ANTOLIN GALENO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. REINERIO TICAO IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF ILOILO, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Galeno versus Ticao

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus filed by Antolin Galeno against Reinerio Ticao, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Iloilo. Galeno asks the Court to compel the Mayor to prefer administrative charges before the City Board against a captain of detectives of the Iloilo City police force. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between a duty the law commands and a discretion the law confers: it teaches that a city mayor does not act ministerially at the mere request of a private complainant, and that mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of judgment. It also illustrates how a supervening statute can render a live controversy academic.

Procedural History

Galeno filed the petition for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, presided over by Judge F. Imperial Reyes. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision on November 20, 1963, dismissing the petition. Galeno appealed that dismissal directly to the Supreme Court, and the appeal is the matter resolved here.

Facts

On October 16, 1962, Antolin Galeno wrote the City Board of Iloilo complaining against Detective Captain Emeterio Verde for grave misconduct as a police officer, arising from an incident between them on the afternoon of October 8, 1962. The letter was not under oath and was not accompanied by any sworn statement. A copy was furnished to the respondent City Mayor, and the City Board, by resolution, forwarded the letter to the Mayor requesting appropriate action. On November 1, 1962, the Mayor endorsed the letter to the Chief of Police, directing Captain Rafael D. Lavente, Chief of the Patrol Division and Legal Officer, to investigate. Captain Lavente investigated and, in a report dated November 6, 1962, recommended dismissal of the complaint.

On November 27, 1962, Galeno sent the Mayor an amended letter-complaint, this time under oath but still unaccompanied by any sworn statement. On November 28, the Mayor replied, attaching Captain Lavente's report. On November 29, through Attorney German Lopez, Galeno questioned why the complaint had been endorsed to the police legal officer instead of the City Board, complained that he had not been heard by Captain Lavente, and formally requested that administrative charges be preferred against Captain Verde. The record also shows that on October 8, 1962, Galeno had filed a criminal complaint for threats and slander against Captain Verde before the City Fiscal, which Assistant City Fiscal Vicente P. Gengos dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On December 10, 1962, the Mayor refused, stating that no administrative case against any member of the Iloilo City Police Force could be filed without first ascertaining the truth of the complaint, unless the member had been accused in court of a felony or violation of law, and noting both the police investigation report recommending dismissal and the Fiscal's dismissal. Galeno then filed the petition for mandamus on January 22, 1963, praying that the Mayor be ordered to prefer charges or endorse the sworn complaint to the City Board, plus moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

Issues

• Whether or not, under Section 1 of Republic Act 557, the city mayor is under a mandatory duty to prefer charges against a city police officer with the city council upon the mere filing of a complaint by any person.
• Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the city mayor to prefer such charges.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Republic Act 557, the statute in force when the complaint arose, provides:

Members of the provincial guards, city police and municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be discharged, except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty, and in such cases charges shall be preferred by the provincial governor in matters against any member of the provincial guards, the city mayor in cases against a member of the city police, and the municipal mayor in cases involving a member of the municipal police, and investigated by the provincial board, the city or municipal council, as the case may be, in public hearing, and the accused shall be given opportunity to make their defense.

This is the provision the Court construes, and its silence on any right of a private citizen to compel the filing of charges is the heart of the ruling.

Section 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code, the antecedent provision, provided:

Members of the municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be discharged except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty and in such cases charges shall be preferred under oath by the mayor or by any other person and investigated by the municipal council, or a committee of three councilors, designated for said purpose by a majority of the council, in public hearing and the accused shall be given opportunity to make their defense.

The Court compares the two texts and treats the omission of the phrase allowing charges by any other person as significant.

Section 14 of Republic Act 4864, the Police Act of 1966, which repealed Republic Act 557, provides:

Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided, for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law.

This provision, with Section 15 creating the Board of Investigators, supplies the new procedure and renders the old question academic.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the duty is not mandatory. It fully concurs with the trial court, which reasoned that whereas under Section 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code any citizen could prefer charges against a policeman, that faculty was omitted from Section 1 of Republic Act 557, and the omission is significant: Congress thereby sought to spare a policeman from the annoyance of malicious, arbitrary, and unmeritorious charges. The Mayor cannot be reduced to a mere instrument of a citizen, obliged to file charges without even ascertaining whether the complaint is meritorious. The Court also notes the opinion of the Head of the Local Governments and Civil Affairs Office of the Office of the President that whether a city mayor should file a complaint with the Municipal Board is for him to decide, as he is vested exclusively by Republic Act 557 with that discretion.

On the second issue, because the duty is discretionary and not ministerial, mandamus will not lie. The trial court further observed that Galeno had not exhausted administrative remedies by resorting to the Office of the President before filing suit. The Court, however, adds a crucial qualification: the procedure under Section 1 of Republic Act 557 is no longer followed, because that Act was repealed by the Police Act of 1966, enacted on September 8, 1966, which now governs through its Sections 14 and 15.

Doctrine

A bar candidate should retain these rules. First, mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, one enjoined by law upon a public officer where no judgment or discretion is allowed; it will not issue to control discretion. Second, under Section 1 of Republic Act 557, the city mayor's authority to prefer charges against a member of the city police is discretionary, not ministerial, and a private citizen's complaint does not oblige him to file charges without first ascertaining their merit. Third, the deliberate omission in Republic Act 557 of the phrase allowing charges by any other person, found in Section 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code, is a legislative choice to protect police officers from baseless complaints. Fourth, a supervening statute repealing the law under which the action arose may render the ruling academic, though the judgment may still be affirmed.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, declaring that the ruling on the preferment of charges may now be considered academic because of the repeal of Republic Act 557 by the Police Act of 1966, with costs against the petitioner.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the city mayor's power to prefer charges against a city police officer is discretionary, so mandamus will not lie to compel it. Examiners use this case to test the ministerial versus discretionary duty distinction, the requisites of mandamus, and the effect of a supervening repeal on a pending controversy.