G.R. No. L-28328. December 29, 1967
NICANOR C. IBUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER/AND BOARD OF CANVASSERS, SAN JUAN, RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, J.:
The scope of the power of the Commission on Elections to appoint
members of the municipal board of canvassers to replace those councilors who
are candidates is to be inquired into in this certiorari proceeding. The law provides: “The municipal council shall constitute
the municipal board of canvassers, excluding the members who are candidates and
who shall be replaced by the ComÂmission on Elections with registered voters of
the same party.”[1]
Petitioner Nicanor C. Ibuna, as chairman of the local NacionaÂlista
Party of San Juan, Rizal, impugned the appointment of
one Cesar Advincula, a Liberal, to the municipal
board of canvassers of San Juan to
replace Calixto Dungo, who
was elected in 1963, his certificate of candidacy then showing that he was a Nacionalista running as an independent. He was a candidate anew in 1967, his
certificate of candidacy categorically stating “that he belongs” to
the “Nacionalista Party”.[2]
The appointment by respondent ComÂmission on Elections of one Arturo Casanova,
also a Liberal, to such board of canvassers in place of Arturo de Guzman, was
likeÂwise challenged. De Guzman was
elected councilor in 1963, his certificate of
candidacy was to the effect that he was then a NacionaÂlista. His certificate of candidacy when he ran for reelection
in 1967 was not made a part of the petition presumably because he had by that
time affiliated with the Liberal Party, according to the answer of the
respondent Commission on Elections.
It is the stand of respondent that such a change of party affiliation
rendered valid the aforesaid choice of a Liberal in place of Councilor de
Guzman. As for Councilor Dungo, respondent Commission on Elections defended its
action on the allegation that the person named by it was the one recommended by
him, there being on his part an express objection to the nominee of petitioner Ibuna. “The party representation, as a matter of
Commission’s policy, must be preserved.
But in the absence of any party, then the candidate himself shall have
the choice to recommend his replacement.” For as
the Commission stated: “When Mr. Dungo was elected in 1963, but proclaimed in September 9, 1967 and assumed office
thereafter, he was still [an] independent candidate.”[3]
1. As to the case of the replacement of Councilor Dungo, it being clear from his certificates of candidacy
that both in 1963 and in 1967, he was a Nacionalista,
the appointment of a person who is not a registered voter of such party finds
no support in the law. If it were true
that his certificate of candidacy indicated the absence of any party as was the
thinking of respondent Commission, then perhaps the discretionary power vested
in the Commission could have afforded a colorable justification for the choice
of the person named to replace him, who admittedly was not a member of the Nacionalista Party.
Such is not the case however, and the statutory provision is
quite explicit. Congress having
pronounced its will, it is the duty of the Commission to obey. To paraphrase the opinion of the then,
Justice now Chief Justice, Concepcion, in Abcede v. Imperial,[4]
the question of policy is for Congress not the Commission to decide. If it is in disagreement with what the law
requires, the remedy is to call the attention of the legislative body with such
suggestion or proposal for change as it may deem best. While recognizing then that it acted in good
faith, it appears undeniable that in thus choosing a person not a registered
voter of the same party, respondent Commission acted “beyond the bounds of
its jurisdiction.”
In another decision through the then Chief Justice Moran, this
Court stated: “The functions and
powers of the Commission on Elections are limited by law. It has no legislative power to change or
modify the law, nor may such power be delegated to the ComÂmission. In the instant case, the action taken by the
Commission on Elections finds no support in law.”[5]
A word more. Respondent Commission in its choice of
replaceÂment is not restricted to the person or persons recommended by
petitioner as chairman of the Nacionalista Party in San
Juan. All that
the law requires is that its appointee is a registered voter of such party.
2. In connection with the
replacement of Councilor de Guzman who was elected in 1963 as a Nacionalista but who thereafter became a Liberal, there is
no unanimity of opinion among the members of the Court concerning the validity
of the action taken by the ComÂmission.
It is the majority view however that what the Commission did was
in accordance with the literal language of the law, which speaks of excluding
from the municipal board of canvassers “the members who are candidates and
who shall be replaced by the Commission on Elections with registered voters of
the same party.” As of the time of the disqualification of Councilor De Guzman,
he was a member of the Liberal Party; his replacement should therefore be a
regisÂtered voter of such party.
As was declared by this Court in a 1913 decision, its first and
fundamental duty is to apply the law. “Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.”[6]
Moreover, if the choice were made to fall on a person belonging to a different
party, then it might upset the balance of power unnecessarily. Such an approach likewise is indicated by Cunanan v. Tan,[7]
where this Court implied that changes of a perÂmanent character as to
membership in political parties in the House of Representatives would not be
denied recognition in the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
A minority of this Court, Justices Zaldivar,
Sanchez, and the writer of this opinion, is of the belief, however, that the
language of the law is not sufficiently plain and explicit to call for only one
interpretation. To paraphrase Cardozo, there are gaps to be filled and ambiguities to be
cleared. It is the thinking of this
group that if the time that determines the party status of the replacement is
the date of the disqualification and not the date of the election, then added
encouragement would be given elective officials who for reasons of their own
are not averse to changing parties.
Under the circumstances, an interpretation that would affix the stamp of
approval on councilors becoming turncoats would hinder rather than promote
party solidarity and strength as seemed to be envisioned both in the
Constitution and the Election Code.
Moreover, the right to the replacement should be looked upon as
appertaining not to the candidate but to the party, without
whose help in the first place he could not have been elected.
There is no question however but that the language of Section 167
could be rendered much more explicit so that it may be crystal clear and free
from doubt. It is to be admitted also
that in the light of previous decisions, such task has been thought of as
properly apperÂtaining to the legislative branch of the government.
WHEREFORE, the appointment of Arturo Casanova to replace
Arturo de Guzman in the municipal board of canvassers of San
Juan, Rizal is sustained,
and the appointment of Cesar Advincula to such board
to replace Councilor Calixto Dungo
nullified. The restraining order is
lifted to enable respondent Commission on Elections to act in accordance with
the opinion of this Court. The
replacement of Councilor Dungo having been chosen,
the board of canvassers of San Juan, Rizal as
reconstituted shall proceed according to law.
All proceedings of the board of canvassers of the Municipality
of San Juan, Rizal
where Cesar Advincula acted are declared null and
void. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
[1] Sec. 167 (a).
[2]
Annexes D and E, Petition.
[3]
Answer.
[4] 103 Phil. 136 (1958).
[5]
Cortez v. Commission on Elections (1947) 79 Phil. 352, 355-356.
[6] Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap
Tico, 24 Phil. 504. See also People v. Mapa, L-22301, August 13, 1967.
[7]
L-19721, May 10, 1962.