BERNARDO O. SALAZAR, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MRS. EMILIANA LIBRES DE CASTRODES, ET. AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

To the legitimate defense of one’s rights, as Von Jhering
pointed out, may be attributed the growth and progress of the law.  That is worthy of admiration and
commendation.  Stubbornness in refusing
to acknowledge the rights of others, even if managed with a certain degree of
adroitness by invoking grounds apparently with colorable support in legal
principles, is something else again. 
Unless characterized and stigmatized for the obstacle it thus presents
to the efficient adminis­tration of justice, the law itself stands in
disrepute.  What distinguishes this case,
if that is the appropriate term, is the persistence that marks the efforts of
defendants-appellants to delay further, if not to render futile, plaintiff-appellee’s enjoyment of his rights to a piece of land.  They were not even deterred from taking up
the time and energy of this Court by appealing, osten­sibly relying on legal
questions that can be character­ized at best as trivial and insubstantial.  Such conduct, to put
it at its mildest, is far from praiseworthy and must be treated as such.

In this complaint to quiet title to a parcel of land planted with
coconuts and having an area of more than two hectares situated in Guindulman, Bohol, plaintiff, now
appellee Bernardo O. Salazar, alleged that he
acquired the same on July 28, 1941 from Bienvenido C.
Libres, brother of the defendants, now appellants,^[1]
in this case.^[2]
It was then recited that plaintiff “had been in open, public, continuous
and peaceful possession of the land above-described, exercising complete
dominion over it, enjoying its fruits, and religiously paying its taxes, in the
concept of an exclusive possessor and absolute owner thereof since July 28,
1941 when the instrument of sale was executed by said Bienvenido
C. Libres, until August 24, 1960 or thereabouts when
said Bienvenido C. Libres,
with neither legal right nor valid reason whatsoever, and employing threat and intimidation, claimed ownership over
the land [in question], and gathered coconuts and bamboos found within said land,
to the actual damage of the plaintiff.”^[3]

As a result,
plaintiff instituted, on October 1,
1960, a civil case^[4]
for the recovery of ownership and possession before the Court of First Instance
of Bohol.  The
decision was rendered on May 9, 1962,
declaring the plaintiff as owner of such parcel of land and ordering the
defendants to vacate and deliver its possession to him.^[5]
Then, on July 16, 1962, a writ
of execution was issued pending appeal in such case, directing the Provincial
Sheriff of Bohol to deliver such parcel of land to
the plaintiff, but when such official sought to comply with such writ of
execution, defendants asserted an interest in such property claiming it to be a part of their individual
inheritance left them by their deceased father, Alipio
Libres.  Such
an adverse claim was a surprise
to the plaintiff as no such representation had ever been made since 1941 when
he acquired the same from their brother, whose sale thereof was not unknown to
them.  Moreover, defendants never
bothered to intervene in the civil case
for recovery of the possession which, as noted, was decided in favor of
plaintiff.^[6]

Hence, this action to quiet title, with plaintiff praying that
the claim of defendants to the property in question be declared illegal and
unfounded and that he be recognized as
the legal absolute owner thereof with a plea likewise for attorney’s
fees, damages and costs of the suit.

Defendants first filed a third-party complaint, on February 18, 1963, to have their
brother, Bienvenido C. Libres,
included as a third-party
defendant.  Then, four days later, they
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that there was no cause of action, that
there was pending before the Court of Appeals another action between plaintiff
and defendants ignoring the fact that in this appeal then pending, the only
defendant was their brother Bienvenido C. Libres and, with a
fine disregard of logic, asserting likewise that plaintiff was guilty of
splitting one cause of action.  It
sufficed for a one-page order, dated March
13, 1963, for the lower court to deny such a motion to
dismiss.  Then came
the answer on March 18, 1963,^[7]
their main defense being that the property in question forms part of the
undivided intestate estate of their father, Alipio Libres, the sale thereof by their brother to plaintiff
being null, void and ficti­tious.

