SPS. SERAPIO SAN DIEGO AND ASUNCION BALAJADIA, RODANTE SAN DIEGO AND LILIA S.D. CHAVEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON, JUDGE, BRANCH XXII, COURT OF FIRST INSTA…

 This is the second case
where an order of a lower court judge, respondent Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon in this instance, in an expropriation proceeding
allowing immediate possession, the other respondent this time being the
Republic of the Philippines,
upon compliance with the applicable Presidential Decrees,^[1] is
assailed as having been issued either in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.  The challenged
order of January 26, 1977 reads as follows: 
“Acting on plaintiff’s ‘Manifestation and Motion’ dated November
10, 1976 as well as that dated December 15, 1976, the latter motion having attached
to it an amended estimate of the costs of damages on oppositor’s
properties, and it appearing that the requirements of both Presidential Decrees
Nos. 42 and 76 have been complied with, and since the defenses raised by
defendants in their opposition and answer are proper during the trial on the
merits, plaintiff is hereby authorized to take possession of the property
sought to be expropriated, after depositing with the Philippine National Bank
in the name of defendants the additional amount of P138.69, representing the
difference in appraisal.”^[2]
In the other case, Arce v. Genato,^[3]
such an issue had to be resolved as the immediate possession of the property
sought to be expropriated by respondent Municipality
of Baliangao
of Misamis Occidental was allowed by respondent Judge
Genato.  In
dismissing such petition, this Court held: 
“Presidential Decree No. 42 speaks categorically.  It is thereby decreed and ordered ‘as part of
the law of the land that, upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent
domain proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and after due notice to the
defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession
of the real property involved if he deposits with the Philippine National Bank,
in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by said
bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court.’ The decree,
issued on November 9, 1972,
was to ‘take effect immediately.’ It is beyond question that such a decree is
included within the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.  So it is therein expressly provided:  ‘All proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding,
and effective even after lifting the martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or
unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly.’ Deference to it, as is to be expected, has been accorded by this
Court.  The task, therefore, of assailing
a lower court order in compliance therewith, made a part of the law of the land
by the Constitution itself, is one attended with extreme difficulty.  That is why on its face, the weakness of the
petition is rather apparent.”^[4]
So it must be likewise in this case.

There is no dispute as to the facts.  The Republic of the Philippines,
on October 29, 1976,
started expropriation proceedings with a complaint against the spouses Serapio San Diego and Asuncion Balajadia,
Rodante San Diego, and Lilia S. D. Chavez, now
petitioners, filed with the sala of respondent
Judge.  The property sought to be
condemned covering 642 square meters, situated in the municipality
of Morong,
Rizal, would form part of a national highway, the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road
(Manila East Road), 2nd
IBRD Project.  It was alleged in such
complaint that upon the filing thereof and with due notice to the defendants,
“the plaintiff is authorized to take and enter into the possession of the
properties involved, upon deposit made with the Philippine National Bank, at
its main office or at any of its branches or agencies, of the amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the subject properties for purposes of taxation, to be
held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court
(Presidential Decree No. 42).”^[5]
It was also set forth in such complaint that for taxation purposes as computed
in accordance with the rate provided for under Presidential Decree No. 76, the
value of such property is P2,889.00.^[6]
There was likewise mention of its being needed for the construction of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road
(Manila East Road), 2nd
IBRD Project.^[7]
Then came as part of the prayer a plea for the issuance of an order or writ
authorizing it to take possession of the parcels of land in question and
appropriate the same for public use, upon the sum of P2,889.00 being deposited
with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or
agencies pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42.^[8]
Thereafter, on November 10, 1976, a manifestation and motion of the Republic of
the Philippines alleging that it has deposited with the Philippine National
Bank, Pasig Branch, the amount of P5,848.00
representing the assessed value for taxation purposes of the lands sought to be
expropriated and the “value of the affected improve­ments thereon,”
was filed with the lower court, with the prayer “that an order be issued
authorizing [it] to take possession of said properties sought to be
expropriated and appropriate the same for public use.”^[9]
Petitioners as defendants in an ex-parte motion
sought deferment of the resolution of the plea for issuance of a writ of
possession, on the ground that there had been no independent assessment by the
Provincial Assessor of Rizal of the improvements on
the lands in question pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 76, the deposit
requirement of Presidential Decree No. 42 not hav­ing been complied with.^[10]
Respondent Judge granted such motion in an order of November 24, 1976 deferring resolution of the
plea by the Republic for the issuance of a writ of possession until it could be
shown that the requirements of the aforesaid Presidential decrees were complied
with.^[11]
There were further proceedings, respondent Judge even conducting an ocular
inspection and deferring action on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Republic, understandably convinced with the immediate possession of the land
needed until there be an amended estimate of the damages to be incurred by
petitioners.  So it was set forth in an
order of December 8, 1976.^[12]
Subsequently, on December 15, 1976, respondent Republic filed a manifestation
and motion praying that having submitted an amended estimate of the value of
the improvements of the land in question in the amount of P3,097.39, or an
increase of P138.39 over the previous appraisal, an order be issued authorizing
it (Republic) to take possession of the properties involved after it shall have
deposited the additional amount of P138.39.^[13]
There was an opposition on the part of petitioners.^[14]
It was not until a month later, on January
26, 1977 to be exact, that the order, subject of this certiorari
proceeding, was issued.

