FORTUNATO DE LA CRUZ AND DIEGA RAMOS-DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH III, AND JOSE I. R…

The issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the
decision of the former court of first instance, affirming the judgment of the
then municipal court which ordered the ejectment of herein petitioners after finding that no tenancy relationship existed between
them and herein private respondent, had still to be referred to the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform for purposes of certification pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 316.

In a complaint^[1]
filed before the Municipal Court of Obando, herein
private respondent, as plaintiff, sought the ejectment
of herein petitioners, as defendants, alleging, inter alia, that plaintiff is the owner of two (2) parcels
of land, consisting of 302 square meters, located in Lawa,
Obando, Bulacan; that
sometime in April, 1967, defendants occupied said parcels of land and built a
residential house and other improvements thereon on mere consent and tolerance
of herein plaintiff; that since April 11, 1970, plaintiff had demanded that
defendants vacate said premises, but defendants refused and failed to do so up
to the present.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss^[2]
alleging that they have been tenants of the aforesaid parcels of land since
1941 up to the present; that, as tenants, defendants are entitled to a homelot and they cannot be deprived of the same unless it
is decreed by a final and executory decision of a
competent court for causes provided by law; that there is a prejudicial
question as to whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between plaintiff
and defendants; and that this case falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, pursuant to Section 154(1) of
Republic Act No. 1267.

Plaintiff filed an opposition^[3]
to the motion to dismiss stating that the subject matter of the action is a
residential lot and is not for cultivation; and that mere allegations that
there exists an agricultural tenancy relation between defendants and plaintiff
do not divest the municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the unlawful detainer case.

In an order dated June 3,
1971,^[4]
the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that there is nothing
in the allegations in the complaint which speaks of tenancy relationship
between the parties, and that since the allegations in the complaint determine
the jurisdiction of the courts, it properly acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case. 
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss was likewise denied.

Thereafter, defendants filed their answer with counterclaim,^[5]
alleging that since 1941 up to the present they have been occupying and
cultivating the parcels of land owned by plaintiff; that they have been tenants
of plaintiff since 1941 up to the present; that the question of whether or not
there exists a tenancy relation between the parties falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations; and that defendants have filed
a complaint for security of tenure before the Court of Agrarian Relations
docketed as CAR Case No. 362.

After hearing and presentation of evidence by both parties,
herein petitioners again filed another motion to dismiss dated January 6, 1973,^[6]
alleging that “(w)hile it is true that the
jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or
forcible entry is determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where
tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real
issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.”

Without resolving this second motion to dismiss, the Municipal
Court of Obando rendered a decision, dated March 28,
1973,^[7]
ordering the defendants to vacate the parcels of land in question; to pay
plaintiff a monthly rental thereon of P30.00 from September 7, 1970 until they
vacate the premises; and to pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total amount of
rentals due to plaintiff.  Petitioners
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, which rendered judgment on June 7, 1974^[8] affirming the municipal court’s decision,
except as to attorney’s fees.

No appeal having been taken from this decision of the Court of
First Instance, upon motion of herein private respondent said court issued a
writ of execution.  However, before the
same could be implemented, petitioners filed a motion for referral of the case
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, dated October 1, 1974.^[9]
After hearing the arguments of both parties, the Court of First Instance issued
an order, dated October 10, 1974,^[10]
denying the aforesaid motion.  The
instant petition involves and assails the said denial order.

We hold that the motion to refer the ejectment
case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was properly denied by respondent
court.

1.  Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 3844, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms, provides:

“SEC. 8.  Extinguishment
of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.  –
The agricultural lease­hold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:

x  x  x

“(2)
Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance;”

x x
x

Petitioners admit that they have voluntarily surrendered their
landholding to private respondent. 
However, they submit that they agreed to surrender their landholding on
the condition that the lot where their house is constructed will belong to
them.  This contention is bereft of
merit.  There is nothing in the law which
imposes a consideration, of whatever kind and nature, for the surrender by the
tenant of his landholding.  What it
requires is a mere written
notice in order that voluntary surrender will terminate the tenancy
relation.  While there is jurisprudence
to the effect that Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844 does not prohibit the
parties from attaching conditions to the agreement on the surrender of the
landholding by the tenant, we are convinced, on the basis of the evidence
presented by private respondent which is neither denied nor confirmed by
petitioners, that the alleged condition adverted to by petitioners was never
agreed upon.

