MACARIA A. TORRES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO AND ADELINA NARCISO, RESPO…

Torres versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is the story of Macaria Torres, who claimed to be the legitimated daughter of Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, and who fought the Santillan and Narciso relatives over a parcel of land in Tanza, Cavite. The case began as two consolidated actions below: an ejectment case brought against Macaria, and her own action for partition of the lot. The Supreme Court's decision matters because it teaches when a document may be admitted as newly discovered evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and it gathers in one place the old Civil Code rules on legitimation, acknowledgment of natural children, and the effect of an amended complaint on a judicial admission.

Procedural History

The ejectment case was first decided by the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza against Macaria, who appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Her partition action was likewise filed before that court, and the two cases were jointly tried. On November 20, 1958, the Court of First Instance found the lot to be the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicated two thirds to the private respondents and one third to Macaria. Macaria moved for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned and the records of both cases were destroyed, though later partially reconstituted. On August 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance, Branch One, granted reconsideration, declared Macaria the legitimated child of the spouses, declared the lot conjugal partnership property, and adjudicated four sixths to Macaria and two sixths in equal shares to the Narciso heirs. The private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals reversed in part: it declared that Macaria was not the legitimated child, held the lot conjugal, and gave one half to Macaria and the other half to the Narciso heirs. Macaria filed a motion for reconsideration and for new trial, offering a sworn statement of her parents dated March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five denied both by a minute resolution on August 24, 1973. Macaria then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, treated as a special civil action.

Facts

Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan, and they had two children, Vicente and Antonina. Claro died, leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina later had six children, the Narcisos, who together with Vicente Santillan are the private respondents. After Claro's death, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole without benefit of marriage, and out of that cohabitation Macaria was born on June 20, 1898. One baptismal certificate named Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres as her parents and listed her as Macaria Arvisu, while another listed her as Macaria Torres with her father's name left blank. On June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres married. Macaria lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita died on December 20, 1931, and Leon died on September 14, 1933.

Lot 551 of the Santa Cruz de Malabon Estate, an urban lot of about 1,622 square meters, had been leased by the Government to Margarita Torres as actual occupant. On December 13, 1910, the Director of Lands issued to her Sale Certificate No. 222 at the price of 428 pesos and 80 centavos, payable in twenty annual installments of 20 pesos each. Testimony showed that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings, although the last installment was paid on December 17, 1936, three years after his death. On August 25, 1933, twenty days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred by notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one half portion of the lot in favor of Macaria for 300 pesos.

On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an affidavit claiming possession of the lot and asking that title be issued in his name. The Bureau of Lands then issued a patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was issued in their favor on November 7, 1957. On June 3, 1954, the private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry against Macaria. On June 8, 1954, Macaria filed her action for partition, claiming the lot was conjugal property of the spouses and that she was their legitimated child.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Macaria Torres is not the legitimated child of Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres.
• Whether or not the admission in the private respondents' original complaint in the ejectment case, that Macaria was a legal heir of Margarita Torres, bound them as a judicial admission despite the filing of an amended complaint.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying the petition for new trial based on the sworn statement of March 5, 1930.

Applicable Provisions

Article 121 of the old Civil Code provides:

Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.

This is the provision the Court of Appeals applied in ruling that Macaria was not legitimated, and which the Supreme Court says must be examined anew on the question of whether the sworn statement conforms to an act of acknowledgment after the marriage.

Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides:

The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.

This is the provision the Court of Appeals used to reject the baptismal certificate as proof of acknowledgment, and which the Supreme Court says must be resolved on new trial as to whether the sworn statement qualifies as a public document.

Article 133 of the old Civil Code provides:

An adult person may not be acknowledged as a natural child without his consent.

This bears on whether Macaria's signature as a witness to the sworn statement was the equivalent of the consent required for the acknowledgment of an adult person.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that, setting aside the sworn statement, Macaria cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents. The Court noted that continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the fact of delivery by the mother, and the like will not amount to automatic recognition; an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, and such an action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. The Court thus agreed with the Court of Appeals on this point.

On the second issue, the Court was not persuaded that the admission in the original complaint controlled. The private respondents had filed an amended complaint deleting the phrase making Macaria a legal heir, so that the statement simply read that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres. The amended complaint takes the place of the original; the original is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. Had Macaria wished to use the original complaint, she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, whose admissibility as evidence required its formal offer. There could therefore be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission for failure to offer it in evidence. The Court also noted that in the partition case the private respondents denied Macaria's legitimacy in their answer.

On the third issue, the Court held that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. Assuming the genuineness and due execution of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve vital considerations: whether the sworn statement qualifies as the public document prescribed in Article 131; whether it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121; and whether Macaria's signature as a witness was the equivalent of the consent necessary for the acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133. Affirmative answers would confer upon her the status of a legitimated child and entitle her to hereditary rights to her mother's estate. On the objection that she signed as a witness and so knew of the document, the Court held that the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during the trial even with due diligence, especially if it had really been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who allegedly suppressed it. In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by the respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Doctrine

First, legitimation by subsequent marriage under Article 121 requires an acknowledgment by the parents before or after the marriage, and under Article 131 that acknowledgment must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child does not by itself amount to recognition; compulsory recognition must be sought, and generally only during the lifetime of the putative parents.

Second, an amended complaint supersedes the original, which is deemed abandoned and ceases to function as a pleading. An admission in the original complaint, if not offered in evidence, is not a judicial admission but at most an extrajudicial admission, and no estoppel arises from it.

Third, a new trial may be granted on newly discovered evidence to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice, where the document could not have been produced at trial even with due diligence, as where it was allegedly in the possession of an adverse party who suppressed it.

Disposition

The case was remanded to the then Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and depending on its outcome, that Court was to resolve the respective participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an amended complaint supersedes the original, so an admission in the original is not a judicial admission unless offered in evidence. Examiners use this case for the requisites of legitimation and acknowledgment under the old Civil Code, and for the standard for newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.