BENITO ARTUYO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO GONZALVES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the present case, which has been certified to Us
by the Court of Appeals, only questions of law being raised therein.

On September 5, 1956,
Benito Artuyo filed, with Regional Office No. 3 of
the Department of Labor, Case No. L03-6722 thereof, against the American
International Underwriters of the Philippines, Inc. – hereafter referred to as
the Company – and Francisco Gonzalves, to recover
compensation for overtime services allegedly rendered to said defendants from
January 1950 to August 9, 1956, in addition to hospitalization expenses, and –
by amendment, made on October 13, 1956 – compensation for work done on Sundays
and other legal holidays.  On November 29, 1956, defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint, which the Regional Office granted on February 27, 1957.  A motion for reconsideration having been
filed by Artuyo, on March 12, 1957, the Regional Office advised his counsel,
on March 18, 1957, to file
a formal complaint with the Hearing Section of said Office.

Artuyo did so, on April 24, 1958, his formal
complaint having been docketed as Case No. 1307 of the Regional Office.  On June
4, 1958, the defendants sought to dismiss the case,
upon the ground of prescription, which, on August 21, 1958, was favorably acted upon by the Regional
Office.  On October 4, 1958, Artuyo appealed from the order of dismissal to the Labor
Standards Commission, which, on May
14, 1959, reversed said order and remanded the case
to the Regional Office for further proceedings. 
The defendants appealed, however, to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in which the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 40544.  At the hearing thereof, on
September 26, 1960, while Artuyo was introducing
evidence on his services from January 1950 to August 1956, counsel for the
Company objected thereto, invoking Section 7-A of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
pursuant to which, actions under said Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1993,
shall be barred unless commenced within three (3) years after accrual of the
cause of action.  The objection was
sustained and Artuyo was not allowed to present
evidence, except for services rendered within three (3) years before the filing
of the complaint, on April 24, 1958.  A motion for the reconsideration of the order
to this effect was denied on January
17, 1961.  A second motion
for re­consideration of Artuyo had, on April 15, 1961, the same fate.

Accordingly,
Artuyo filed with the Supreme Court a petition
docketed as Case G. R. No. L-19505, for a writ of certiorari and mandamus,
to set aside the orders of the Court of First Instance dated September 26, 1960 and January 17,
and April 15, 1961.  On March
8, 1962, this Court certified said petition to the
Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30622-R.  Said appellate court rendered judgment, on September 29, 1962, in favor of Artuyo, allowing him to introduce evidence on his claim for
overtime compensation beginning from January 1950.  The defendants sought a review of said judgment
by this Court (G. R. No. L-20399), which, on August 23, 1963,
denied the petition for review, for lack of merit.

Back to the court of first instance, pursuant to the decision of
the Court of Appeals, on November 29, 1963, the former court dismissed Civil
Case No. 40544, for want of appellate jurisdiction over the case, upon the
ground that the Labor Standards Commission and the Regional Office had no
original jurisdiction to hear Case No. 1307, under our ruling in Corominas v. Labor Standards Commission.^[1]
Accordingly, on February 15, 1964,
Artuyo filed, with the court of first instance, the
complaint in the pre­sent action, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
56254.  On February 27, 1964, defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint, upon the ground of lack of cause of action, against Gonzalves, and of prescription, as regards the
Company.  The motion having been denied,
on April 15, 1964, the
defendants filed their answer on April
24, 1964.  Subsequently, or
on August 12, 1965, the
defendants moved for a reconsideration of the order of
April 15, 1964, which the
trial court granted, on September 25,
1965.  Hence, this appeal, in
which Artuyo maintains that the lower court
erred:  (1) in not holding that its order
of dismissal dated April 15, 1964 had become final, long before the defendants
had moved for its reconsideration, on August 12, 1965; (2) in finding that Artuyo had no cause of action against Gonzalves;
and (3) in holding that the cause of action against the Company is barred by
the statute of limitations.

The first contention is manifestly devoid of merit, for the order
of April 15, 1964, denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration, is
interlocutory in nature^[2]
and, not being appealable, independently of the
decision on the merits, which has not been rendered, as yet, could not and has
not become final.^[3]

As
regards the second issue, it is worthy of notice that, al­though plaintiff’s
complaint alleges that Gonzalves had engaged his
services acting as agent or representative of the Company, of which he is its
Vice-President, the answer filed by Gonzalves avers
that the services of Artuyo were engaged by him in
his personal capacity, from January 15, 1950 to December 1950; that in January 1951, Artuyo was employed by the
Company as its driver, although in April 1951, there was a change in the policy
of the Company, pursuant to which drivers ceased to be its employees and
reverted to their former status as domestic drivers; that, while Artuyo was such domestic driver, he drove for local of­ficials
of the Company and other officials thereof who came on periodic visits to the
Philippines; that Artuyo received a Christ­mas gift,
in money, from the Company and that he had, moreover, been
allowed to join the Company employees in their group, insurance policy.

