BAY VIEW HOTEL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MANILA HOTEL WORKERS’ UNION-PTGWO, HONORABLES JOSE S. BAUTISTA, ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA AND AMANDO C. BUGAYONG, JUDGES …

Following are the grievances lodged in the Court of Industrial Relations
(herein referred to as CIR)^[1] by
respondent union against petitioner, Bay View Hotel, Inc., on September 27,
1962, viz:

“3. That the respondent [petitioner herein], in violation of Commonwealth Act
No. 444, better known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, has not been paying full
overtime compensation to the employees who have worked and have been working for
more than eight hours a day due to the exigency of the service and those also
who have worked and have been working on Sundays and legal holidays;

4. That the respondent, in violation of Sec. 10, letters (f) and (g), of
Republic Act No. 602, better known as the Minimum Wage Law, has been deducting
the amount of P2.00 from each employee every month allegedly for medical fees
thus reducing the salaries of the employees without the consent of the employees
concerned;

5. That the respondent has not also been paying or has not been refunding in
full to the employees concerned the collection from the customers of the Manila
Hotel of the extra ‘service charge’ in lieu of ‘tips’ to the waiters or roomboys
and which therefore are supposed to be paid to said employees but respondent has
not been able to pay or refund in full said collection to the employees
concerned;

6. That the respondent has not been complying with the grant of vacation
leave of three (3) days a year in accord- ance with the Collective Bargaining
Contract between the respondent and the Hotel Employees Union, another union in
the respondent premises which is the collective bargaining agency in the
Collective Bargaining Contract with the respondent;

7. That the respondent has been dismissing many of the members of the
petitioner union since the organization and registration of the petitioner
herein with the Department of Labor on May 31, 1962 beginning with the dismissal
of the Treasurer, Ramiro Zamora, and Manuel Braga, board member, on the same
date and thereafter, has dismissed and has been dismissing from the service its
employees who are members of the petitioner union without just cause or for
union activities up to this date, numbering 65 employees in all, 41 of whom were
refused admission by an illegal lock-out in the Laundry Department of the
respondent on August 26, 1962, and [of] the Bamboo Room on September 10, 1962,
whose names and dates of dismissal are herewith attached as Annex ‘A’ and made a
part of this petition;”

On January 16, 1963, petitioner moved to dismiss. Grounds: (1) CIR has no
jurisdiction; and (2) the dismissals and lockout alleged, constitutive of unfair
labor practice, are the subject matter of Case 3387-ULP before another branch of
the CIR.

On March 11, 1963, CIR Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne sustained the motion,
dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.

On August 15, 1963, the CIR en banc resolved to reverse Judge
Tabigne’s order. It declared itself with jurisdiction “under the Com. Act No.
103, and the ruling in the Prisco case” since “the number of the complainants
involved exceeds thirty (30), they are still employees of the respondent, their
claims arose out of employment relation, and the labor dispute may cause a
strike or lock-out”. The court gave due course to the complaint. As expected.
Judge Tabigne dissented. Petitioner now brings this matter to us on
certiorari.

1. Petitioner’s case is planted upon the averment that respondent’s causes of
   action are not covered by any one of those enumerated in the 1956 case of PAFLU
   vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, 882. There, this Court confined the CIR’s jurisdiction to
   the following cases:

   “x x x (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable
   to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial
   court (Section 10, Republic Act No. 875); (2) when the controversy refers to
   minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602); (3) when it
   involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act
   No. 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Section 5, (a).
   Republic Act No. 875].”

   But the court below asserted
   jurisdiction on the authority of PRISCO vs. CIR, et al., L-13806, May 23, I960.
   In that case, this Court reviewed the cases decided since PAFLU and then stated:

   “Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all of
   them, though not stated in express terms, is that where the employer-employee
   relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its
   wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of
   Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in
   connection with employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and
   the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the relationship and no
   reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within
   the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

   We are aware that in 2 cases,^[2] some
   statements implying a different view have been made, but we now hold and declare
   the principles set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one governing
   all cases of this nature.”

   Then, amongst the many cases thereafter, restatements
   were made in Sy Huan vs. Bautista, et al., L-16115, August 29, 1961, and Campos,
   etal., vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., L-17905, May 25, 1962. In Sy
   Huan, we said:

   “The jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, under the law and the
   jurisprudence, extends only to cases involving (a) labor disputes affecting an
   industry which is indispensable to the national interest and so certified by the
   President to the Court, Section 10, Republic Act No. 875; (b) controversy about
   the minimum wage under the Minimum”Wage Law, Republic Act No. 602; (c) hours of
   employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act No. 444; and (d)
   unfair labor practice. Section 5 (a) Republic Act No. 875. PAFLUvs. Tan, 52 O.G.
   5836. xxx And such disputes and controversies, in order that they may fall under
   the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, must arise while the
   employer-employee relationship between the parties exists, or the employee seeks
   reinstatement. When such relationship is over and the employee does not seek
   reinstatement, all claims become money claims that fall under the jurisdiction
   of the regular courts. Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial
   Relations, et al, x x x”.

   And in Campos, the language we employed was:

   “We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and the
   bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
   jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875, the
   following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the
   parties an employer-employee relationship, or the claimant must seek his
   reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the
   President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must have a bearing
   on an unfair labor practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour
   Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these
   circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the
   jurisdiction of the regular courts.”

   Later pronouncements reiterate the Campos case. As matters now stand, the
   doctrine enunciated in Campos still prevails.^[3

2. A rule so highly esteemed and honored for so long a time is that
   jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
   complaint,^[4] the truth of which is to be
   theoretically admitted.^[5]

   With this precept on hand, we now proceed to analyze the recitals in the
   petition.

