CHOY KING TEE ALIAS CHUAA KING TEE, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO L. GALANG, AS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal by the Commissioner of Immigration from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila granting the petition for prohibition and mandamus
filed by Choy King Tee alias Chua King Tee.

The record shows that appellee’s husband, Tan Ban
Seng, a native of
China, was
granted Philippine citizenship by naturalization on January 13, 1959 and took his oath of allegiance on
January 21, 1961. Appellee, also Chinese and a resident of Hongkong, first came to the
Philippines in
1955. Since then she had gone to and returned from Hongkong several times, the last time she returned being in
January 1960, when she was admitted here as a temporary visitor. Her authorized
stay expired on February 14,
1961.

On January 27, 1961 Tan Ban Leng, in his own behalf
and in behalf of his wife, appellee herein, and of his
son, Jacinto Chua Tan, filed a petition with the Commissioner of Immigration
asking him to recognize petitioners as citizens of the Philippines, to cancel
their alien certificates of registration and to issue in their favor respective
identification certificates as Philippine citizens. The petition was granted
insofar as Tan Ban Seng and his son were concerned,
but was denied as to appellee. On February 8, 1961 appellee filed in the lower court a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that she be declared a citizen
of the
Philippines and
that the Commissioner of Immigration be ordered to
cancel her alien certificate of registration.

The trial court ruled that appellee automatically
acquired Philippine citizenship upon her husband’s naturalization and ordered
the Commissioner to cancel her alien certificate of registration and to issue in
lieu thereof an identification certificate as Philippine citizen.

In this appeal the Commissioner claims that the lower court erred (1) in
holding that appellee automatically became a
Philippine citizen upon her husband’s naturalization
and (2) in granting the petition for prohibition and mandamus.

Appellant and appellee are in disagreement as to
the meaning of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, which provides that “any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”
Appellant contends that for an alien woman to avail of his provision she must
first prove that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization. On the other hand’ appellee maintains that all she has to show is that she has
none of the disqualifications, as she claims to have done in this case.

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number
of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all
the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a
Philippine citizen (Lao Chay vs. Calang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuan vs. Calang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Young vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Siok Sy vs. Vivo, L-21136,
December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew
the court for a possible re-examination of the said ruling the light of the
interpretation of a similar law in the States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the
Revised of the U.S.) The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to
the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on
March 26, 1920. Under this
Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three
classes of persons: (a) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens
thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and
(c) citizens of the United States or foreigners who, under the laws of the
United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing therein.
The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American citizens
is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as
racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between
the naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to
accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the
United States to
the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying
American citizens.

This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the
enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on
June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act
No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose
to retain the said provision—that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon
marriage the alien wife must be one “who might herself be lawfully
naturalized,”—the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman
belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the
statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman “might herself be lawfully
naturalized” would be meaningless surplusage, contrary
to settled norms of statutory construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of
marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs
and traditions.

Appellee here having failed to prove that she has
all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of
the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine
citizen.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the petition denied, with costs
against appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon J.P. and Zaldivar, concur.