GONZALO SANTOS RIVERA, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila involving purely questions of law.

The eleven (11) petitioners herein are members of the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila. Respondent Antonio J. Villegas was, on the
dates material to this case, the Vice-Mayor of said City and presiding
officer of the aforementioned Board. It is alleged in paragraphs (6)
and (7) of the petition:

6. “That on or about March, 1960, during the regular
   session of the Municipal Board of Manila, in connection with a
   deliberation of the members of said Board in voting upon a measure then
   under discussion, the respondent, instead of determining the result of
   the voting and announcing the same to the members of the Municipal
   Board, then present (acts of which are purely ministerial on his part),
   proceeded to address the same members of the Board, giving his opinion
   on the matter under discussion, and otherwise performing acts properly
   belonging to the members of the Municipal Board, respondent, among
   other things, stating:

   ‘The Chair should not be interrupted because like any other member of the Board, he has the right to speak’ and

* * * * *

‘* * * the Chair holds the view that he has a right
to speak as that is one of the freedoms granted us by our Constitution.
* * *’

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‘* * * He is not a simple servant of this Body. He is in fact the administrative and legislative head of this Body.’

7. “That sometime on March 25, 1960, upon a
   Resolution submitted by sixteen (16) members of the Municipal Board to
   request the President of the Philippines to order the Honorable
   Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend, recall or
   repeal the set of rules and regulations promulgated by virtue of
   Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548 and approved on February 9, 1956 and
   adopted by said Body on same date, the herein respondent caused to be
   inserted in the body of the approved Resolution, statements and
   matters, not authorized nor deliberated upon by the members of the
   Municipal Board who supposedly passed the same.”

Petitioners further allege that said acts and utterances of
respondent are “without and/or in excess of his powers” as presiding
officer of said Board; that despite petitioners’ admonitions to the
contrary, respondent persists in performing said acts, thereby
unnecessarily delaying and hampering the deliberations of said Board,
to the prejudice and damage of the interest and welfare of the people
of Manila; and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For these reasons,
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to
desist in actively participating in the discussions of matters before
said Board and giving his opinion and remarks thereon, other than to
preside over the sessions of the Board, calling it to order,
recognizing members desirous of speaking and performing acts incident
to these duties.

In his answer, respondent admitted some allegations of the petition,
denied other allegations thereof, stated what acts were performed by
him and maintained his right to do so. After appropriate proceedings,
the lower court rendered judgment for respondent. A reconsideration
thereof having been subsequently denied, petitioners appealed directly
to this Court.

Owing to the recent demise of the Mayor of Manila and ascent to said
office of the Vice-Mayor, respondent herein, the issues herein have
thereby become moot. This notwithstanding, the Court deems it best to
pass upon said issues in the interest of public policy and welfare.

The facts pertinent to the allegations in paragraph 6 of the
petition are set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we
quote:

“In a session prior to March 8, 1960, the Municipal
Board adopted a Liberal Party-sponsored resolution requesting the City
Engineer to prepare estimates for the asphalting and/or cementing with
curbs and gutters all the unasphalted streets of the city. During the
session of March 8, Nacicnalista councilor Maceda presented a motion
for the reconsideration of the approval of the said resolution.
Respondent as presiding officer ruled, a point of order raised by
Liberal Party councilor Isidro, that the motion for reconsideration was
out of order, since,, according to respondent, the resolution had
already been implemented and the matter was already in the hands of the
City Engineer (p. 38, Exh. I or A). Nacionalista councilor Maceda
appealed the ruling of respondent to the Board. While respondent was
obtaining the decision of the Board on the appeal of Nacionalista
councilor Maceda by counting raised hands and after counting 11 votes
in favor, Liberal Party councilor Quintos asked for nominal voting.
Respondent granted the request for nominal voting relying on section 17
of the Charter and sections 6(e) and G(g) of Rule VII of the Rules of
the Board. Nacionalista councilor Remigio in turn raised a point of
order, objecting to nominal voting because voting by raised hands had
already begun (p. 30, Exh. I or A). Respondent overruled the point of
order, because the purpose of nominal voting was to record the names of
those in favor, those against and those abstaining (pp. 39-41, Exh. I
or A). An appeal from this last ruling was then made by Nacionalista
Councilor Maceda and, during the nominal voting, the Nacionalista
councilors gave their votes and explained their votes by airing many
charges against respondent as presiding officer for allegedly violating
the Rules of the Board and favoring the Liberal Party minority (pp.
41-48, Exh. 1 or A). As respondent was about to answer these
accusations and innuendos, he was interrupted by Nacionalista Councilor
Ocampo who even walked out of the session, followed by the other
Nacionalista councilors prompting a recess (pp. 48-49, Exh. 1 or A).
When session was resumed, respondent again attempted to answer the
charges against him; but he was again rudely interrupted by
Nacionalista councilor Maceda who questioned respondent’s right to
speak, leading to adjournment (pp. 49-51, Exh. A or I). Thus was
respondent’s right to speak come to be question (Exh. I-A, pp. 36, 51
in Exh. or A; Exh. 2-A, pp. 18-46 in Exh. 2 or B).”