It was the submission of Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza^[15]
in his comment treated as the answer that the requisites of Presidential Decree
No. 42 having been fully complied with, there being filed in the proper court a
complaint for expropriation with the deposit in the Philippine National Bank of
an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of
the court, as well as the notice to the defendant, the order cannot be impugned
on the ground that the court acted either in excess or with grave abuse of
discretion.  Independently, therefore, of
the authoritative ruling in the aforesaid Arce v. Genato decision, there would be no justification for
sustaining the claim of petitioners.  Certiorari,
as noted at the outset, does not lie.

1. There is insistence on the part of petitioners that there be a
prior hearing on the question of necessity before immediate possession can be
granted the Republic of the Philippines.  That is an untenable stand.  There is no such requirement in Presidential
Decree No. 42.  As noted in the assailed
order, the defenses raised by petitioner in their opposition to the motion for
immediate possession could be considered in the trial on the merits.  The Decree is plain and explicit.  All that is required is notice to the owner
of the property sought to be condemned. 
Petitioners were duly notified. 
They were so informed upon the filing of the complaint by the Republic
of the Philippines
on October 25, 1976.^[16]
They received copy of the manifestation and motion for immediate possession
dated November 10, 1976.^[17]
As a matter of fact, in a pleading dated November 17, 1976, they presented an urgent ex-parte motion to defer resolution on writ of possession.^[18]
The order of respondent Judge of November
24, 1976 was agreeable to such manifestation and motion deferring a
ruling on the plea for immediate possession until it could be shown that the
requirements of both Presidential Decrees Nos. 42 and 76 have been complied
with.^[19]
There was a motion for reconsideration dated November 26, 1976 by the Republic of the Philippines.^[20]
Petitioners again filed their own opposition to such motion on December 2, 1976.^[21]
Again, respondent Judge held in abeyance the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration until after an ocular inspection as set forth in an order of December 3, 1976.^[22]
Even after such an ocular inspection, there was another order from respondent
Judge of December 8, 1976 holding in abeyance the action on the motion for
reconsideration by the Republic of the Philippines to enable it to have an
immediate possession until an amended estimate of the cost of damages on the
property have been submitted by the Republic of the Philippines.^[23]
Then came such data in a manifestation and motion filed by the Republic of the Philippines
on December 15, 1976
wherein it asked that an order be issued authorizing it to take possession of
the property sought to be condemned.^[24]
On December 27, 1976, an
opposition was filed by petitioners.^[25]
It was not until January 26, 1977,
long after the plea for possession, that the assailed order was issued.  Any assertion, therefore, that the require­ments
of Presidential Decree No. 42 were not complied with before the order for
possession was issued would be absolutely bereft of any support either in fact
or in law.

