MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOAQUIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. NICANOR SIVA, BASILIO SAPITANAN, ET AL, RESPONDENTS-APPLLEES.

Municipality of San Joaquin versus Siva

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition filed by the Municipality of San Joaquin against the persons appointed by the President as mayor, vice mayor, and councilors of the newly created Municipality of Lawigan. San Joaquin asked the court to restrain these officials from performing their functions, on the ground that the executive order creating Lawigan rested on a statute that unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. The case matters because it carries forward the doctrine of the Pelaez decision on the limits of delegated legislative power, and it shows how the Supreme Court treats a lower court ruling that runs against a doctrine it has already settled.

Procedural History

San Joaquin filed its petition for prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the statute challenged was not an undue delegation of legislative power. San Joaquin appealed that dismissal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court.

Facts

On the tenth of July, nineteen hundred sixty one, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order Number 436. That order created the Municipality of Lawigan out of twenty one barrios that had until then formed part of the Municipality of San Joaquin.

Pursuant to the executive order, the President appointed a mayor, a vice mayor, and councilors for the new Municipality of Lawigan. These are the respondents in the case.

San Joaquin contested the legality of the executive order. It argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provision on which the order was based, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers and is therefore unconstitutional. The trial court disagreed, and San Joaquin brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which Executive Order Number 436 is based, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers and is therefore unconstitutional.
• Whether or not Executive Order Number 436, creating the Municipality of Lawigan out of barrios of San Joaquin, is valid.

Applicable Provisions

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is the provision on which the challenged executive order rests, and the Court treats it as the source of the constitutional question:

The President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, or municipal district, or may divide or merge existing political subdivisions, and create new ones, and fix the seats of government.

Because the executive order was issued under this provision, the validity of the order rises or falls with the validity of the delegation it embodies.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the question had already been squarely taken up and settled in the Pelaez case, promulgated on the twenty fourth of December, nineteen hundred sixty five. In that case the Court upheld the very theory advanced by San Joaquin and rejected the view taken in the appealed decision. The Court put the matter thus:

The issue herein has been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G. R. No. L-23825, promulgated on December 24, 1965, which upheld the theory of appellant herein, and rejected the view taken in the appealed decision.

On the second issue, it follows that Executive Order Number 436 cannot stand. The Court declared the order null and void from the beginning, and directed the respondents to refrain from acting as officers of the Municipality of Lawigan.

Doctrine

A statute that authorizes the President to create, divide, or merge political subdivisions by executive order effects an undue delegation of legislative power and is unconstitutional. The doctrine is not new in this case; it was settled in the Pelaez decision, and the Court applies it here as controlling. Once the delegation is void, the executive order issued under it is void from the beginning, and the officials appointed under that order may be restrained from performing their functions. For a Bar answer, the rule to write is this: the creation of municipalities is a legislative function that cannot be delegated to the President through a general authority such as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, declared Executive Order Number 436 null and void from the beginning, directed the respondents to refrain from acting as officers of the Municipality of Lawigan, and assessed costs against them.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the issue was squarely settled in Pelaez, so that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot support the creation of a new municipality by executive order. Examiners use this case as the companion authority to Pelaez on undue delegation of legislative power, and on the effect of a void executive order as void from the beginning.