PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO ALBAN ALIAS FRED, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. ALFREDO ALBAN ALIAS FRED, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

People versus Alban

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Alfredo Alban, also known as Fred, for the killing of Teofilo Boado. The accused was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance of La Union and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with an order to pay indemnity of 6,000 pesos and the costs. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers in one decision several doctrines tested again and again in criminal law and evidence: the requirements of a valid alibi, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise, and the deference appellate courts give to the trial court's findings on credibility.

Procedural History

The accused was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of La Union. After trial, that court rendered a judgment of conviction, finding him guilty of murder and imposing reclusion perpetua, together with an indemnity of 6,000 pesos and the costs. The accused appealed from that judgment directly to the Supreme Court. The appeal raised no question of law; it turned entirely on the credibility of the witnesses and on the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court reviewed the record, adopted the factual findings of the trial court, and affirmed the conviction, with costs against the appellant.

Facts

At around eight o'clock on the night of July 16, 1956, two men with handkerchiefs covering their faces below the eyes climbed up the house of Teofilo Boado in barrio San Julian, Agoo, La Union. Teofilo and his wife Marcela Dacanay had gone to sleep and were awakened by the intruders. Marcela rose and lighted two kerosene lamps. Carrying one of the lamps, she went to the dining room, where she met the two men. As they advanced toward her husband, Marcela recognized the appellant as one of them, even with the handkerchief masking the lower part of his face. The appellant held a small white gun. Suddenly Marcela heard shots. Turning, she saw her husband fall to the floor. She rushed to him, lifted him onto a mat, and shouted for help.

Help came quickly, among them Sergeant Silvestre Boado and Patrolman Francisco Balancio. As the victim was being assisted, he spoke, saying that they should arrest Fred, the son of Juan and Paer, because he was the one who shot him. The victim was brought to a hospital in Agoo and attended to by a physician. Two policemen were sent to apprehend the appellant, who was found in the house of his uncle Dionisio Boado in the same barrio and taken to the municipal building. Later the victim was transferred to another hospital in San Fernando for blood transfusion, where he expired not long after. Earlier that night, Patrolman Balancio took down the victim's statement in Ilocano. It was translated into English as follows: that Fred, the son of Juan and Paer, was the one who shot him, and that his companion was thin and small but could not be recognized. Because of the victim's condition, and upon the advice of the attending physician, the statement was not signed by him.

The defense was alibi. The appellant claimed that from about seven thirty to eight thirty that night he was in the house of Felino Dumo in the same barrio, listening to a radio program while waiting for the family to finish supper. When he left, the program was still on, and he crossed the street to the house of his uncle Dionisio Boado, took his supper, smoked a cigarette, and retired. Later he was awakened by his sister when two policemen came looking for him at around ten o'clock. He went with them willingly. At the municipal building, Sergeant Boado pointed at him and told him not to talk because, verbally speaking, he had shot old man Pelo. He slept that night in the office of the chief of police and was investigated the next day by two Constabulary men.

Issues

• Whether or not the appellant's alibi can overcome the clear, positive, and straightforward testimony of the victim's wife, who recognized and identified him as the assailant.
• Whether or not the victim's outcry naming his assailant immediately after he was shot is admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Whether or not the appellant's alleged inability to handle a gun because of missing fingers, and the failure to give him a paraffin test, create reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the absence of proof of motive prevents conviction.
• Whether or not the killing is murder qualified by treachery, attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the settled rule on alibi, which the Court states as follows:

To establish an alibi, a defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place about the time of the alleged crime, but also that he was at such other place for so long a time, that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either before or after the time he was at such other place.

This rule bears on the case because the appellant proved only his presence in the same barrio, not the physical impossibility of being at the scene, which the appellant himself placed only 500 meters away.

The decision also applies the rule on the review of credibility findings, stated as follows:

Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it is shown that it has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

This rule bears on the case because the appeal presented no issue of law, only questions of credibility, and the trial judge had made a complete analysis of the testimonies of all the witnesses.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the alibi was weak and unconvincing. It could not overcome the clear, positive, and straightforward testimony of Marcela Dacanay, who had seen the appellant on two prior occasions. The mask below his eyes did not sufficiently hide his identity because of his exposed forehead and physical appearance, and the two kerosene lamps sufficiently lighted the house for the widow to recognize him. Even granting that he was at his uncle's house that night, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene and to have committed the crime, since the distance was only 500 meters. The Court also noted that the defense gave no valid reason why the widow would perjure herself against the appellant.

On the second issue, the Court held that the victim's outcry naming his assailant immediately after being shot was part of the res gestae. The trial court's observation, which the Court adopted, was that the statement was made when the deceased had no time or opportunity to concoct and contrive any falsehood, and that under his mental and physical condition the statement was spontaneous and reflected the truth. The Court added that the deceased had ample opportunity to know and identify the appellant: they were residents of the same barrio, they were related, the appellant came to the barrio from Manila from time to time, and on the very afternoon before the killing they had both been in a store in the barrio. The deceased had no grudge against the appellant that would move him to impute so grave a crime falsely.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that it was not difficult to squeeze the trigger with the remaining fingers of the right hand, and that if the right hand was not used, the appellant could have used his left. The widow could have mistakenly referred to the right hand, given the exciting conditions of the incident. As to the paraffin test, its non-accomplishment did not weaken the prosecution, because there was already sufficient identification of the appellant as the one who shot the deceased.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that while motive should be proven whenever possible, it is not absolutely necessary and indispensable where the evidence is such as to justify a conviction. The identification by the deceased and the widow warranted conviction and rendered proof of motive unnecessary.

On the fifth issue, the Court found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery, because he shot the victim, who was unarmed, suddenly and without any warning, thereby insuring the accomplishment of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim might have offered. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime, and no mitigating circumstance offset them. However, for lack of the required number of votes, the maximum penalty of death could not be imposed.

Doctrine

First, alibi is a defense of physical impossibility. The accused must show not only that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime, but that he was at such other place for so long a time that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene, either before or after. Presence in the same barrio, a short distance away, is not enough.

Second, a spontaneous statement made by a dying victim naming his assailant immediately after the attack, with no time or opportunity to concoct a falsehood, is admissible as part of the res gestae. It is trustworthy precisely because it is spontaneous and reflects the truth.

Third, where the issue is credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, which saw and heard the witnesses and observed their deportment, unless it overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result.

Fourth, motive is not an indispensable element of the crime. It aids in completing proof, but where the evidence, such as positive identification by the victim and an eyewitness, justifies conviction, proof of motive is not necessary.

Fifth, treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the offender shoots an unarmed victim suddenly and without warning, insuring the accomplishment of the crime without risk to himself from any defense the victim might offer. Dwelling and use of disguise are aggravating circumstances.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with indemnity of 6,000 pesos, and with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

Memorize the alibi rule: the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene, not merely that he was somewhere else nearby. Examiners use this case for the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, for the deference given to trial courts on credibility, and for the rule that motive is not indispensable where identification is positive.