Referring to the question whether respondent had authority to act as he did, the lower court said:

“Respondent has the power to ‘preside over the
sessions’ of the Municipal Board and the position of presiding officer
implies direction, control or regulation over the deliberations of the
Board (See definition of ‘preside’ in Webster’s New International
Dictionary, p. 1956). Section 1-A-1 (e) of Rule I of the Rules of
Procedure of the Municipal Board provides that the presiding officer
shall assist in expediting business’ (Exh. 8, p. 1). And Robert’s Rules
of Order has this to say on the matter:

‘If
at any time, the chairman rises to state a point of order, or give
information, or otherwise speak, within his privilege, a member
speaking must take his seat till the chairman has been heard first.
When called to order by the chair, the member must sit down until the
question of order is decided.’ (Art. VII, Sec. 43, Robert’s Rules of
Order, 1951 ed. p. 181).

‘* * * Wherever the presiding
officer decides a question of order, he has the right, without leaving
his chair, to state the reasons for his decision * * *’ (Art. IV, Sec.
21, id. p. 79).

which are applicable here
pursuant to section 1, Rule IX of the Rules of Procedure of the
Municipal Board (Exh. 8, p. 11). Such right is demanded by the nature
of the position and on the grounds of equity and fairness.

“In
view of the foregoing, the right of respondent Presiding Officer to
state his reasons for his ruling as happened here is undeniable.”

We are fully in accord with this view. The right of a presiding
officer to state the reasons for his rulings as such is too obvious to
require demonstration.

As regards the allegations in paragraph (7) of the petition, the
facts are stated in the appealed decision, in the following language:

“On March 18, 1960, Nacionaiista councilor Gatmaitan
submitted a motion co-authored by the 19 other councilors, for the
adoption of a resolution requesting the Mayor of Manila to suspend the
enforcement of Commonwealth Act No. 548 (Exh. 3). Respondent as
presiding officer stated that the Mayor of Manila could not suspend the
enforcement of a duly enacted law and that the motion should therefore
be modified (Exh. A-4, p. 29 in Exh. A). Liberal Party councilor Isidro
likewise submitted a written motion dated March 17, 1960 proposing the
adoption of a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the Manila
Police Department to hold in. abeyance or suspend the enforcement of
the traffic rules and regulations allegedly promulgated under
Commonwealth Act No. 548 (Exh. 3-A). The Nacionaiista majority
floorleader then moved to consolidate the proposal of Nacionaiista
councilor Gatmaitan as proposed to be modified by respondent and the
proposal of Liberal Party councilor Isidro. This motion was adopted
(Exh. 5, p. 34).

“Afterwards, on March 22, 1960, thirteen
councilors headed by Liberal Party councilor Isidro submitted a motion,
that the Board I adopt a resolution requesting the Honorable Secretary
of Public Works & Communications to suspend, recall or repeal
certain regulations promulgated by virtue of Sec. I of CA 548 which
prohibits animal-drawn vehicles to pass through streets’, plazas and
bridges in the City of Manila’. There being no objection, this motion
was declared by respondent as approved (pp. 34-35, Exh. 5). The
resolution referred to reads:

‘The
undersigned members respectfully move that this Honorable Body adopt a
resolution requesting the Honorable Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to suspend, recall or repeal the set of rule’s and
regulations promulgated by virtue of section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548
and approved on February 9, 1956 which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles
from passing through twenty-seven (27) streets, plazas and bridges in
the City of Manila.