   There is an employer-employee relationship. And those dismissed seek
   reinstatement. The initial requirement of the Campos rule is thus satisfied.

   Next we go to the claims of respondent union.

   The first refers to a violation of Commonwealth Act 444. Petitioner herein,
   so the union asserts, “has not been paying full overtime compensation to the
   employees” who worked more than eight hours a day and also on Sundays and
   holidays.

   The second involves a transgression of Republic Act 602. Petitioner, it is
   alleged, “has been deducting the amount of P2.00 from each employee every month
   allegedly for medical fees thus reducing the salaries of the employees” without
   their consent.

   These two fall clearly within the orbit of the Campos decision. For, they are
   claims that “arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum
   Wage Law”.^[6]

   Another claim: The alleged dismissals of union members, including union
   officials, numbering 65 in all, and lockout of 41 of that number — “without just
   cause or for union activities”. This is an unfair labor practice charge^[7] over which the CIR unquestionably has
   jurisdiction.^[8]

   We are not unmindful of the admission made by the respondent union in its
   opposition of January 19, 1963 — to the motion to dismiss — that “the dismissal
   and lockout made by respondent [petitioner herein], as alleged in the complaint,
   have been duly investigated by the Prosecuting Division” of the CIR “and
   assigned to another branch” of said court as Case No. 3387-ULP.^[9] This fact alone will not dislodge
   jurisdiction from the CIR. The complaint in the case at bar, we must remember,
   was presented on September 27, 1962, long before the union made the admission
   aforesaid on January 19, 1963. And, it is not known whether ULP case was filed
   before the present complaint was received in court. Or, whether said ULP case
   was but an offshoot of that complaint. If the latter be the case, then the
   charge of unfair labor practice here is necessarily interwoven with the ULP
   case. And, said charge, should not be dismissed. Because, jurisdiction once
   acquired is not lost.

   Two grievances remain.

   One is that petitioner “has not been refunding in full” to the waiters and
   roomboys the amounts collected from customers as extra “service charge” in lieu
   of “tips”. The other is that petitioner has failed to comply “with the grant of
   vacation leave of three (3) days a year in accordance with the Collective
   Bargaining Contract”.

   Whether the two causes just mentioned, standing alone, belong to the domain
   of the CIR, we need not now consider. The industrial court has jurisdiction over
   the main causes of action with respect to rninimum wage, overtime compensation
   and unfair labor practice. Which places the complaint herein in its entirety,
   including the two, within the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Because,
   all of said claims arose out of the same employment.

3. But, petitioner takes the position that jurisdiction over one is not
   jurisdiction over all.

This Court, however, already had occasion to rule in a case^[10] similar in factual context to the present,
as follows:

“x x x But considering that in this case, plaintiff-appellant’s main claim is
for the collection of overtime compensation, which comes within the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Court, We see no reason for dividing the 2 causes of action,
involved herein and for holding that one falls within the jurisdiction of one
court and the remaining cause of action of another court, x x
x”

We find reinforcement of this view in PRISCO, supra, where
express pronouncement was made that as long as the employer-employee
relationship exists or is sought to be re-established, the industrial court “has
jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with,
employment”.^[11]

We are unprepared to break away from the teaching in the cases just adverted
to. To draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor
litigations. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to
multiplicity of suits. To force the employees to shuttle from one court to
another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. The time to
be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense incurred — these
are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is
more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of
action here “be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of Industrial
Relations.”^[12]

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorar is hereby
denied and the appealed resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en
banc of August 15, 1963 is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner Bay
View Hotel, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.

---

^[1] Case No. 1755-V, entitled “Manila
Hotel Workers’ Union-PTGWO, petitioner, vs. Bay View Hotel, Inc., operator of
the Manila Hotel, respondent”.

^[2]
Mindanao Eus Employees Labor Union (PLUM) vs. Mindanao Bus Co., et al., L-9795,
December 28, 1957; Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18,
1958.

^[3] Naguiat vs. Arcilla, et
al., L-16602, February 28, 1963; Araullo vs. Monte de Piedad Savings Bank, et
al., L-17840, April 23, 1963; Barranta vs. International Harvester Company of
the Philippines, L-18198, April 22, 1963; National Mines & Allied Workers’
Union vs. Philippine Iron Mines, Inc., et al., L-19372, October 31, 1964;
Mercado vs. Elizalde & Co., Inc., L-18962, December 23, 1964; Oriental Tin
Cans Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-17695, February
26, 1965; Edward J. Nell Corporation vs. Cubacub, et al., L-20842, June 23,
1965.

^[4] Suanes vs. Almeda Lopez,
73 Phil. 573-574; Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila, Inc., etc. vs.
Olivar, et al., L-19526, September 20, 1965.

^[5] Insular Sugar Refining Corporation vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-19247; May 31, 1963; Edward J. Nell
Corporation vs. Cubacub, et al., supra.

^[6] (a) As to overtime compensation, see also:
NASSCO vs. Almin, et al., L-9055, November 28, 1958; Monares vs. CNS
Enterprises, et al., L-11749, May 29, 1959. (b) On the question of propriety of
deductions made from wages, see Benguet Consolidated Mining Company vs. Coto
Labor Union, L-12394, May 29, 1959.

^[7] Section 4 (a) (4), Industrial Peace
Act.

^[8] Section 5, Industrial
Peace Act.

^[9] Quoted from the
Order of Judge Tabigne dated March 11, 1963.

^[10] Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co.,
Inc., L-11945, August 18, 1958, which involves two claims: separation pay
and overtime compensation. See also; Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 938.

^[11] Italics supplied.

^[12] Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co.,
supra.