Thus, although under his complaint Artuyo
might have no cause of action against Gonzalves, the
latter’s own answer indi­cates the contrary. In fact, said answer suggests that
Artuyo‘ s status as
a driver was rather peculiar, in that,
although he was, at given times, a domestic driver of Gonzalves,
he, likewise, drove other officials of the Company, received a Christmas bonus therefrom and participated in the group insurance of its
employees.  Under these circumstances, it
is understandable, that he sued both as alternative defendants.  In other words, it is not indubitable from
the record that Artuyo has no cause of action against
Gonzal­ves, so that the lower court should have
denied the motion to dismiss, insofar as Gonzalves is
concerned, without prejudice to passing upon the existence or inexistence of a
cause of action against the latter in the decision that may, in due course, be
rendered on the merits.^[4]

On the third issue, the lower court found that Artuyo’s action against the Company is barred by the
statute of limitations, more than three (3) years having elapsed from August 9, 1956 to February 15, 1964, when the present case was
instituted.  It should be noted, however,
that the first complaint against the defendants, or Case No. L03-6722 of
Regional Office No. 3, was filed by Artuyo as early as September
5, 1956, or less than a month after his services to the defendants
had ceased.  Although the proceedings in
connection therewith, seemingly, ended sometime in 1957, when the Regional
Office advised Artuyo’s counsel to file a formal
complaint with the Hearing Section of said Office, such complaint was filed on
April 24, 1958 and docketed as Case No. 1307 of the Office.  As above indicated, the defendants appealed
this case to the court of first instance – where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. 40544 – whose action was the object of a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the Supreme Court; the latter certified the case to the Court of Appeals,
which decided it on September 29, 1962, in favor of Artuyo;
and defendants’ petition for review of said decision of the Court of Appeals
was denied by the Supreme Court on August 23, 1963.  Civil Case No. 40544 was, however, dismissed
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, on November 29, 1963, upon the ground
that it had acquired no appellate jurisdiction over Artuyo‘ s claim, the Labor
Standards Commission and the Regional Office having been without original
jurisdiction to hear Artuyo’s claim in Case No. 1307
of said office, according to the decision of this Court in the Corominas case.  As
early as December 28, 1961,
We have, however, held^[5]
that the filing of the claim with the Regional Office had the effect of
interrupting the prescriptive period embodied in Republic Act No. 1993, even if
said Office had subsequently been held to be without original jurisdiction over
said claim.  This doctrine was reiterated
in 1962,^[6]
in 1967,^[7]
in 1968^[8]
and even as late as March 1969.^[9]

Deducting the period from September
5, 1956 to March 1957, when the proceedings relative to Case No.
L03-6722 were pending, and then from April 24, 1958, when Artuyo
filed Case No. 1307 of the Regional Office, to November 29, 1963, when the
court of first instance dismissed Case No. 40544, the result is that said
period of three (3) years had not expired when the case at bar was com­menced on February 15, 1964.

Furthermore, Section 7-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by Republic Act 1993, explicitly provides
that actions already commenced before the effective date of said Act – June 22, 1957 – shall not be affected by the period of three (3) years
therein prescribed.  Artuyo’s
claim for overtime compensation is well within the purview of this proviso,
said claim having been pending since September 5, 1956.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order
of dismissal should be, as it is hereby reversed, and the record remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings, consistently with this decision.  Costs of this instance
against the defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., on leave, did not
take part.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
L-14837, June 30, 1961.

^[2]
Yu Goat v. Hugo,
L-4842, August
20, 1953; Lopez v. Vda. de
Tinio, L-6005, December 29, 1953; Harrison Foundry & Machinery v. Harrison Foundry Workers’ Ass.,
L-18432, June 29, 1963.

^[3]
Rule 41, section 2, Rules of Court; Astraquillo v. Javier, L-20034, Jan. 30, 1965; Warrington
v. De la Rama,
46 Phil. 881.

^[4]
Rule 16, Section 3, Rules of Court.

^[5]
Tiberio v. Manila
Pilots Assn., L-17661, Dec. 28, 1961.

^[6]
A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. v. Borja, L-17750, Aug. 31, 1962.

^[7]
Fernandez v. P. Cuerva
& Co., L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967.

^[8]
Luzon
Stevedoring v. Celorio,
L-22542, July
31, 1968.

^[9]
Agraviador v.
Court of Appeals, L-26487, March 28
1969.