‘This resolution is necessary because
it practically negates the power of the Municipal Board to regulate the
operations of all kinds of vehicles within the city under section 18
(hh) of the Charter of the City of Manila and its power of local
autonomy and for the more important reason that rules and regulations
promulgated under section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548 closing national
roads to any ‘or all classes of traffic must be temporary in nature.
The subject rules and regulations could not be said to be temporary in
view of the fact that it was approved since February 9, 1956 and since
that time so many traffic rules and regulations have been approved by
the Municipal Board to cope with up-to-date necessities and needs of
the riding public, transportation operators and the inhabitants of
Manila in general which might altogether render the enforcement of the
aforesaid rules and regulations purposeless and untimely.

Very respectfully yours,
s/ Martin B. Isidro

(Exh. 3-F)

There being no adopted worded resolution, respondent framed the
following resolution based on the records, particularly Exhibit 3-F
quoted above:

‘Whereas, the set of rules and
regulations promulgated by virtue of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548
and approved on February 9, 1956 which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles
from passing through twenty-seven (27) streets, plazas and bridges in
the City of Manila, practically negates the power of the Municipal
Board of Manila to regulate the operation of all kinds of vehicles
within the city under Section 18 (hh) of the Charter of the City of
Manila and its power of local autonomy and for the more important
reason that rules and regulations promulgated under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 548 closing national roads to any or all classes of
traffic must be temporary in nature; and

‘Whereas, the
subject rules and regulations could net be said to be temporary in view
of the fact that it was approved since February 9, 1956 and since that
time so many traffic rules and regulations have been approved by the
Municipal Board to cope with up-to-date necessities and needs of the
riding public, transportation operators and the inhabitants of Manila
in general which might altogether render the enforecement of the
aforesaid rules and regulations! purposeless and untimely: Now,
therefore, be it

‘Resolved by the Municipal Board of Manila
to request, as it hereby respectfully requests, the Honorable Secretary
of Public Works and Communications to suspend, recall or repeal the set
of rules and regulations promulgated by virtue of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 548 and approved on February 9, 1956 which prohibits
animal-drawn vehicles from passing through twenty-seven (27) streets,
plazas and bridges in the City of Manila.

‘Adopted unanimously by the Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held on even date, March 22, I960.’ (Exh. 3-E)

“Likewise,
on March 25, 1960, respondent declared as approved for lack of any
objection a supplementary motion (Exh. C or 6) presented by Liberal
Party councilor Martin B. Isidro and 14 other councilors for the
Municipal Board to adopt a resolution requesting the President of the
Philippines to order the Department of Public Works &
Communications to suspend, recall or repeal the ruling regarding the
use of streets in Manila (Exh. 7-A, p. 78 in Exh. 7). The body of said
motion reads:

‘The undersigned members
respectfully move that this Honorable Body adopt a resolution
requesting the President of the Philippines to order the Honorable
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend, recall or
repeal the set of rules and regulations promulgated by virtue of
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548 and approved on February 9, 1956
which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles from passing through twenty-seven
(27) streets, plazas and bridges in the City of Manila.’ (Exh. 6).

Respondents drafted and authenticated resolution Exhibit 6-B, which reads:

(Title Omitted)

‘RESOLVED by the Municipal Board of
Manila to request, as it hereby respectfully requests, His Excellency,
the President of the Philippines to please order the Honorable, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to suspend, recall or
repeal the set of rules and regulations promulgated by virtue of
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 and approved on February 9, 1956
which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles from passing thru twenty-seven
(27) streets, plazas and bridges in the City of Manila, on the ground
that the enforcement of said rules and regulations is unnecessary,
untimely, illegal, discriminatory, unjust and highly prejudicial to the
livelihood of approximately 7,000 families who are dependent upon the
calesa trade in Manila.

‘Adopted unanimously by the Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held on March 25, 1960.