2. Nonetheless, petitioners, in pleading after pleading, both in
the lower court and with this Tribunal, reiterate their stand that there should
be a prior
hearing before an order for immediate possession could be issued.  Ostensibly, support is derived from two
judicial decisions, Urban Estates, Inc. v. Montesa^[26] and
Republic of the Philippines
v. La Order de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas.^[27]
Neither case is applicable.  The opening
paragraph of the Urban Estates decision reads as follows:  “This case, brought here on appeal from
an order of Judge Agustin P. Montesa denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss, concerns the authority of the City of Manila
to expropriate a
tract of land situated within the city limits and having an area of
49,553.10 square meters; more or less.”^[28]
Moreover, as stressed in the opinion of the ponente,
Justice Tuazon, the question deals with the power of
the government to condemn “urban private lands for subdivision or resale
to private persons * * *.”^[29]
Since such an issue had previously been passed upon in the leading case of
Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,^[30]
De Borja v. Commonwealth of the Philippines,^[31] and Arellano Law Colleges v. City of
Manila,^[32]
he stressed that “the question is no longer open, at least as far as
inferior courts are concerned.”^[33]
Nor could petitioners derive comfort from the Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos
decision.  For as expressly set forth in
the opinion of Justice Dizon, there was an order
“authorizing appellant [Republic of the Philippines]
to take immediate possession [of the property in question] upon depositing said
amount.”^[34]

3. What cannot be sufficiently stressed is that there being a
compliance with Presidential Decrees which now constitute part of the law of
the land and there being no claim that such decrees are violative of any constitutional
provision, it follows that respondent Judge is not susceptible to the
accusation of acting either in excess or with grave abuse of discretion when
all that she did was to comply. 
Moreover, as noted at the outset, the assailed order is in conformity
with the aforesaid Arce v. Genato
decision, the facts of which are controlling. 
As a matter of law, the position taken by respondent Judge is even less
vulnerable as the plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines,
seeking to expropriate property not only of petitioners but of others to
construct a much-needed national highway. 
All that respondent Judge did was to implement the applicable decrees
and thus assure that no judicial obstacle be placed to the governmental efforts
aimed at completing infrastructure projects to assure economic growth and
development.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed.  Costs against petitioners.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The basic order is Presidential Decree No. 42 (1972).  Presidential Decree No. 76 (1972) requires
natural or juridical persons owning or administering real property, including
the improvements thereon to file sworn state­ment of the true value of such
property.  It is provided in Section 1
thereof:  “For purposes of just
compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public
use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner
or administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor, which­ever
is lower.”

^[2]
Petition, Annex A.

^[3]
L-40587, February 27, 1976,
69 SCRA 544.

^[4]
Ibid, 547-548.

^[5]
Petition, Annex B, par. VII.

^[6]
Ibid, par. VIII.

^[7]
Ibid, par. IX.

^[8]
Ibid, Prayer.

^[9]
Ibid, Annex C.

^[10]
Ibid, Annex D.

^[11]
Ibid, Annex E.

^[12]
Ibid, Annex J.

^[13]
Ibid, Annex K.

^[14]
Ibid, Annex L.

^[15]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino.

^[16]
Petition, Annex B.

^[17]
Ibid, Annex C.

^[18]
Ibid, Annex D.

^[19]
Ibid, Annex E.

^[20]
Ibid, Annex F.

^[21]
Ibid, Annex G.

^[22]
Ibid, Annex H.

^[23]
Ibid, Annex J.

^[24]
Ibid, Annex K.

^[25]
Ibid, Annex L.

^[26]
88 Phil. 348 (1951).

^[27]
111 Phil. 230 (1961).

^[28]
88 Phil. 348, 349.

^[29]
Ibid, 351.

^[30]
84 Phil. 847 (1949).

^[31]
85 Phil. 51 (1949).

^[32]
85 Phil. 663 (1950).

^[33]
88 Phil. 348, 351.

^[34]
111 Phil. 230, 231.  The amount is in the
sum of P270,000.00.