The records show, and it is not disputed, that in a letter dated April 11, 1970,^[11]
private respondent advised petitioners that he is giving them thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof within which to elect whether or not to buy the parcel of
land occupied by them.  When petitioners
failed to reply, it was then that private respondent demanded that they vacate
the premises and pay the rentals. 
Petitioners likewise do not deny that they were allowed by private
respondent to purchase the lot adjoining that on which their house is
constructed, with the promise that they will transfer their house to the
adjoining lot.^[12]
We find no plausible reason why petitioners would still transfer their house to
the adjoining lot if it were true, as they claim, that the land on which their
house stands actually belongs to them. 
The filing of the complaint for ejectment only
serves to strengthen the fact that the subject premises did not belong to
petitioners.  Thus, there is sufficient
basis to conclude that petitioners had surrendered their landholding to herein
private respondent.

Considering that by the voluntary surrender of the landholding
the tenancy relationship, if any, was terminated, it follows that the land ceased
to be within the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 316.  Consequently,
the mandatory provisions in Section 2 thereof, requiring referral of the case
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, could no longer be invoked.

2.  Petitioners argue that,
pursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316, it is necessary for said
secretary to determine whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the
parties herein, because it is only when said official finds that no such
relationship exists that the ejectment case may
proceed for further proceedings in the Court of First Instance.

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 provides:

“SEC. 2.  Unless
certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or
hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance, municipal or city court, or any
other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment
case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural
land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed, these
cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his
authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of
the relationship between the contending parties.  If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds
that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer
to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute of controversy.”

It is readily apparent that the aforesaid provision applies only
if what is involved is agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn.  In the case at bar, it has been
sufficiently established by the evidence presented and the facts found, both in
the aforesaid Municipal Court and Court of First Instance, that the two parcels
of land on which petitioners’ house is located are residential in nature.  We cannot, therefore, accept the theory advanced
by petitioners that the trial court can proceed to hear the ejectment
case filed before it only after the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has certified
that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties.

Even assuming arguendo that
the land is indeed agricultural, petitioners’ submission must still fail.

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1038, which is aimed at
strengthening the security of tenure of tenant-tillers in non-rice/corn
producing private agricultural lands, in conjunction with Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 316 hereinbefore quoted, provides:

“SEC. 2.  No judge of
the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first instance, city or municipal
courts, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other
case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted
to rice and/or corn, unless certified
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a
court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any
such case is filed, the case shall
first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized
representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship
between the contending parties.  If the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality
finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing
officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing
officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.

“The preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom
the case is certified as a proper case for trial.  Said court, judge or hearing officer may,
after due hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as
the evidence and substantial merits of
the case may warrant.”

We had the occasion to apply the aforequoted
provision of law in Puertollano,
et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.,^[13]
where we held that:

“From the foregoing provisions of the law it is clear that the trial
court cannot take cognizance of any ‘ejectment case
or any other case designed to harass or
remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn’ without first referring the
same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his
authorized representative in the
locality for a preliminary determination of
the relationship between the contending parties.  If said officer finds that the case is proper
for determination by the court
it shall so certify and thence said court
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.  Such preliminary
determination of the relationship, however, is not binding upon the court.  Said court may after due hearing confirm,
reverse or modify said preliminary determination
as the evidence and substantial merit of the case may warrant.”

This was reiterated in the
more recent case of Graza, et al. vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,^[14]
which specifically underscores the
fact that the secretary’s certificate
on the supposed tenancy relationship
between the contending parties is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the courts.

Petitioners insist that Presidential Decree No. 316 should apply
in the instant case considering their allegation,
both in their motion to dismiss and answer, that there exists a tenancy
relationship between the parties.

Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint,
which in this case is for ejectment, determine the
jurisdiction of the court.  And,
jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising
as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties.

A perusal of the complaint for ejectment
filed by private respondent shows that there is nothing in the averments
therein which establishes or tends to establish the existence of a tenancy
relation between private respondent and petitioners.  We have specifically ruled in Concepcion vs. Presiding
Judge, etc., et al.,^[15]
that:

“Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief,
petitioner’s main contention is that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of Civil Case No. SM-243
and therefore, its decision dated December
18, 1969, as well as the writ of execution dated April 15, 1972 and the order of
demolition dated July 5, 1972
issued to implement said decision, were all null and void.  According to petitioner, the case involves an
agrarian dispute and an established tenancy relationship between the parties,
hence, it should fall squarely within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR).

