PABLO DE JESUS, ENGRACIA DE JESUS AND MANUELA DE JESUS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH I; THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPIN…

De Jesus versus Garcia

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought directly before the Supreme Court by Pablo de Jesus, Engracia de Jesus, and Manuela de Jesus against Judge Gregorio Garcia of the City Court of Manila and against their co-owner Maxima de Jesus and the Shell Company of the Philippines. The petitioners ask the Court to strike down two orders of the city court: the denial of their motion to dismiss, and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that compelled Shell to keep paying the rentals through Maxima de Jesus alone. The case matters because it is a clean lesson on two jurisdictional truths: that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law and cannot be fixed by the will or acquiescence of the parties, and that a city court has no power to hear a suit for specific performance or for final injunction, and therefore no power to issue an ancillary writ of injunction in such a suit.

Procedural History

Maxima de Jesus, assisted by her husband, filed a complaint in the City Court of Manila against her co-owners and against Shell. On the strength of that complaint, the respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the writ on jurisdictional grounds. The city court denied the motion to dismiss, and later denied the motion for reconsideration. Instead of appealing, the petitioners came straight to the Supreme Court by an original action of certiorari and prohibition, raising the jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court issued a cease-and-desist order and then decided the petition on the merits.

Facts

Ten persons, among them the petitioners and Maxima de Jesus, are co-owners of six parcels of land along Espana, P. Campa, and Adelina Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Maxima de Jesus served as administratrix and attorney-in-fact of the co-owners, with a stipulated compensation of ten percent of the rentals. Each co-owner signed a monthly receipt acknowledging that ten percent had been deducted for her administration fee and expenses.

The lessee of the property was Shell. The original lease was renewed in January 1966, and through the efforts of Maxima de Jesus the monthly rentals were raised from 850 pesos to 3,500 pesos for the first ten years and to 4,000 pesos for the next five years. Shell paid by a check drawn in the name of Maxima de Jesus, who then distributed the shares of the co-owners. On the basis of 3,500 pesos monthly, the petitioners' combined shares came to 1,850 pesos and 80 centavos, and the ten percent claimed by Maxima de Jesus on those shares came to 185 pesos and 8 centavos monthly.

In October 1966, according to the complaint, the petitioners sought to deprive Maxima de Jesus of her ten percent compensation and instructed Shell to pay their shares directly to them. Maxima de Jesus then sued, praying that Shell be ordered to keep the existing manner of payment and that the petitioners be ordered to pay her the ten percent, deducted from their shares. The city court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Shell from changing the manner of payment, and Shell delivered the October 1966 rental to Maxima de Jesus.

Issues

• Whether or not the City Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, which in substance sought specific performance of contract.
• Whether or not the City Court of Manila had the power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, and to hear a case for final injunction, against Shell.
• Whether or not the city court could retain jurisdiction on the theory that the claim against the co-owners was merely a money claim of 185 pesos and 8 centavos.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 58, on who may grant a preliminary injunction, provides:

SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district.

The respondents relied on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending," but the Court read that phrase in context with the last sentence, which shows that the city court cannot grant the writ except where a statute specifically authorizes it.

Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, on the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, is the provision the Court invokes when it holds that specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation and that final injunction belongs to the Court of First Instance. The Court states the rule in these words:

For, specific performance - the subject of the litigation - "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".

This is the statutory language that removes the case from the city court and places it in the Court of First Instance.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the city court had no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties, nor acquired, waived, enlarged, or diminished by any act or omission of the parties, nor conferred by acquiescence of the court. The averments of the complaint taken as a whole determine the nature of the action. Reading the complaint as a whole, Maxima de Jesus was asking that Shell continue the former manner of payment and that the co-owners pay her the ten percent as agreed. That is an action for specific performance of contract, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction lies in the Court of First Instance. The Court relied on its earlier ruling that a prayer for payment of a sum does not give a pecuniary estimation to the litigation when the payment can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance primarily sought.

On the second issue, the Court held that the city court had no power to issue the writ. The law grants the power to issue final injunction expressly to Courts of First Instance in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, and historically the power of city courts to issue preliminary injunction was limited to forcible entry cases. The Court rejected the argument based on Section 2 of Rule 58: first, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the city court was powerless to grant an ancillary remedy; second, the last sentence of the rule shows that the city court cannot grant the writ except where specifically authorized by statute; and third, absent an explicit grant, no expansive construction can confer the jurisdiction.

On the third issue, the Court held that even if the claim against the co-owners were treated as a money claim of 185 pesos and 8 centavos, the city court still had no jurisdiction, because the money claim cannot be divorced from the injunction suit. Without a mandatory injunction to Shell, the certainty of collecting the compensation would be problematical. The action is indivisible, and the jurisdiction of the city court must yield to that of the Court of First Instance. The Court also noted that the breach charged was total and indivisible, so only one action for specific performance could be brought, and successive actions could not be maintained.

Doctrine

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties, cannot be acquired through or waived, enlarged, or diminished by any act or omission of the parties, and is not conferred by acquiescence of the court. The averments of the complaint taken as a whole determine the nature of the action and therefore the court's jurisdiction. An action for specific performance of contract is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not the city court. A city court has no power to issue a writ of preliminary injunction except in the cases where a statute specifically authorizes it, such as forcible entry, and having no jurisdiction over the subject matter it cannot grant an ancillary remedy. A money claim that cannot be divorced from an injunction suit does not save the city court's jurisdiction, because the action is indivisible.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition, declared the preliminary injunction it had issued final, and directed the city court to dismiss the civil case, with costs against the respondents other than the respondent judge.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law, and specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation, so it belongs to the Court of First Instance. Examiners use this case to test the nature-of-the-action rule, the limits on a city court's power to issue injunctions, and the indivisibility of a suit that combines specific performance with a money claim.