Why such a defense
could not prosper is explained clearly in the decision of December 14, 1965, vindicating the right of
plaintiff as the absolute owner
of the parcel of land in question. 
Thus:  “During the trial of
the case, the parties in this case, that is the plaintiff, defendants and third
party defendants, stipu­lated and introduced as evidence, the records of Civil
Case No. 1380, together with the testimonial evidence embodied in the
transcript of stenographic notes * * *. 
Pending resolution of this case by this Court, the Court of Appeals had
decided that [CA-G.R. No. 32569-R] which was the appealed Case No.1380 of this
Court, between Bernardo O. Salazar as plaintiff-appellee and Bienvenido C. Libres as defendant-appellant, confirming the decision of
the lower court and declaring that the plaintiff-appellee
Bernardo O. Salazar is the owner of the parcel of land described in the
complaint which is the same parcel of land in question in this case before
us.  Likewise, the Court of Appeals
declared the deed of sale * * * then executed by Bienvenido
C. Libres in favor of Bernardo O. Salazar as valid and legal.”^[8]

An appeal from such judgment was taken directly to this
Court.  Only questions of law can thus be
raised, defendants, now appellants, being bound by the
findings of facts.^[9]
On the above decisive facts, it is not surprising at all that success should
crown the efforts of plaintiff and that the claim of defendants to the property
in question should be considered as nothing but a form of harrassment being totally
bereft of any support in law.

Nonetheless, as pointed
out at the outset, defend­ants did appeal and, as appellants, would seek to
impugn the correctness of the decision of the lower court by alleging errors,
which on their face, are clearly devoid of merit.  They are that the lower court erred in
denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, in applying the judgment in a
previous action in personam to the case
at bar which is also an action in personam,
and in making a finding of
partition of a hereditary estate by relying solely on a deed of sale which was
executed by one heir without the knowledge or consent of the other co-heirs.

Even if the motion to dismiss were not as untenable as it clearly
was, still it would be too late to raise it on appeal after it was shown that
during the trial of the case defendants did stipulate with plaintiff that they
would be bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals in the other civil case
filed by plaintiff against their brother, the third-party defendant.  Nor could they raise the question implicit in
the third assignment of error as it
is a matter factual in char­acter,
and our appellate jurisdiction, as made clear, is limited to deciding questions of law.  Appellants should not have ignored so
elementary a proposition.  Their second alleged error, setting forth as their grievance that a judgment in
a personal action should not be
applied to the case at bar, which is another personal action, could have
required a certain degree of consideration were it not for the fact, as pointed out above, that they did
agree to be bound by the result of the decision of the Court of Appeals in such
case then pending before it.

It is thus apparent that on its face the brief for
defendants-appellants is notable only for its flagrant and obvious disregard of
what the proprieties, not to say the decencies, of such a serious matter as an appeal to this Tribunal
requires.  Even if due regard be had for
the state of mind under which claimants to a piece of land, possessed of more
than an ordinary degree of obduracy, might be laboring under, still respect for
the rule of law ought to have cautioned defendants in attempting, perhaps
thoughtlessly, to delay unduly the termination of a pending litigation and thus accord respect to the just claims
of others.

Nor is their counsel free from blame when he could have informed
them not only about the futility of such efforts, which was bad enough, but
also the barrier thus interposed against a fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice.  As a member
of the bar and an officer of the court, he owes such minimum obligation to this
Tribunal.  Unfortunately, he failed to
live up to it.  He should not escape
responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of December 14,
1965 is affirmed, with the modification that the defendants should pay
attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,500.00.  Treble costs should be charged defendants,
payable by their counsel, Attorney Lilio L. Amora.

Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., in the result.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
did not take part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.

^[1]
The defendants are Mrs. Emiliana Libres
de Castrodes, Mrs. Eufronia
Libres de Bernaldez, Mrs.
Francisca Libres de Piezas,
Mrs. Maria Libres de Amora,
Mrs. Leona Libres de Bonita, Dr. Guillermo Libres, Mr. Antonino Libres, and Mrs. Asuncion Libres
de Ramirez.

^[2] Record on Appeal, pp. 2 and 3.

^[3] Ibid, pp. 3 and 4.

^[4] Civil Case No. 1380.

^[5] Record on Appeal, pp. 4 and 5.

^[6] Ibid, pp. 5 and 6.

^[7] Ibid,
pp. 30 to 33.

^[8] Ibid, pp. 52 and 53.

^[9]
Perez v. Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968.  Citing Portea v.
Pabellon, 84 Phil. 298 (1949) and Republic v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corp., L-21749, Sept. 29, 1967.