“The contention is without merit.  It cannot be controverted
that the allegations of the Complaint filed by herein private respondents in
the court below (Civil Case No. SM-243) constitute a cause of action for ejectment and damages against petitioner.  Private respondents, as complainants therein,
claimed ownership over the parcel of land in question identified as Lot No.
2604-B but which was allegedly in the possession of petitioner who had been
unlawfully depriving them of their right to possess the property for several
years.  In other words, they filed an accion publiciana,
a plenary action for the recovery of possession of real property, properly
cognizable by the court of first instance. 
x x x The Court does
not lose nor is it deprived of its jurisdiction by a defense of tenancy but has
the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or
not it has jurisdiction (Evangelista vs. CAR Iloilo, et al., 109 Phil. 957).

“Thus, in the case at bar, petitioner’s defense of tenancy in
his Answer to private respondents’ complaint did not automatically divest the
lower court, a court of first instance, of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
SM-243.  It merely gave the court
authority to receive evidence to determine the tenability of the claim of
tenancy.  x x x.”

In the case at bar, the court a quo categorically
declared in its decision that the land is residential and, therefore, no
tenancy relation exists between the parties.  This was affirmed on appeal by respondent
court.  Such factual finding laid to rest
the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners in the first instance and
removed the case from the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 316.

3.  Petitioners further
claim that since the execution of the decision would result in the ejectment of a tenant-farmer, the ejectment
case should be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in accordance with
Memorandum Circular No. 29, Series of 1973, of said department.  Said memorandum circular provides:

“In the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 316, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 27, the following guidelines shall be
strictly observed.

I. CASES COVERED BY THE DECREE

1.  Those within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations;

a. 
Ejectment cases;

b. 
Other cases designed to harass or remove the tiller of the land and/or
the tenant-farmer.

2.  Those within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance or City or Municipal Court;

a.  Civil cases which involve question of
possession;

b.  Civil cases involving other issues where
there is allegation of tenancy relationship or actual cultivation and use of
the land appearing in the pleading of the plaintiff or defendant, or in the
records of the case.

x x
x

II. WHEN REFERRAL SHALL BE MADE

1.       With respect to
agrarian or civil cases newly filed or pending – at any stage of the
proceedings;

2.       With respect to
agrarian or civil cases submitted for decision or pending execution – before
decision is rendered or before execution of decision where such decision or
execution would result in the ejectment of the actual
tiller or the tenant-farmer in order to determine whether the defendant has
become a beneficiary or a recipient of a Land Transfer Certificate pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27.”

x x
x

It must be noted that the above circular speaks of “actual
tiller” and “tenant-farmer.” There is no question that only a tenant may
avail of the beneficent provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 29.

The essential requisites set by law for a tenancy relationship
are as follows:  (1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural
production; and (4) there is consideration. 
It is understood that there is consent to the tenant to work on the
land, there is personal cultivation by him and the consideration consists of
sharing the harvest.^[16]
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the
alleged tenant a de jure tenant
as contradistinguished from a de facto tenant.  Unless a person has established his status as
a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure.

Considering our earlier finding that the subject premises are
residential lands and, therefore, there is no tenancy relationship in this
case, the inescapable conclusion is that petitioners’ claims must be rejected.  Verily, even Memorandum Circular No. 29 finds
no proper application to the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, Branch III, dated October 10, 1974, is hereby AFFIRMED.  The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on March 12, 1975
is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 6.

^[2]
Id., Annex B; ibid.,
8.

^[3]
Id., Annex C; ibid.,
11.

^[4]
Id., Annex D; ibid.,
14.

^[5]
Id., Annex H; ibid.,
23.

^[6]
Id., Annex J; ibid., 27.

^[7]
Id., Annex L; ibid.,
42.

^[8]
Id., Annex M; ibid.,
48.

^[9]
Id., Annex N; ibid.,
54.

^[10]
Id., Annex O; ibid.,
58.

^[11]
Exhibit B, Rollo, 77.

^[12]
Comment, 7; id.

^[13]
156 SCRA 188 (1987).

^[14]
163 SCRA 39 (1988).

^[15]
119 SCRA 222 (1982).

^[16]
Hilario, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 148 SCRA 573 (1987).