Approved.’ (Exh. 6-B)”

Obviously, the resolution thus drafted by respondent do not justify
the charge made in the aforementioned paragraph (7) of the petition. As
correctly stated by His Honor the trial Judge:

“From the above, it is clear that resolution Exhibit
6-B duly interpreted the will of the Municipal Board as can be gleaned
from the reasons given by the members as per minutes of March 18, 22,
and 25, 1960. The reasons which were incorporated in the corresponding
resolution were based mainly on the statements of Councilor Martin B.
Isidro during the session of the Board on March 22, 1960 (pp. 28_33,
Exh. 5) as well as on the motions Exhibits 6 & 3_F. The right and
duty of respondent to frame the questioned resolutions may be gleaned
from his duty as presiding officer to authenticate, whenever necessary,
all orders, acts, and proceedings of the Board, declaring its wills and
obeying its commands (Rule 1, sec. 1_A_1h, Rules of Procedure of the
Municipal Board).

‘* * * It is his (presiding officer’s) duty
to declare the will of the body over which he presides, ascertained by
rules previously adopted, or, in the absence of such rules, by other
methods not repugnant to the due and orderly procedure of a
deliberative body’ (37 Am. Jur. 672).”

Lastly, petitioners maintain that the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila, is not a member of its Municipal Board, but merely its
presiding officer, like the Vice-President of the United States, who is
ex-officio presiding of the Senate of the United States, but not a
member thereof, and, hence, devoid of the powers and attributes of the
latter, except to vote in case of tie. In this connection, Section 13
of the Revised Charter of Manila, as amended by Republic Act No. 1571,
reads, in part:

“The Municipal Board shall be the legislative body
of the City and shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding
officer, and five elective members from each representative district
who shall hold office for four years. The Vice-Mayor shall have no
right to vote except in case of a tie. * * *. The presiding officer
shall sign all ordinances, or resolutions and measures directing the
payment of money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board
* * *.”

The language of this provision is clear and explicit. The Municipal
Board of Manila “shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding
officer and five (5) elective members from each” of its representative
districts. The Vice-Mayor of Manila forms part, therefore, of said
Board, unlike the Vice-President of the United States who is not a
constituent element of its Senate—the same being exclusively “composed
of two (2) senators from each State * * *”—although he is “President of
the Senate” and “shall have no vote, unless” its members “be equally
divided” (Article I, Section 2, Constitution of the United States), and
unlike the President of the Senate of the Philippines in relation to
our Commission on Appointments, which consists only of “twelve (12)
Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives”, and,
accordingly, does not include the President of the
Senate—except insofar as he is its “Chairman ex-officio” and, as such,
may vote “in case of tie”, and may call the Commission to meet, while
the congress is in session, to discharge such powers and functions as
are conferred by the Constitution upon said Commission (Article VI,
Sections 12 and 13, Constitution of the Philippines).

The lower court opined that the present case is at parity with that
of Bagasao vs. Tumangan, 104 Phil., 1033; 55 Off. Gaz. (31) 6018, in
which we held that the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City—the charter of
which provides that “the Municipal Board shall be the legislative body
of the city and shall be composed of the Vice-Mayor, who shall be the presiding officer,
and two (2) councilors who shall be elected from each district”—is, not
only the presiding officer of said Board, but, also, a member thereof,
with the right to vote on any proposed ordinance, resolution or motion even though there is no tie.
Finding, in effect, that said provision of the charter of Cabanatuan
City is identical to that of the City of Manila, the lower court
concluded in this case that “respondent is a member of the Municipal Board, with all the rights and privileges” of the latter” (except as to salary) subject to the limitation that he cannot vote except in case of a tie”.

It is our considered view, however, that the Vice-Mayor of Manila is not
identically situated as the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, except
insofar as each forms part of the respective municipal board and
presides the same. The former is an integral part of the Municipal
Board of Manila, but only “as the presiding officer” thereof. Hence, unlike the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, that of Manila does not
have either the status of a regular member of its municipal board, or
the powers and attributes of a municipal councilor. In short, the
Vice-Mayor of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board of Manila no more
than the prerogatives and authority of a “presiding officer” as such,
and those specified by law (to vote in case of tie, and to sign all
ordinances or resolutions and measures directing the payment of money
or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified accordingly, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur