, 2012, as erroneously done by the petitioner. The last day for the filing of the Verified Answer, applying A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC in relation to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, is September 16, 2012. Thus, fifteen (15) days from September 16, 2012 is October 1, 2012. Therefore, as petitioner’s Verified Answer was filed only on October 3, 2012, the same was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed.
Assuming further that the last day for the filing of the Verified Answer is reckoned from September 17, 2012, the “next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday,” the filing of petitioner’s Verified Answer still falls beyond the period prescribed by law.”[10]
The trial court declared petitioner in default because it found that the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days and was not accompanied with a Motion to Admit Answer. The trial court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for lack of motion for postponement with original official receipt from the Office of the Clerk of Court of Quezon City evidencing payment of the postponement fee, in violation of item A (4) (b) of A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC or “Guidelines for Litigation in Quezon City Trial Courts.”
The petition lacks merit.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a defending party may be declared in default upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of failure to file an answer within the time allowed for it.[11] Thus:
“SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Xxx.”
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, “[t]he defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.” In the present case, petitioner was served summons on September 1, 2012 as shown in the “Sheriff’s Return of Summons.”[12] As such, she only had until September 17, 2012 to file her answer considering that September 16, the fifteenth day from receipt of summons, was a Sunday. Petitioner however, filed on September 14, 2012 a “Formal Entry of Appearance with Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer,” asking for an extension of fifteen days from September 20, 2012 or until October 5, 2012 to file an answer. She thereafter filed her “Verified Answer” on October 3, 2012.
Clearly, petitioner’s answer was filed out of time and as correctly pointed out by private respondent, even if petitioner was given a fifteen-day extension, her answer was still not perfected within the reglementary period. Petitioner’s counting of the period was erroneous because she wrongly alleges that she received the summons on September 5, 2012, contrary to what was indicated in the server’s return. Thus, the extension would start on September 16, 2012, which was the last day of the fifteen-day period sought to be extended. She would then have only until October 1, 2012 to file an answer which in this case, she failed to do.
Indeed, default orders are not viewed with favor.[13] However, petitioner has shown the inability to render due compliance with elementary rules on the matter. Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. Rules and procedures must be observed to uphold the noble purpose behind their issuance. Rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and own bidding. It may be noted at this point that once the defendant is declared in default, the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. Favorable relief can be granted only after it has been ascertained that it is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. Further, even if declared in default, petitioner is not deprived of her right to appeal the decision of the trial court.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in Civil Case No. Q-12-71674 dated October 15, 2012, December 14, 2012 and February 18, 2013, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Villon (Chairperson) and Corales, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-37.
[2] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[3] Rollo, p. 82.
[4] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[5] Rollo, pp. 134-154.
[6] Rollo, pp. 136-142.
[7] Rollo, p. 12.
[8] Rollo, pp. 55-69.
[9] Rollo, pp. 52-54.
[10] Rollo, pp. 125-127.
[11] Narciso v. Garcia, G.R. No. 196877, November 21, 2012.
[12] Rollo, p. 74.
[13] David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda, et al., G.R. No. 170427, January 30, 2009.
[14] Philippine National Bank v. Deang Marketing Corporation and Deang, G.R. No. 177931, December 8, 2008.