RAYMUNDO ANCHETA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CALIXTO BLAZA AND CANUTO DAMASO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision* of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1972
dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner which sought the reversal of the
decision** of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch II-A, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
dated March 23, 1971 dismissing his complaint
for repossession of his land on the ground of personal cultivation; and the resolution dated
August 17, 1972 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are
as follows:

On March 2, 1970, plaintiff-petitioner Raymundo
Ancheta filed an action for ejectment
on the ground of personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth Regional
District, Branch II-A, Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija (Rollo, Annex
“A”, p. 9) against defendants-respondents Calixto
Blaza and Canuto Damaso who are agricultural lessees of landholdings
situated at Barrio Colosboa, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, with areas of
1 1/2 hectares and 3 hectares, respectively (Rollo,
Annex “B”, p. 19).

Plaintiff-petitioner alleges
in his complaint that he is the owner and landholder of those
landholdings under agricultural leasehold by defendants-respondents; that he
desires and intends to personally cultivate the aforesaid landholdings, with
the aid of members of his immediate family, and that defendants-respondents
were notified in writing at least one agricultural year previous to the filing
of the action (Rollo, Annex “A”, p. 9).

Defendants-respondents filed their joint answers admitting that
plaintiff-petitioner is their agricultural lessor-owner.  Canuto Damaso admits that he was duly notified as alleged in the
complaint while Calixto Blaza
denies having received any such notice.  As a special defense, defendants-respondents
aver that plaintiff-petitioner was
motivated by vindictiveness in seeking to eject defendants-respondents from
their respective landholdings (Rollo, Annex
“B”, p. 20).

At the pre-trial, the
parties entered into the following stipulations:

“1. 
Stipulations of facts:

“a) That the
plaintiff is the owner-agricultural-lessor of the landholding in question, while the
defendants are the agricultural lessees thereon;

“b) That the
area of defendant Calixto Blaza’s
landholding is 1 1/2 hectares while that of
Canuto Damaso’s landholding
is 3 hectares, both located at Barrio Colosboa, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
which has been declared as Land Reform Area on May 13, 1968;

“c) That the defendants admit that the landholding in question
is covered by TCT No. NT-26924 in the name of the plaintiff;

“d) That the defendants were notified of the bona fide
intention of the plaintiff for personal cultivation, but they deny its
validity.

“2. 
The only issue to be resolved is:

“Whether the plaintiff should be allowed to personally
cultivate the landholdings in question.” (Ibid.)

After due trial, the court
a quo rendered its decision,
the dispositive part of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit, with costs against the plaintiff.

IT IS SO
ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 16).

Ancheta appealed to the Court of Appeals, which appeal
was denied in a decision dated April
19, 1972, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed for
lack of cause of action in view of the provisions of Section 7, Republic Act
No. 6389, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 26-27).

Hence, this petition for review, which was previously denied for
non-compliance with the Rules requiring: 
(a) the submission of the record on appeal as filed in the Court of
Appeals; and (b) the verification of the petition, by this Court in a 15 September 1972 resolution (Rollo, Resolution, p. 38). 
Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the said order of denial (Rollo,
pp. 39-40).  On 2 October 1972, this Court gave due course to the
instant petition (Rollo, Resolution, p. 43).

On November 7, 1972,
petitioner filed his brief (Rollo, p. 47).  With the private respondents failing to file
their brief within the extended period which expired on January 6, 1973, the
Court resolved to consider the case submitted for decision without said
respondents’ brief (Rollo, p.  53).

In his brief, petitioner made the following assignments of error:

1.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HEREIN ACTED IN BAD FAITH;

2.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PREMATURELY
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN AND/OR HIS FARM HOUSEHOLD IS INCAPABLE TO PERFORM PERSONAL CULTIVATION;

3.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS DISPUTABLE
WHETHER DIONISIO ANCHETA, APPELLANT’S FORMER PROTEGEE, WHO IS NOW
MARRIED AND LIVING SEPARATELY FROM HIM IS WILLING TO PERSONALLY ATTEND TO THE
CULTIVATION OF SAID PROPERTIES;
AND

4.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6389 HAS RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

(Brief for the Petitioner, p.1, Rollo, p. 47)

The primary issue to be resolved
in this case, is whether or not
petitioner has the right to eject private respondents on the ground of personal
cultivation under Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 (as amended).

The petition is without
merit.

The Court of Appeals,
evidently erred in applying retroactively Republic Act No. 6389 particularly
with respect to personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment.  It is well-settled that R.A. 6389, which removed
personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of tenant/lessee, cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or
a clear implication of the law to that effect (Castro v. Castro, 128 SCRA 519
[1984]; Diga v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421 [1984];
Gallardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 [1988]; Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
[1989]).

However, we cannot ignore the undisputed findings of the agrarian
court which remained undisturbed by the Court of Appeals that petitioner was in
bad faith because Raymundo Ancheta
is economically well off and is old and sickly and cannot work on the land
himself.  Dionisio
Ancheta from whom he expects help, is now married and
living separately from Raymundo.  It was also found that Raymundo
was motivated by hatred and vindictiveness against private respondent Canuto Damaso whom he blamed for
the loss of his carabao.  These findings are supported by substantial
evidence on record particularly in his rebuttal testimony on October 20, 1970 (Original T.S.N.,
pp. 68-70), which are sufficient in this case being an agrarian case where
all that is required is mere substantial evidence (Castro v. Court of Appeals,
169 SCRA 383 [1989]).  While petitioner
correctly pointed out that a presumption of bona fide
intention is inherent in the filing of an action for personal cultivation under
Section 36(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, still like other disputable
presumptions, the same can be overcome by evidence to the contrary; such as the
facts brought out during the trial, showing bad faith and malice.  Judicial notice should be taken of the
pernicious practice of many landowners who resort to filing cases of ejectment against their
tenants based on personal cultivation in
retaliation to harass tenants who were determined to enforce the rights
granted them by law.

More than that, on both justiciable and
equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian justice, has generally
upheld the tenants’ security of tenure (Primero v.
Court of Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil. 675 [1957]; Pineda v. De Guzman, 21 SCRA
1450 [1967]; Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA
294 [1972]) or the right of the tenant to
the enjoyment and possession of his farmholding
which has been created, conferred, protected and guaranteed by the police power
of the state in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution expressed in
Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution (as well as in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions).  In pursuance thereof,
the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help small farmers and to
uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of
living.  The law further protects them by
conferring upon them security of tenure over the landholding they work on.  Thus, it has been held that the leasehold
relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract or by the sale, alienation, transfer or conveyance of the legal
possession of the landholding.  The
tenant can only be ejected by the Court for cause (Code
of Agrarian Reform of the Philippines with Notes and Comments, Venerando L. Agustin, pp. 26-45, 1981 edition; De Jesus v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 175 SCRA 559 [1989]), and such cause for dispossession
must be proven and justified.

In the light of the foregoing, it is this Court’s duty to protect
the poor tenants/agricultural lessees against the harassment and vindictiveness
of their landlord, thus giving substance to the security of tenure provisions
of our law.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED except as to the application of Republic Act No. 6389 which should
be prospective merely (that is, not retroactive).

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

* CA G.R. No. 00057-R decision
penned by Associate Justice Manuel P. Barcelona with Associate Justices Ramon Nolasco and Guillermo Santos, concurring and Associate
Justices Lourdes San Diego and Ruperto G. Martin, dissenting.

** Presided by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao.